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Abstract
The U.S. Department of State disseminates counter-radicalization information through
social media but has been unable to reach users due to an inability to create engaging
posts due to a lack of understanding of the interests of the general population. The purpose of this quantitative study was to assess the utility of data analytics when administering counter-radicalization social media campaigns. The population for this study were social media posts published on the Quilliam Facebook page between 1 January 2018 and
31 December 2018. The nonexperimental quantitative descriptive research design sought
to examine the correlation between the independent variables (topic of a post, use of visual aids in the post, and the geopolitical region the post addresses) and the dependent variables (resulting likes and shares). This study relied on the strategic choice theory which
argues that individuals perform a cost and benefit analysis when deciding to join a terrorist organization and commit acts of terrorism. Specifically, individuals are often interested in participating in terrorism in an effort to gain resources and feel a sense of belonging but can be dissuaded upon realization that terrorism can actually degrade their quality
of life. The research found that social media can be used as a tool to increase the perceived costs of terrorism and decrease the perceived benefits of terrorism. The study concluded that posts which involved a personal story emphasizing the ramifications of terrorism and included a video resulted in the highest number of likes and shares, respectively.
The findings provide a strong argument for utilizing data analytics to improve the dissemination of counter-radicalization information which could prevent individuals from
joining terrorist organizations and committing acts of terrorism.

Evaluating the Effectiveness of Counter-Narrative Tactics in Preventing Radicalization
By
Ellen Rose Berman

MA, American Military University, 2013
BS, University of Maryland, 2010

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy and Administration

Walden University
May 2019

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank her Committee Chair, Dr. John Walker, her Committee Member, Dr. Lance Spivey, and her University Research Reviewer, Dr. James
Frampton, for their invaluable comments and support during the writing phases of this
dissertation. She would also like to express her gratitude to the leadership of the Department of Defense which allowed her to pursue these research efforts and develop an expertise in terrorist recruitment. Finally, the author would like to thank her parents and
spouse who have displayed both patience and encouragement as she pursued her Bachelors, Masters, and Doctoral degrees.

Table of Contents
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................6
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................8
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study....................................................................................1
Background of the Study ...............................................................................................1
Problem Statement .........................................................................................................3
Purpose of the Study ......................................................................................................4
Research Question and Hypotheses ...............................................................................7
Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................................9
Social Movement Theory.......................................................................................11
Social Identity Theory............................................................................................12
Applying Social Movement and Social Identity Theories to Radicalization .........12
Communication Concepts ............................................................................................14
Targeted Information .............................................................................................14
Social Media Consumption ....................................................................................16
Nature of the Study ......................................................................................................18
Definitions....................................................................................................................19
Assumptions.................................................................................................................21
Scope and Delimitations ..............................................................................................22
Limitations ...................................................................................................................23
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................25
Significance to Theory and Practice ......................................................................26
I

Significance to Social Change ...............................................................................27
Summary ......................................................................................................................27
Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................29
Literature Search Strategy............................................................................................29
The History of Terrorist Recruitment ..........................................................................31
The Concept of Jihad .............................................................................................31
The Return of the Caliphate ...................................................................................32
The Process of Radicalization ................................................................................35
The Evolution of Terrorism .........................................................................................39
The Fall of Al-Qaeda .............................................................................................39
The Rise of the Islamic State .................................................................................41
Rejecting Extremism ..............................................................................................48
The Emergence of Social Media ..................................................................................52
The Internet as a Gateway to Radicalization .........................................................52
The Islamic State’s Messaging Tactics ..................................................................54
Attempted Solutions.....................................................................................................57
Immersive Deradicalization Programs ...................................................................57
Military Intervention ..............................................................................................60
The Muslim Ban ....................................................................................................63
Monitoring Social Media .......................................................................................64
A Failed Information Operation.............................................................................67
Competing Narratives and Counter-Narratives ...........................................................70
II

Phases of Radicalization to Focus On ....................................................................70
A Localized Approach ...........................................................................................74
Messaging Theories .....................................................................................................77
Creating the Illusion of Consensus with Constant Posting ....................................77
The Audience, Communicator, and Content..........................................................80
Summary and Conclusions ..........................................................................................85
Chapter 3: Research Method ..............................................................................................87
Research Design and Rationale ...................................................................................87
Methodology ................................................................................................................88
Population ..............................................................................................................92
Sampling and Sampling Procedures ......................................................................95
Procedures for Participation and Data Collection ................................................100
Data Analysis Plan ...............................................................................................104
Threats to Validity .....................................................................................................105
External Validity ..................................................................................................106
Internal Validity ...................................................................................................106
Content Validity, Empirical Validity, and Construct Validity ............................106
Ethical Procedures .....................................................................................................108
Summary ....................................................................................................................109
Chapter 4: Results ............................................................................................................110
Introduction ................................................................................................................110
Data Collection ..........................................................................................................110
III

Exclusion of Self-Promotional Posts ...................................................................111
Challenges Encountered When Coding Posts ......................................................112
Statistical Analysis .....................................................................................................113
Satisfying the Assumptions..................................................................................113
Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................119
Testing the Hypotheses ..............................................................................................124
Hypothesis 1.........................................................................................................129
Hypothesis 2.........................................................................................................131
Hypothesis 3.........................................................................................................133
Post Hoc Tests............................................................................................................135
Summary ....................................................................................................................139
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ..........................................140
Introduction ................................................................................................................140
Discussion of Findings ...............................................................................................141
The Most Liked and Shared Posts .......................................................................142
Genuine Public Figures ........................................................................................144
Local Messaging ..................................................................................................147
Limitations of the Study.............................................................................................147
Other Factors Effecting Outreach ........................................................................148
Lurkers .................................................................................................................149
Re-posts................................................................................................................150
Policy and Social Change Implications .....................................................................150
IV

Intervention ..........................................................................................................151
Prevention ............................................................................................................152
Recommendations for Further Study .........................................................................153
Focused Content...................................................................................................153
Source Power .......................................................................................................155
Message Framing .................................................................................................155
Information that Can Trend and Deradicalize .....................................................157
Conclusions ................................................................................................................157
References ........................................................................................................................160
Appendix A: Facebook Data Policy ................................................................................173
I. What kinds of information do we collect?..............................................................173
II. How do we use this information? ..........................................................................174
III. How is this information shared? ..........................................................................176
IV. How do the Facebook Companies work together? ..............................................178
V. How can I manage or delete information about me? ............................................178
VI. How do we respond to legal requests or prevent harm? ......................................179
VII. How do we operate and transfer data as part of our global services? ................179
VIII. How will we notify you of changes to this policy?...........................................179
IX. How to contact Facebook with questions ............................................................179
Appendix B: Data Dispersion ..........................................................................................181

V

List of Tables
Table 1. Terrorist attacks and motive ............................................................................................. 9
Table 2. Criteria for coding ........................................................................................................... 24
Table 3. Independent variable data coding ................................................................................... 90
Table 4. Dependent variable constructs ........................................................................................ 90
Table 5. Facebook age demographics ........................................................................................... 93
Table 6. Countries with most Facebook rsage .............................................................................. 94
Table 7. American usage of Facebook .......................................................................................... 94
Table 8. Facebook gender demographics...................................................................................... 95
Table 9. Effect size ....................................................................................................................... 97
Table 10. Coding in Microsoft Excel 2016 example .................................................................. 104
Table 11. Tests of normality ....................................................................................................... 114
Table 12. CATEGORY residuals statistics ................................................................................. 115
Table 13. CONTENT residuals statistics ................................................................................. 116
Table 14. GEOPOLITICAL REGION residuals statistics ......................................................... 116
Table 15. Correlation .................................................................................................................. 117
Table 16. Box's test of equality of covariance vatrices ............................................................... 118
Table 17. Levene's test of equality of error variances ................................................................ 118
Table 18. Between-Subjects factors ............................................................................................ 119
Table 19. Descriptive statistics ................................................................................................... 120
Table 20. Multivariate tests......................................................................................................... 125
Table 21. Tests of between-subjects effects ............................................................................... 128
VI

Table 22, CATEGORY contrast results (k matrix) .................................................................... 130
Table 23. CATEGORY multivariate test results ........................................................................ 131
Table 24. CATEGORY multivariate test results ....................................................................... 131
Table 25. CONTENT contrast results (k matrix)........................................................................ 132
Table 26. CONTENT multivariate results .................................................................................. 133
Table 27. CONTENT univariate test results ............................................................................... 133
Table 28. Region contrast results (k matrix)............................................................................... 134
Table 29. REGION multivariate test results ............................................................................... 135
Table 30. REGION univariate test results .................................................................................. 135
Table 31. CATEGORY multiple comparisons ........................................................................... 136
Table 32. CATEGORY LIKES .................................................................................................. 137
Table 33. CATEGORY SHARES .............................................................................................. 138
Table 34. GEOPOLITICAL REGION multiple comparisons .................................................... 138
Table 35. Top 10 liked posts ....................................................................................................... 142
Table 36. Top 10 shared posts .................................................................................................... 143

VII

List of Figures
Figure 1. Quilliam Facebook page .................................................................................................. 7
Figure 2. Quilliam newsfeed ........................................................................................................... 7
Figure 3. Sykes Picot agreement ................................................................................................... 34
Figure 4. 2017 Terrorist attacks .................................................................................................... 96
Figure 5. G*Power sample size calculation. ............................................................................... 100
Figure 6. G*Power sample size and power plot. ........................................................................ 100
Figure 7. Facebook data usage policy. ........................................................................................ 101
Figure 8. Post example................................................................................................................ 103
Figure 9. Asia Bibi post .............................................................................................................. 146

VIII

1

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
On 15 April 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and Tamerian Tsarnaev, detonated two explosive
devices near the finish line of the Boston Marathon (Sinai, 2017). The brothers were motivated
to defend Islam and left a note stating that the bombings were retribution for U.S. military action
in the Middle East (Sinai, 2017). The brothers were not connected to any terrorist organizations
(Sinai, 2017). They were radicalized by listening to the thoughts and opinions of their friends
and family who were sympathetic to the jihad and viewing jihadist material on the internet (Sinai, 2017). The brothers chose the Boston Marathon because it was an upcoming event in their
area. Further, the brothers used instructions from Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine to create the explosive devices using a pressure cooker and fireworks (Sinai, 2017).
The Boston Marathon Bombing marked a substantial shift in global terrorist strategy. Attacks no longer required years of planning where known terrorists had to routinely communicate
to recruit followers, plan the attack (choose target, date, time, method, personnel, etc.), and acquire sophisticated weapons. Attacks are now executed by the inspired who require no contact
with known terrorists, minimal planning, and weapons comprised of household items. As a result, the historic approach to counterterrorism involving the intercept of communications to prevent attacks is quickly becoming obsolete.
Background of the Study
Over time, terrorism has evolved. From 1972-2002, terrorist organizations used directed
attacks where fighters traveled to the terrorist organization’s headquarters, completed extensive
training, and were given specific instructions to execute an attack that was meticulously planned.
From 2002-2010, terrorist organizations were forced to use enabled attacks because fighter
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could no longer travel to the Middle East to receive training. Terrorist organizations feared that
foreign governments would monitor fighters who return or send operatives to infiltrate their
ranks (Vidino, Marone, & Entenmann, 2017). In response to these changes, recruiters began
providing detailed information and instructions to fighters over the internet and occasionally deploying recruiters to meet with fighters to provide further assistance. After 2010, terrorist organizations began using inspired attacks because they believed that the communications of recruiters
were being heavily surveilled by various governments (Brantly, 2017). Recruiters began posting
general information and instructions about how to execute attacks to the masses through a range
of websites (Baaken & Schlegel, 2017).
The internet is a source of information and a means of communication that can also
enable spreading ideology and indoctrinating recruits. With the emergence of social media, a
growing number of citizens from Europe, Canada, and the United States are being provided
terrorist content and becoming radicalized. The majority of terrorist content on social media is
generated by the Islamic State which has over 50,000 affiliated accounts that average 200,000
posts a day (Berger & Morgan, 2015). Much of the progress is the result of between 500 and
2000 accounts, many of which are bots that simply repost Islamic State content so that it trends
(Berger & Morgan, 2015). The Islamic State uses many social media applications; such as
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Tumblr, Telegam, Kik, WhatsApp, and Surespot to
reach their target audience of males between the ages of 16 and 25 (Wilner & Rigato, 2017).
Many citizens are drawn to the Islamic State for religious, ideological, and material
reasons. Many fighters want to assist in the development of a caliphate for Muslims that is
governed by Sharia Law as they believe is stipulated in the Quran (Stacey, 2017). Other fighters

3

are drawn to the Islamic State because they want to be a part of a revolution that changes the
balance of power in the world. Some fighters are drawn to the Islamic State because of the
promises of a luxurious lifestyle which includes cars, houses, and multiple brides. Regardless of
the reason, the inspired no longer need to travel to the Middle East to learn how to plan and
execute an attack. Instead, they only need an internet connection. The Islamic State administers
countless social media sites which explain how to build a bomb, which gun to purchase for a
mass shooting, and where to drive a truck into a crowd of people (Stacey, 2017). The evolution
of terrorism from directed, to enabled, to inspired, attacks has made it impossible to detect
terrorists and uncover their plans; this, in turn, leaves governments to pursue another option –
counter-radicalization (Stacey, 2017).
Problem Statement
Most research on radicalization focuses on the recruitment of an individual to execute an
attack and ignores the factors that caused the individual to consider becoming involved in
terrorism. Researchers have not studied what is effective, or ineffective, at reaching the general
population with the intention of dissuading at-risk individuals from joining terrorist
organizations. What makes a person want to become involved with terrorism? What makes a
person plan a terrorist attack? What makes a person execute a terrorist attack? What can prevent
a person from completing each step? Questions, like these, all target the fundamental problem of
developing and disseminating information that can successfully prevent radicalization.
Radicalization is a process. It typically starts when people are frustrated with their
surroundings at a local or global level. The individuals then begin voicing their frustration to
friends and family who agree with them (van Eerten, Doosje, Konijn, de Graaf, & de Goede,
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2017). Once their perspective is validated, they begin searching for more information (usually
via the internet) that further affirms their beliefs that Islam is under attack, Islam must be
protected, and that it is their duty to protect Islam (van Eerten et al., 2017). The available
ideological information often also explains the benefits of joining a terrorist organization, which
often include things such as camaraderie, spouses, leadership who represent them and their
interests, a house, and a vehicle (Faria & Arce, 2005). Finally, there is a trigger; the individual
will experience a great injustice either at a community or global level resulting in a commitment
to the cause and encourage them to plan and execute an attack (Rowe & Saif, 2016). This study
will rely on the strategic choice approach as it focuses on the first stage of the radicalization
process where individuals begin discussing their frustration with friends and family and
searching for more information on the internet (van Eerten et al., 2017). The outcome of this
study is based on a statistical evaluation of a nongovernmental counter-radicalization social
media campaign to determine what types of information reach and engage the general user
population on social media.
Purpose of the Study
This quantitative study sought to assess the utility of data analytics when administering
counter-radicalization campaigns on social media. The descriptive design examined the
correlational relationship between the independent variables (CATEGORY, CONTENT, and
GEOPOLITICAL REGION) and the dependent variables (resulting LIKES and SHARES). The
findings provide a strong argument for utilizing data analytics when administering a counterradicalization social media campaign.
Several countries are in the process of administering counter-radicalization social media
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campaigns to prevent vulnerable populations from being recruited. The United Kingdom
administers Prevent Tragedies, Canada administers Extreme Dialogue, and the United States
administers, The Global Engagement Center. With under 20,000 followers for each account,
these governmental counter-radicalization social media campaigns are not reaching the general
population (Mazza, Monaci, & Taddeo, 2017). However, there are currently several
nongovernmental counter-radical social media campaigns that are gaining a following.
Quilliam is a Think Tank founded by Maajid Nawaz, Rashad Zaman Ali, and Ed Husain,
who are all former members of Hibut-Tahrir, an organization that has been accused of supporting
and participating in terrorist activity (Hamid, 2016). The absence of government involvement
and the founders illicit background has fostered a sense of credibility that has undoubtedly
contributed to its popularity (Hamid, 2016). After all, those with ties to terrorist activity are most
equipped to discuss terrorism. Their Facebook page has over 25,000 followers who routinely
like, share, and comment on the content posted (see Figure 1). The content posted emphasizes
the destruction being caused by religiously motivated terrorism and promotes a moderate
practice of the religion (see Figure 2).
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Note. From “Quilliam,” in Facebook [Group page]. Retrieved December 28, 2018, from
https://www.facebook.com/QuilliamInternational/
Figure 1. Quilliam Facebook page

Note. From “Quilliam,” in Facebook [Group page]. Retrieved December 28, 2018, from
https://www.facebook.com/QuilliamInternational/
Figure 2. Quilliam newsfeed
Research Question and Hypotheses
The study attempted to answer the following three questions to understand if certain posts
are more likely to trend on social media than others:
1. Are some categories of information posted on social media more appealing to the
general user population than others? If so, which categories of information posted on
social media are more appealing to the general user population than others?
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2. Are some content styles on social media more appealing to the general user
population than others? If so, which of the content styles on social media are more
appealing to the general user population than others?
3. Are some social media posts concerning geopolitical regions more appealing to the
general user population than others? If so, which geopolitical regions are more
appealing to the general user population than others?
Each post in the sample was coded based upon its CATEGORY (personal story, news
article, research/policy analysis, military defeats, religious doctrine), CONTENT (written status,
written status with a link to a website, written status with a video, written status with a
photograph), and GEOPOLITICAL REGION (West, Middle East, global, cyber). The dependent
variable was the effectiveness of the social media posting measured by the number of LIKES and
SHARES. The results led to the acceptance or rejections of the following null and alternate
hypotheses:

H01: The social media post CATEGORY of personal story will reach more social media
users than other categories.

Ha1: The social media post CATEGORY of personal story will not reach more social
media users than other categories.

H02: The social media post CONTENT of written status with a link to a website will
reach more social media users than other CONTENTs.
Ha2: The social media post CONTENT of written status with a link to a website will not
reach more social media users than other CONTENTs.
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H03: The social media post GEOPOLITICAL REGION of Middle East will reach more
social media users than other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs.
Ha3: The social media GEOPOLITICAL REGION of Middle East more social media
users than other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs.
Theoretical Framework
The field of terrorism is dominated by two overarching approaches. The first approach
claims that terrorists are psychopaths who choose to attack others due to mental abnormalities or
traumatic past experiences leading to mental challenges (Borum, 2011). This approach is insufficient because it is unable to explain the majority of attacks that have occurred over the last 2 decades. The 1995 Paris subway bombings, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, 2005 London
subway bombings, and 2015 coordinated Paris attacks were all found to be orchestrated by terrorist organizations which, afterwards, communicated the specific goals that the attacks were intended to achieve (see Table 1).
Table 1
Terrorist attacks and motive
Attack

Year

Paris Subway Bombing

1995

9/11

2001

Terrorist organization
Stated goal
responsible
Armed Islamic
To force France to end its
Group of Algeria
aid to Algeria’s military
rulers
Al Qaeda
Retribution for U.S. supporting:
-attacks on Muslims in
Somalia and Chechnya
-Indian oppression of
Muslims in Kashmir
-Israeli aggression against
Muslims in Lebanon
-the presence of U.S.
troops in Saudi Arabia
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London Subway
Bombing

2005

Al Qaeda

Coordinated Paris Attack

2015

The Islamic State

Retribution for the British
supporting:
-attacks on Muslims in
Chechnya
-oppression of Muslims
in Palestine
-military occupation of
Afghanistan and Iraq
-Revenge against
France’s participation in
the international coalition
to eliminate the Islamic
State
-To show the world that
the Islamic State’s reach
is not limited to the Middle East
-To recruit new followers

Note. From “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” by
M. Abrahams, 2008, International Security, 32(4), p. 78-105.

The second approach is the strategic choice approach, which asserts that attacks are used
as an instrument to achieve religious, social, political, and/or economic goals (Borum, 2011).
This approach assumes that terrorists and terrorist organizations are rational and perform a cost
and benefits analysis when making decisions (Borum, 2011). The strategic choice approach also
attempts to explain the dynamics within terrorist organizations as the individuals are concerned
with their own power and the group’s power, both of which can be a higher priority than ideological goals. The flaw in the strategic choice approach is that while terrorist organizations are
largely motivated by power, there are also other factors that play a role such as values, especially
when the terrorists involved are deeply religious (Borum, 2011).
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Social Movement Theory
The strategic choice approach laid the foundation for the social movement theory, which
has been used to explain how people become radicalized (Borum, 2011). The social movement
theory suggests that people are motivated to carry out or resist social change when they feel
deprived of resources. The creation of the social movement theory cannot be attributed to a
single philosopher but has been developed over the years by Davies who published Toward a
Theory of Revolution in 1962, Touraine who published Sociologie de l’action, in 1965, and C.
Tilly who published As Sociology Meets History in 1981. Davies argued that revolutions were
due to rising individual expectations and falling levels of perceived well-being (Davies, 1962).
Touraine (1965) and Tilly (1981) further explained that individuals will unite over their
disappointment with economic conditions and attempt to implement change, which results in a
social movement.
With the emergence of social media and its constant accessibility, individuals have
become keenly aware of their socioeconomic status. It only takes a few minutes to scroll through
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to see the lavish life of others and compare it to one’s own
circumstances. Terrorist organizations exploit this vulnerability by advertising the obtainment of
resources not only for themselves but for others who are like them (Boucek, 2011). These
resources are often social (i.e., camaraderie and spouses), political (i.e., leaders who represent
them and work towards their interests), and economic (i.e., jobs, houses, and cars). If the social
movement theory is true, then it is possible to prevent radicalization by improving social,
political, and economic living conditions in communities that encourage susceptible people to
ignore recruiters (Boucek, 2011)
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Social Identity Theory
The social identity theory builds upon the social movement theory by explaining that individual see themselves based on their knowledge of membership to a group. This understanding
is used to predict an individual’s and group’s behavior. The social identity theory was originally
formulated by Tajfel and Tuner in the 1970s and 1980s who published several papers. Tajfel independently published Inter-individual and Intergroup Behavior (Tajfel, 1978). Turner independently published Social Categorization and Social Discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm (Turner, 1978). Then, Tajfel and Turner jointly published The Social Identity Theory of
Intergroup Behavior (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Tajfel and Turner argued that if an individual
wants to enhance her self-image, she will change her perspective and actions to improve the status of the in-group and degrade the status of the out-group, essentially dividing the world into
“us” and “them” (Borum & Neer, 2017). Tajfel and Turner believed that this phenomenon is initiated when an individual categorizes himself as part of a group, then he adopts the identity of the
group and behavior of others in the group, and finally he begins to compare his group with all
other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
Applying Social Movement and Social Identity Theories to Radicalization
Terrorist organizations are often motivated to collect and maintain a large number of supporters and utilize the social movement theory and social identity theory to achieve these goals.
Terrorist organizations attempt to provide their members with more benefits than costs leading to
emotional attachment to the group and improving cohesion (Al Raffie, 2013). Benefits often include a mixture of social, political, and economic resources and group membership, as explained
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by the social movement theory and social identity theory. When a group can offer more individual benefits and fewer costs, recruits will join (Al Raffie, 2013). When a group offers fewer individual benefits and more costs, members will defect (Al Raffie, 2013). If joining a terrorist organization and choosing to execute an attack appear to be strategic choices made after weighing
the costs and benefits, then a potential strategy to prevent radicalization could be to decrease the
perceived benefits of terrorism and increase the perceived costs of terrorism. This strategy assumes that individuals who choose to commit acts of terrorism are rational actors making a strategic choice. Individuals who are mentally unstable could join regardless of costs and benefits
and most likely would not be dissuaded by a counter-narrative.
This study attempted to develop a preliminary understanding of what information about
the cost of terrorism captures the attention of the general user population on social media. This
was accomplished by measuring the reach of information about the costs of terrorism. It focused
on the type of the cost (personal stories about those who are affected by terrorism and military
defeats) and how the cost was communicated to the general user population. The results of this
study could be used to design a follow-on study which builds on the strategic choice approach to
test the validity of the social movement theory and social identity theory. The social movement
theory suggests that individuals join terrorist organizations and commit attacks when they feel
deprived of resources (Borum, 2011). Further research could focus on providing information
about the lack of resources within the Islamic State’s caliphate and measuring the resulting public perception of the Islamic State. Social identity theory suggests that individuals join terrorist
organizations and commit attacks to feel like a member of a group (Borum & Neer, 2017). Fur-
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ther research could focus on providing information about Islamic State fighters who were ostracized by the terrorist organization and measuring the resulting public perception of the Islamic
State.
Communication Concepts
Targeted Information
In addition to the strategic choice approach, social movement theory, and social identity
theory, this study also relied on several communication concepts. On social media, users are
constantly bombarded with information from a variety of different platforms. Currently, terrorist
organizations primarily use Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube (Wilner & Rigato, 2017).
While viewing information contributes to radicalization, an individual’s social interactions also
play a pivotal role. This study focused on Facebook because 22% of the world’s population uses
Facebook, making it the most popular social media platform (Donnelly, 2018). In addition,
unlike Twitter, Telegram, and YouTube, it leverages a user’s social network when disseminating
information (Tremayne, 2017). When compared to Twitter, Telegram, and YouTube, Facebook is
more often used as a source of information rather than a means of communication (Westerman,
Spence, & Van Der Heide, 2014). Facebook exposes its users to pictures, videos, and links,
which are of interest to them. This provides an opportunity for journalists, local and federal
governments, nonprofit organizations, and corporations to engage their audiences about topics
ranging from impending inclement weather in their town to social issues around the world (Harode-Rosario, Sáez-Martín, & del Carmen Caba-Pérez, 2018).
When Facebook was first created, most users saw their friends posts, which were
displayed on their newsfeed in the order that they were posted. Over time, users became
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overwhelmed by the amount of meaningless information that they were receiving. In response,
Facebook created algorithms to manipulate what each user sees in their newsfeed based on their
specific interests. As a result, there are three types of information that a user will see on their newsfeed:
following information, trending information, and targeted information.
Following information includes statuses, pictures, videos, and links posted by friends that
a user follows. A user can actively follow a friend by clicking follow. A user can also often
passively follow a friend when the Facebook algorithms determine that the user has repeatedly
shown interest in that particular friend. Perhaps the user has regularly searched for the friends
page, or the user regularly clicks to view their pictures, videos, and links that populate on their
newsfeed. Either way, Facebook has discovered that the user is interested in this friend and will
therefore show more posts made by this friend to satisfy the user’s desires.
Trending information includes posts that have been liked or shared by many people. For
example, a user has a friend that they are not interested in. The user has never searched for this
friend and have never clicked on this friends posts. When this friend announces an engagement
or pregnancy, hundreds of people that the user is friends with like the picture, which makes it
trend and show up on the users’ newsfeed. Facebook knows that while the user typically is not
interested in this friend, something has happened that might be of interest to the user because it is
of interest to so many others in their social network.
Targeted information includes posts that Facebook algorithms have chosen to display on a
user’s newsfeed based on their historical web browsing, which includes prior searches and
clicks. For example, if a user recently searched to see what movies are playing this weekend,
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Facebook may begin showing them previews for similar movies or interviews with the actors and
actresses for movies that they may have previously expressed interest in.
Together, followed information, trending information, and targeted information are
consolidated and balanced to present a unique newsfeed to each user. When a user comes across
a post, she has the choice to like it and share it. If a user likes a post, it is assumed that the user
agreed with the information presented. If a user shares a post, it is assumed that the user wants
other users to view it. Users like and share posts to appear thoughtful and knowledgeable, to
inform or entertain others, to promote causes that they believe in, and to stay connected to others
(Berger & Milkman, 2012). The decision to like and share content is influenced by the content of
the post, what users will see the liked and/or shared post, and the desires of the user who likes
and/or shares the post (Wong & Burkell, 2017). Users specifically look for content that will be
relevant to themselves and to others (Wong & Burkell, 2017).
Social Media Consumption
With never-ending newsfeeds, social media users have choices when it comes to viewing
information. As a result, the information presented on social media has evolved to meet the demands of social media users who want easily digestible information on topics that are of interest
to them. With limitless publishing, the quality of information circulating the internet has been degraded, yet social media users still seek articles that are relevant and credible (Westerman et al.,
2014). When users view information on social media, they make certain assumptions about its
reliability (Westerman et al., 2014). The topic provides insight into what users believe is relevant. If a user thinks a post is relevant, then the user will like and share the post with others (Ber-

17

ger, 2013). The source provides insight into what users consider to be credible. Receiving information from a source with high credibility will lead to a positive acceptance, resulting in an
abundance of likes and shares; receiving information from a source with low credibility will lead
to rejection and an absence of likes and shares (Berger, 2013).
Information in social media posts can be presented as either a cost or benefit depending
on how it is framed (Hilverda, Kuttschreuter, & Giebels, 2017). Communicators use placement
(timing and platform), approach (positive or negative), and words (ethical, emotional, logical) to
frame messages that influence perception (Hilverda et al., 2017). This study does not delve into
message framing. Instead, it focuses on the superficial elements of a post – its topic and source.
The study is limited because while likes and shares can easily be objectively counted, an individual’s attitude towards a post cannot. The study is interested in discovering what posts can capture
a user’s attention, not a comprehensive evaluation of the persuasive techniques of the post and
the effect that they have on a reader.
When a post gets a high number of likes and shares it is considered viral. For example, in
2015, a picture of a dress was posted on Tumblr went viral (Wong & Burkell, 2017). When
viewers looked at the dress, some thought that it was blue and black while others thought that it
was white and gold due to the differences in human color perception. The dress was discussed in
homes, school, and workplaces all over the world (Wong & Burkell, 2017). The dress represents
the power that one post can have on society. Viral posts are the objective of a radicalization
campaign and a counter-radicalization campaign. When posts become viral, they can reach the
entire general user population, which inevitably reaches those who are contemplating terrorism
(Badawy & Ferrara, 2017).
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Nature of the Study
The emergence of social media has changed radicalization because individuals no longer
need to search for terrorist organizations. Instead, content has become popular enough to trend to
the extent where content is recommended to users. Terrorist ideology cannot easily be contained
because each social media user can reproduce existing content and can produce new content,
which exponentially increases the amount of information circulating (Hamblet, 2017). In
addition, the ability to constantly post allows individuals to provide content from social media to
be adaptive and meet the needs of a changing audience (Rowe & Saif, 2016). Social media
platforms are also interactive, which leads to the development of relationships between users and
has a significant impact on radicalization (Gill, Corner, Conway, Thorton, Bloom & Horgan,
2017). Therefore, social media represents a threat—and an opportunity—to governments around
the world to curtail terrorism.
This quantitative study sought to examine the correlation between the independent variables (CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION) and the dependent variables
(number of LIKES and SHARES). Preliminary research was conducted by searching for counterradicalization Facebook pages and viewing their posts. During the process, it was discovered that
posts often fell into four categories of information, including (1) personal stories, (2) news articles, (3) research/policy analysis pieces, (4) military defeats, and (5) religious doctrine. These
categories of information also varied in what GEOPOLITICAL REGION they addressed and
how they were presented. Posts were often about (1) the West, (2) the Middle East, or they were
(3) global, or about (4) cyber. Posts were often presented as: (1) a written status, (2) a written
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status with a link to a website, (3) a written status with a video, or (4) a written status with a photograph. Therefore, it seemed indicative to choose a specific counter-radicalization Facebook
page and code each Facebook post by CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION. The resulting LIKES and SHARES could then be counted, recorded, and analyzed with
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) tests.
After assessing several counter-radicalization Facebook pages, Quilliam was chosen.
Quilliam is a United Kingdom-based think tank that focuses on counter-radicalization and promoting a moderate interpretation of Islam through community and social media outreach
(Quilliam, 2018a). Quilliam was chosen because the administrator uploaded posts regularly and
had over 25,000 followers (Quilliam, 2018a). The population for the study was all 2018 postings
on the Quilliam Facebook page (Quilliam, 2018a). The sample for this study was all posts in the
population.
Definitions
For clarity, the following terms needed to be defined and explained:
Directed terrorist: Terrorist who has received general information and instructions to execute an
attack (Vidino, Marone, & Entenmann, 2017).
Echo Chamber: When a group of individuals radicalize each other by sharing their similar
beliefs and values (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017).
Enabled terrorist: Terrorist who has received training, weapons, and specific instructions to
execute an attack (Vidino et al., 2017).
Following information: A status, picture, video, or link posted by a friend who a user is actively
(clicked follow) or passively (Facebook has determined that the user regularly views) following.
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General user population: Individuals who regularly accesses social media.
Headquartered terrorist: Terrorist who resides within close proximity of a terrorist organization
and interacts on a regular basis with terrorist organizations.
Inspired terrorist: Terrorist who has had no contact with a terrorist organization but has become
inspired by jihadist material (Vidino et al., 2017).
Islamic State: A terrorist organization that follows the Salafi doctrine of Sunni Islam and is
attempting to develop a caliphate. Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Daesh.
Islamic Terrorism: Using violence to invoke fear and achieve social, political, and/or economic
goals which are rooted in Islamic ideology.
Lurker: Social media users who do not create or engage with posts but are still viewing them and
developing opinions on the topics (Leiner, Kobilke, Rueß, & Brosius, 2018).
Newsfeed: An on-going page of information that begins when a user joins a social media
platform.
Targeted Information: Information that Facebook algorithms have chosen to display on a user’s
newsfeed based on their historical preferences (prior searches and clicks).
Terrorist Attack: An act of violence perpetrated by a headquartered, directed, enabled, or inspired
terrorist to achieve social, political, and/or economic goals.
Trending Information: Information that has received a large number of LIKES and SHARES and
as a result, social media platforms show it to more users, which results in even more LIKES and
SHARES.
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Quilliam International: A United Kingdom-based think tank that focuses on counterradicalization and promoting a moderate interpretation of Islam through community and social
media outreach (Quilliam, 2018a).
Viral Information: Information that receives such a large number of LIKES and SHARES that it
reaches beyond social media and is discussed in society.
Vulnerable population: Individuals who feel sympathetic towards the jihad and may eventually
become radicalized.
Assumptions
This study relied on two critical assumptions involving both the theoretical framework
and conceptual framework. The theoretical framework relied on the strategic choice theory,
which argues that individuals are rational and perform cost and benefit analysis when deciding to
join a terrorist organization (Borum, 2011). However, it is possible that some individuals are not
rational and may decide to join a terrorist organization because they have psychological problems or are under duress. Presenting a counter-narrative to individuals who are not rational will
be futile. However, this study assumed that most individuals who become involved in terrorism
are rational and can be deterred if provided with information that changes their perspective. The
communication concepts such as targeting information, trending information, and following information rely on the flawless interpretation of social media consumption. When user comes
across a post, the user has the choice to like it and/or share it. If a user likes a post, it is assumed
that they agreed with the information presented. If a user shares a post, it is assumed that they
want other users to view it. However, users often make mistakes when navigating social media
because they are distracted or tired while scrolling through their newsfeed (Hurst, Mankoff, &
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Hudson, 2008). Researchers are currently attempting to develop mechanisms that can identify
and eliminate unintentional clicks from studies but have had limited success given the uncontrollable nature of the users (Tolomei, Lalmas, Farahat, & Haines, 2018). Even if social media studies are conducted in an environment where researchers can ensure that the users could concentrate on the content, users may still mistakenly click LIKE or SHARE while scrolling due to imperfect finger control (Hurst et al., 2008). This margin of error has been accepted for the study
because it is difficult to overcome.
Scope and Delimitations
When evaluating the spread of information on social media, there are clear trends. These
trends need to be studied and understood to ensure that beneficial information can reach the
masses. Because this study is observational, there were few threats to validity. The study was
open to all social media users because the page measured was open to all social media users.
However, some social media users were more likely to see the page being measured simply because they viewed similar pages. As a result, it is possible that this study provided insight only
into the behavior of users who are already interested in counter-radicalization, either because
they strongly support terrorism or strongly oppose terrorism. Therefore, this study may not be
generalizable to the entire population of social media users. This study could have been more
generalizable if it had focused on posts which were displayed on every single social media user’s
newsfeed, regardless of their viewing preferences. However, this feat could be accomplished
only by the social media platform, which can override the algorithms that regulate what content
is displayed. In the past, social media platforms, including Facebook, have experimented on their
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users by pushing content and measuring the user reaction (Grimmelmann, 2015). While the experiments did not cause physical or mental harm to users, they generated outrage from users who
felt that the experiments violated business ethics (Grimmelmann, 2015). Therefore, research in
the field of social media is forced to rely on measuring the reach of content posted on individual
pages, which will always have a specific viewership (Grimmelmann, 2015). After all, even the
most popular pages featuring brands such as Coca-Cola, Samsung, and Barak Obama are only
going to be seen by their target audiences.
Limitations
The data collection for this study was limited because the study was conducted without
administrator privileges for Facebook. Administrators can view insights to track metrics, which
gauge social media outreach and engagement. For example, the view insights function measures
the number of times content was displayed on the newsfeed of subscribers, known as impressions, and the number of times content was liked and shared by the subscribers who were exposed to the content. These metrics would have enabled the study to demonstrate how many subscribers were seeing the content and what percentage of those subscribers were providing feedback, which would demonstrate how engaging specific content is. An administrator could also
see the total number of users who choose to hide all posts from the page and the total number of
users who unsubscribed from the page. Viewers hide all posts and unsubscribe from pages for a
variety of reasons. Perhaps the administrators are posting too frequently and dominating the users’ newsfeed or maybe the administrators are posting content that is not relevant or credible to
the user. This information could have provided valuable information about user perception of
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specific content and the overall performance of the page (Dolan, Conduit, Fahy, & Goodman,
2017).
Instead, this study had to rely on manually coding posts and counting the existing LIKES
and SHARES. Choosing the CONTENT and GEOPOLITICAL REGION was objective and easy
to code. However, choosing the CATEGORY was subjective and more difficult to code. For example, an editorial piece published by a news outlet about a woman who joined the Islamic State
to become a bride but defected because of the poor living conditions could fall into the personal
story, news article, research/policy analysis, military defeats, and religious doctrine categories.
To ensure that coding was consistent, criteria were developed to determine the CATEGORY
based on the information source as seen below in Table 2.
Table 2
Criteria for coding
Category of social
media post

Information source

Example

personal story

-current terrorists
-defected terrorists
-friends and families of terrorists
-victims of terrorism
-bystanders

-testimonials

news article

-news outlet

-recent attacks
-thwarted attacks

research/policy Analysis

-interviews with experts
-articles from reputable sources (i.e.
The Independent, The Atlantic, The
Economist)

-interviews
-research studies

military defeats

-news outlet

-campaign updates

religious doctrine

-religious scholars

-fatwas (religious
declarations)
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The study also did not account for the existence of lurkers. Lurkers are social media users
who are viewing posts and forming opinions but refrain from liking or sharing posts because
they do not want to publicize their stance on controversial issues (Leiner, Kobilke, Rueß, &
Brosius, 2018). Not only is terrorism a controversial issue, but many social media users fear that
discussing it over the internet will prompt government surveillance. Therefore, lurkers may be
present and have a significant impact on this type of research. Because the findings of this study
are contingent on observing participant behavior in their natural environment, a public forum,
there is no way to unveil the lurkers. Due to the unknown impact of lurkers on this type of research, this study is less generalizable to the global population. A follow-on study may benefit
from unveiling the lurkers by assuring anonymity for all participants and soliciting feedback
from all social media users who view the content.
Significance of the Study
Academic researchers are often far removed from terrorism, which degrades the validity
and reliability of their findings. Headquartered terrorists live within proximity of their terrorist
organization and interact on a regular basis with their terrorist organization. Headquartered terrorists are extremely difficult to study because they are often in remote regions, speak local dialects (for which there are no interpreters), can be dangerous to meet with, and are often unwilling
to be interviewed. Inspired terrorists are either already imprisoned or would face imprisonment if
they divulged their inclinations and intentions to researchers. As a result, the field of terrorism
research has been dominated by the only people who have access to terrorists: military and intelligence agencies. Further, these same researchers with access who view terrorism as a threat, and
a belief that they must be defeated, makes them inherently biased (Pipes, 2017). To make matters
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worse, military and intelligence agencies often have not been trained to overcome their bias and
follow a methodology for data collection and analysis that led to unreliable findings (Pipes,
2017).
Given the many challenges involved in communicating with terrorists, academic research
has focused on case studies that seek out individuals who have committed an act of terrorism
(Jensen, James, & Tinsley, 2015). They answer common questions, such as where they were
raised, what socioeconomic class their family was from, did their biological mother and father
raise them, what was their performance in school, did they attended religious services, who they
were talking to online (Jensen et al., 2015). Researchers often do not have access to the terrorist
to ask why the person became interested in becoming a terrorist and what information had an impact on their decision.
Significance to Theory and Practice
Further, radicalization research should focus on an area that can be empirically studied,
such as understanding what information about terrorism is of interest to the general user population. When information trends within the general user population, it inevitably reaches individuals who are in the first and second phases of radicalization, and who also support the ideology,
and may eventually encourage others to execute attacks or choose to execute attacks themselves.
This study is being conducted because when used properly, social media has the potential to
reach general user populations, which include the at risk population, and prevent radicalization.
This study will be of interest to governmental and nongovernmental organizations throughout the
world, which are attempting to eradicate terrorism with counter-radicalization campaigns. The
findings are expected to provide insight into the potential of radicalization research to shift the
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efforts from only eliminating wanted terrorists to also preventing the creation of future terrorists
by leveraging data analytics on social media.
Significance to Social Change
A deeper understanding of how counter-radicalization influences social trends and terrorist acts may lead to greater safety of the global community as well as the full impact of social
media. Further, research should focus on understanding what makes a counter-radicalization information trend, which will require constant study because the atmosphere of social media
changes every single day. This understanding could then be utilized by governmental and nongovernmental counter-radicalization efforts when uploading information to social media to ensure that messages are liked and shared to trend. Trending messages can reach the general user
population, which includes those who are considering supporting or joining a terrorist organization. The outcome of this study could demonstrate that disseminating information on social media to prevent radicalization is effective. It could be used for disseminating information using
other platforms, such as community programs where governments and nongovernmental organizations are currently expending resources. If governmental organizations and nongovernmental
organizations are able to increase the reach of their counter-radicalization efforts, then they may
be able to decrease the amount of terrorist attacks.
Summary
To prevent more attacks like the Boston Marathon Bombing, it is essential to identify the
key opportunities and obstacles in disseminating counter-radicalization information. This chapter
provided an overview of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions and hypotheses,
and delved into the theoretical framework and conceptual framework which the study is based
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upon. Executing an attack on behalf of a terrorist organization is a strategic choice. Terrorists
weigh the costs and benefits based on the information that is available to them (Borum, 2011). It
is critical to develop an understanding of common motivations that push individuals towards radicalization and pull individuals away from radicalization (Bertram, 2015). This chapter also addressed the assumptions, limitations, and significance of the study that aims to determine if there
is a relationship between the content of a social media post and reaction to the social media post.
If a relationship is found, then further research on the use of data analytics for counter-radicalization efforts may be warranted.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the existing literature on counter-radicalization efforts
made by governmental and nongovernmental organizations throughout the world and illuminates
gaps in the research that will be filled by this study. Chapter 3 presents the chosen research design and methodology and addresses threats to validity. Chapter 4 delves into the statistical analysis, results, and interpretation of the results. Chapter 5 is devoted to discussion of the findings,
limitations of the study, policy implications, conclusions, and recommendations for further study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This research addressed historical, current, and possible future efforts at the dissemination of counter-radicalization information made by governmental and nongovernmental organizations throughout the world. Counter-radicalization information is readily available but is not
reaching the general user population (Khatib, Dutton, & Thelwall, 2012). As a result, the individuals who are at risk of being radicalized are viewing only jihadist propaganda and not viewing
information that contradicts the jihadist propaganda. The purpose of this study was to assess the
utility of data analytics when administering counter-radicalization campaigns on social media to
ensure that the posts are reaching and engaging the general user population. This chapter reviews
the literature by looking at the history of terrorist recruitment, the emerging use of social media
in terrorist recruitment, the effectiveness of prior counter-radicalization efforts, and the potential
of utilizing data analytics. Most importantly, this chapter describes the empirical research in the
field of counter-radicalization efforts and sets up the study to examine the outreach of a specific
counter-radicalization information operation.
Literature Search Strategy
This literature review examined the research across numerous significant topics and
fields relevant to the study: (a) terrorist recruitment; (b) counter-radicalization; (c) information
operations; (d) governmental and nongovernmental counter-radicalization efforts; (e) nongovernmental counter-radicalization efforts; and (f) social media. The review included aspects of the
theoretical framework of the social movement and social identity theories that were both derived
from the strategic choice approach to terrorism. These theories state that individuals evaluate
costs and benefits when considering supporting or joining a terrorist organization (Al Raffie,
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2013). The perception of costs and benefits are heavily influenced by the information that at risk
individuals have access to (Al Raffie, 2013). Existing research was placed into categories to systematically examine how terrorist recruitment has evolved with the emergence of social media
and the potential use of data analytics to improve outreach.
In this study, the following databases were used: Google Scholar, International Security
and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Homeland Security Digital Library, West Point’s
Combatting Terrorism Center, Military and Government Collection, Sage Publications, and
RAND Publications. Examination of the literature was conducted between the years 2015 and
2018, using the following search terms: terrorist recruitment, jihadist ideology, jihadist social
media strategy, self-radicalization, online radicalization, counter-radicalization, information operations, trending information, and viral information. The reference lists within the listed publications and related bibliographies of the studies were further examined for additional sources.
The resulting studies discussed how terrorist organizations are currently recruiting and
how to undermine their strategies. The studies emphasized two prevalent concepts. The first
concept was the need to understand the ideology and how terrorist organizations gain followers.
The articles also attempted to determine the perceived costs and benefits of terrorism. The
second concept was to provide information that would encourage a moderate interpretation and
practice of the ideology. Some of the papers, articles, and speeches proposed ideas that could be
effective in preventing people from becoming terrorists and included an evaluation of current
counter-radicalization efforts. However, none of the papers, articles, or speeches discussed the
use of data analytics to focus counter radicalization-efforts on social media platforms.
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The History of Terrorist Recruitment
Terrorist organizations justify their existence and operations with fragments of passages
from ancient religious texts. However, their recruitment strategy has changed over the years as
they have been forced to repeatedly defend their lands from foreign invaders. With the emergence of the internet, terrorist organizations have taken their efforts online.
The Concept of Jihad
There are three distinct sects of Islam: Sunni’s, Shi’as, and Kharijites, and each sect has
its own jurisprudence schools. Under each jurisprudence school, there are even more divisions.
The Sunni Mulsims believe that the successors of Mohammed should be democratically elected
and follow the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’I, and Hanibali schools of jurisprudence (Khalid, 2018).
The Shi’a Muslims believe that the successors of Mohammed should be descendants of Mohammed and follow the Fivers, Seveners, and Twelvers (Khalid, 2018). The Kharijites believe that
the successor of Mohammed should be chosen by God through battle and follow the Sufris,
Azariqa, Najdat, Adjarites, and Ibadis (Khalid, 2018). While the many sects and schools of jurisprudence follow different laws, they all believe that it is their duty to practice the purest form of
Islam.
The practices of Islam are determined by the Quran and Hadith. The Quran is the ideological text as dictated by Mohammed. The Quran explains how to live as a Muslim, how to create an Islamic Society, and how to navigate a world where there are many enemies of Islam
(Khalid, 2018). The Hadith is a collection of traditions which are based on what Mohammed may
have said or done (Khalid, 2018). Both the Quran and Hadith have been interpreted by religious
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scholars and teachers which has resulted in various interpretations of Islam. Most Muslims interpret jihad as the internal struggle to be a devout Muslim who follows the five pillars of Islam;
faith, prayer, charity, fasting, and pilgrimage (Boutz, Benninger, & Lancaster, 2018). A minority
of Muslims interpret jihad as the struggle to rid the world of infidels (Boutz et al., 2018).
There are different types of jihad, including: verbal support, written support, physical
support, and funding support. Waging jihad can be profitable for fighters. Muslims are required
by the Hadith to pay zakat which is a tax that is levied annually at 2.5% – 10 % of income depending on wealth and local conditions. Zakat is disbursed for the needy, local government
workers, and those fighting jihad. For jihadists, zakat can pay for their fighting expenses and personal expenses. In addition, those who become a martyr receive entry into paradise where they
will be forgiven of all sins and live a life of luxury while securing admission into paradise for
relatives as stated in the Quran. Between promises of payment and eternal bliss, jihadism is not
only a religious duty but a lucrative career (Boutz et al., 2018).
The Return of the Caliphate
From the year 632-750 CE, Muslims experienced expansion under the Rashidun Caliphate and Umayyad Caliphate which conquered large portions of the Sassanian Empire and Byzantine Empire. During this time, jihad was viewed as a form of warfare used to gain and protect
territory. Rules to guide this view of jihad were documented and included the protection of noncombatants and explained that those conquered only had to submit to the rule of the caliphate
and did not have to convert. When the Abbasid Caliphate and Ottoman Caliphate were overthrown, the concept of jihad was weakened (Israeli, 2017).
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It was not until the Middle East was invaded by colonial powers, that the concept of jihad
was revived (Kraidy, 2018). After World War I, France and the United Kingdom decided that because of their victory they were entitled to ownership of land in the Middle East. A politician
from each side, Sykes and Picot, created an agreement to divide the land and drew arbitrary lines
to create the countries known today as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel (Fawcett, 2017). For both
France and the United Kingdom, colonization of the Middle East was a failure because it was expensive and unsurprisingly difficult to enforce European social, political, and economic infrastructure in regions where the natives did not welcome their presence. As a result, France and the
United Kingdom eventually pulled out of the Middle East, but left their boundaries in place as
seen in Figure 1. Those boundaries cut apart the religious tribes’ access to sacred lands and natural resources, igniting conflicts throughout the region leading to the fundamentalist movement
(Kraidy, 2018).
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Note. From “The Gulf/2000 Project,” by M. Izady, 2000, Columbia University. Retrieved from
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/.
Figure 3. Sykes Picot agreement
The new fundamentalist movement brought a resurgence of writings on jihad. Most
notably, Ibn Taymiyya, who encouraged the forced conversion or killing of all infidels and
Abdullah Azzam, who made it permissible to no longer protect non-combatants when fighting
(Hasan, 2018). Terrorist organizations began developing in the 1970’s as foreign invaders reentered the region. Maktab al-Khidamat, also known as the Afghan Services Bureau, was created
in the 1970’s to support the Mujahideen as they traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the
Soviet invasion (Cragin, 2017). Following their victories, Maktab al-Khidamat created a wave of
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publications including the magazine, al Jihad, the leaflet, Defense of Muslim Lands, and the
book Birth of the Afghani Arabs, all argue why it is a religious duty to support the jihad (Cragin,
2017). Maktab al-Khidamat also provided classes on their teachings which are founded on the
concept of only one God’s existence and a literal interpretation of the Quran which
emphasizes the rejection of what is new and different (Cragin, 2017). These teachings discussed
the establishment of a society built on Sharia Law that reaches across nations and is seen as a
solution to poverty and injustice and is guided by the caliph. Sympathizers of the caliphate may
condemn the use of violence, but still see terrorism as at least doing something to resolve
society’s problems (Cragin, 2017).
The Process of Radicalization
According to Bloom (2017), terrorist recruitment is often cyclical. When a terrorist
organization is conceived, its leadership is motivated to fill the ranks, known as manpowerfocused (Bloom, 2017). During this time the terrorist organization will recruit whoever is
available. Often, this includes average criminals who do not have specialized skills. As the
terrorist organization matures, its leadership becomes more selective and searches for expertise,
known as expertise-focused (Bloom, 2017). Recruitment strategy also must shift throughout the
life of a terrorist organization to overcome external pressures. For example, if a terrorist
organization has withstood several defeats, it may have trouble recruiting expertise and must
revert back to being manpower-focused (Bloom, 2017). On the contrary, if a terrorist
organization is gaining popularity, it may choose to become expertise-focused when recruiting to
preserve its message (Bloom, 2017). Regardless of what stage a terrorist organization is at, this
cyclical nature explains why researchers encounter average and expert terrorists in the
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operational environment. Depending on what stage a terrorist organization exists, eliminating
terrorists can be counter-productive because an average terrorist could be replaced by an expert
terrorist (Bloom, 2017). When a terrorist organization is combatting foreign invaders, they may
equally split their recruitment between manpower-focused and expertise focused (Bloom, 2017).
The radicalization process for manpower-focused and expertise focused terrorist recruitment
follows the same four phases but often includes different incentives.
Radicalization is achieved over time and through multiple channels of communication
(Cragin, 2017). There is consensus among researchers who separate radicalization into four
phrases – sensitivity, discovery, group membership, and commitment to action (Cragin, 2017).
Sensitivity begins when an individual is surrounded by friends and family who are frustrated
with their government or other governments domestic and foreign policies and become
sympathetic to jihadism (van Eerten et al., 2017). Often, this will lead the individual to seek
more information about the ideology on the internet and/or in their community, known as
discovery. Indoctrination occurs when the individual begins to feel a sense of belonging from
these interactions (Borum & Neer, 2017). Group membership interactions can be as cursory as
reading about a terrorist organization’s vision and goals, which align with their own, and talking
to others who are interested in terrorism (Borum & Neer, 2017). Interactions can also be as
complex as involving years of prolonged contact with recruiters (Borum & Neer, 2017).
Recruiters can make contact anywhere - on the internet, at school, during prayer, and while
playing sports, to name a few (Bloom, 2017). Recruiters often adapt to different environments,
adjusting the method and message to fit the individual (Bloom, 2017). The fourth phase,
commitment to action, varies from individual-to-individual. Again, the trigger can be as
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superficial as becoming aware of perceived injustices in their community or another community,
or it can be as complex as the death of a family member or friend (Cragin, 2017). The ideological
motivations of terrorists are undoubtedly tied to political and economic condition but are also
heavily influenced by the availability of information and social interactions.
The authors of Analyzing Pathways of Lone-Actor Radicalization: A Relational
Approach, Malthaner and Lindekilde (2017), analyzed relational configurations and their
evolution over time to identify common patterns. The authors gathered empirical data on loneactor radicalization by studying 30 cases in the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East. In each case,
they looked for perpetrator characteristics (heritage, socioeconomic status, personality,
popularity, religious devotion, and academic performance), attack types (sophisticated or
unsophisticated), and social ties. They found that beliefs do not always result in action. Instead,
beliefs combined with available information and social interactions, result in action (Malthaner
& Lindekilde, 2017). The researchers concluded that radicalization can either be top-down,
where the terrorist organization contacts the individual, or bottom-up where the individual seeks
out the terrorist organization. Either way, radicalization begins with the individual already being
susceptible to recruitment because they are frustrated with society and surrounded by friends and
family who feel the same. In top-down radicalization, the individual is often exposed to teaching
by a recruiter, asked to participate in radical activities, and creates personal ties to others in the
terrorist organization – all of which commits them to the cause. To radicalize individuals,
terrorist organizations often attempt to further isolate followers by encouraging them to stop
associating with mainstream Muslims and only associate with likeminded Muslims. This tactic
has been known to accelerate radicalization. In bottom-down radicalization, individuals are often
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searching for further information either by looking online and/or reaching out to recruiters. They
then become involved in the terrorist organization, participate in radical activities, and create
personal ties – all of which makes the individual unwavering in their radical beliefs and commits
them to the cause (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017).
In both top-down and bottom-up recruitment there are several points in the radicalization
process that depend on social networks. Malthaner and Linekilde (2017) found that two of the
most effectual motivators are the pre-existing ties to friends and family and the group dynamics
they encounter once indoctrinated to a terrorist organization. If either of these motivators are
interrupted, there is a possibility that radicalization could be prevented. For example, if an
individual has pre-existing ties to friends and family who condemn terrorism, they will be less
likely to feel enticed by a terrorist organization (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). Likewise, if a
terrorist organization is filled with individuals who do not truly believe in the cause, perhaps
because they are being exposed to information that conflicts with the ideology, then members
will become deradicalized (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). Just as an echo chamber can
radicalize individuals, it can also deradicalize individuals (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). The
effect of pre-exiting ties to friends, family, and group dynamics make it impossible to develop a
profile for potential terrorists. However, relational analysis can improve an understanding of how
relationships are intertwined in the process of radicalization and may explain why some
individuals become radicalized while others with the same characteristics do not (Malthaner &
Lindekilde, 2017).
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The Evolution of Terrorism
Terrorist organizations are constantly forced to evolve in order to plan, coordinate, and
execute attacks without detection. In addition, terrorist organizations have to ensure that their attacks are inspiring enough to gain followers who are willing to further the cause.
The Fall of Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda developed in the 1970s while fighting to expel the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda turned their
attention to overthrowing what they believed to be corrupt regimes throughout the world
(Ibrahimi, 2017). They specifically intervened in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Israel, and reached
out to other regional terrorist groups to indoctrinate them in their cause (Siebert & Keeny, 2017).
By using a localized strategy that focused on pursuing short-term political goals for various local
communities, they were able to create a sophisticated network of affiliated terrorist organizations
that loosely followed their guidance (Siebert & Keeny, 2017).
Operationally, Al-Qaeda has never had enough manpower and funding to wage a conventional war. Instead they have sought to undermine their opponents through desecration of honor
(Jones & Libicki, 2008). Attacks are meant to challenge their opponents’ ability to protect themselves which makes the opponent appear weak to its own people, allies, and enemies (Jones &
Libicki, 2008). If the opponents’ response to an attack is unpopular, then their reputation may be
further tarnished (Jones & Libicki, 2008). For example, the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Pennsylvania, demonstrated Al-Qaeda’s desecration of honor. The attack was
a symbolic strike on U.S. financial and economic might, military headquarters, and U.S. civilians/citizens. Therefore, the attack demonstrated that the United States was unable to protect its
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own infrastructure and people. The 9/11 attacks also succeeded in provoking an unpopular response, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, which caused the public to lose even more faith in the
United States. The choice of targets chosen by Al-Qaeda provides further insight into their strategy. Al-Qaeda did not have broad religious goals of ridding the world of infidels and developing
a caliphate. Instead, they were driven by narrow political goals that focused on eliminating immediate threats to Muslim sovereignty (Klein, 2016).
In addition to planning and executing unconventional attacks, Al-Qaeda also intended to
be a source of expertise that could enable other terrorist organizations (Ibrahimi, 2017). Affiliates
were invited to travel to their camps to receive spiritual, basic military, and survival training
(Ibrahimi, 2017). The jihad experience created cohesive bonds between affiliates who were then
sent throughout the world to complete their duties (Ibrahimi, 2017). However, in the 1990s, AlQaeda was forced to stop bringing affiliates to training camps because travel was being closely
monitored and there was a fear of infiltration (Ibrahimi, 2017). Instead, Al-Qaeda attempted to
continue recruiting and indoctrinating affiliates through the internet. Al-Qaeda created several
websites to articulate their ideas. In keeping with their localized strategy, thinkers such as Abu
Musab al-Suri, Abu Bakr Naji, Yusuf al-Ayyiri, Saif al-Adl and Louis Atiyatallah provided
input on the issues of local Islamic practices and local politics to win over the ‘hearts and minds’
of local communities (Ibrahimi, 2017). Al-Qaeda used the internet to create repositories for
ideological information rather than as an interactive platform where interested individuals could
develop relationships (Rudner, 2017). While they were able to recruit some followers, the focus
on the local level severely limited their outreach. To make matters worse for them, Al-Qaeda was
unable to properly indoctrinate these limited followers without training camps and subsequently
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lost control of their planning and execution of attacks (Torres-Soriano, 2016). As a result,
followers often executed attacks that also killed Muslims and undermined the credibility of AlQaeda (Torres-Soriano, 2016). Al Qaeda also attempted to recruit from Madrasahs where the
focus is on teaching extremist religion and not on useful skills. These unskilled terrorists often
made lethal mistakes when attempting to plan and execute attacks which further undermined the
credibility of Al-Qaeda (Torres-Soriano, 2016).
The rise and fall of A-Qaeda proves that all terrorist organizations do not last forever.
Like a business, they are highly susceptible to failure and cycles. The median duration of a
terrorist group is one year (Jones & Libiki, 2008). Jones and Libiki (2008) studied 648 cases and
concluded that terrorist organizations dismantle due to a variety of reasons, including policing,
military intervention, splintering, and politics. Al-Qaeda failed due to a combination of policing,
military intervention, splintering, and politics, but only because it was severely weakened by its
own localized strategy. By focusing only on highly politicized local issues, the leadership lost
touch with the religious base for the ideology. This made it difficult to recruit and indoctrinate
terrorists who were willing to follow orders at all costs. A terrorist organization’s ability to
develop a structure, delegate responsibilities, adapt to counterterrorism efforts, and implement
changes also impact its success in recruitment and indoctrination. It also impacts a terrorist
organization’s viability in recruitment and indoctrination (Byman, 2017).
The Rise of the Islamic State
Unlike Al-Qaeda, and its affiliate terrorist organizations, the Islamic State has a vision.
During the 800th Century, a Sunni scholar, Ahmad bin Mujammad bin Hanbal Abu Abd Allah alShaybani, developed an orthodoxy of literal interpretation of Islam (Haykel, 2016). During the
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13th century, Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, also a Sunni scholar, made that orthodoxy
stricter (Haykel, 2016). During the 17th century, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab another Sunni
scholar, turned the orthodoxy into a movement, known as Wahhabism, and began spreading his
teachings throughout the Middle East (Haykel, 2016). The end goal of Wahhabism is to establish
a caliphate where everyone follows Sharia Law and is ruled by a caliph who is a descendent
from the Prophet’s Tribe. The Islamic State is highly influenced by Wahhabism, but they have
also added social and political elements. As a result, they have created not just a religion, but a
utopian way of life. In their attempt to establish a caliphate, they are building an infrastructure of
law and order and providing clean water, food, clothing, and shelter to their followers. Rather
than attempting to win over ‘hearts and minds’ by fighting for one community at a time, the
Islamic State has broadcasted a message throughout the world about the re-establishment of a
caliphate (Hamblet, 2017). The caliphate appeals to followers because it promises desirable
amenities and has been interpreted to have a deeply religious meaning (Al-Ghazzi, 2018). Yet, in
the Quran and Hadith, there are mentions of a caliph, but there is no mention of a caliphate that
is governed by a single legislative, executive, and judicial system (Al-Ghazzi, 2018). However,
many Muslims who feel discriminated against and marginalized by their countries are willing to
overlook this detail when deciding to support the Islamic State (Al-Ghazzi, 2018).
The Islamic State operates by gaining territory by force and establishing infrastructure
once the territory is claimed (Phillips, 2017). They recruit the unskilled followers for fighting
and professionals (such as doctors, nurses, engineers, and computer scientists) to provide
services to their constituents (Phillips, 2017). To accomplish these goals, the Islamic State uses a
targeted manpower-focused and expertise-focused recruitment strategy and a general religious-
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based and caliphate-based messaging strategy to develop a resilient brand (Bloom, 2017). The
Islamic State has been successful in radicalizing followers because they understand their
audience and are willing to use a variety of approaches to reach them.
The manpower-focused marketing strategy involves capturing attention, feeding on
individual and society frustrations, and offering benefits. The Islamic State posts graphic and
violent images and videos on social media to capture attention (Gill et al., 2017). These uploads
are specifically created to appeal to youth and often include rap songs and memes. In order to
recruit manpower, the Islamic State promises two very sought-after concepts to Muslims who
feel rejected by society and without a future– identity and power (Haykel, 2016). In the U.S.,
Europe, and Canada, Muslims are often first-, second-, or third-generation citizens who
immigrated to a new country and had to completely re-build a career and life (Haykel, 2016). As
a result, many Muslims communities in these countries live in poverty (Haykel, 2016). To make
matters worse, many of these Muslim communities are often discouraged from using outside
assistance such as job training, job searching, and job guidance programs (Haykel, 2016). In
order to find a job, they must use a network, if they cannot find a job, they cannot afford an
apartment, if they cannot afford an apartment than they will not be married and have children
(Haykel, 2016). The Islamic State feeds on these frustrations using social media to emphasize the
hopelessness of their current lives and the promises of identity and power that the Islamic State
will provide them (Haykel, 2016). The Islamic State highlights the sophisticated weapons that
fighters will be able to use which include explosives, machine guns, and rocket-propelled
grenades, and emphasize the admittance to paradise if they are chosen to be a martyr (Schmid,
2017). In addition, the Islamic State also provides material luxuries such as homes and cars
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which are often extremely enticing to Muslims who have only known poverty (Schmid, 2017).
The Islamic State also offers camaraderie and companionship which is often appealing to
Muslims who have felt isolated and seek a sense of belonging (Schmid, 2017). The unskilled
followers independently view the content from the Islamic State and become inspired enough to
travel to Iraq and Syria to fight, or execute lone-wolf attacks, in their country without requiring
direct communication (Gill et al., 2017).
The expertise-focused strategy requires more resources. The Islamic State actively
searches for potential candidates at universities and workplaces (Bloom, 2017). Recruiters then
craft a tailored message which includes altruistic messages aimed at the educated (Bloom, 2017).
The benefits presented with the expertise-focused strategy include being a part of something
bigger than themselves (Bloom, 2017). The recruiters will often show potential candidates
images and videos of women and children who need medical treatment and access to shelter,
clean water, and food (Bloom, 2017). Similarly, to the manpower-focused strategy, the expertisefocused strategy also emphasizes the economic benefits of homes and cars and social benefits of
camaraderie and companionship that are provided by the Islamic State (Schmid, 2017).
In addition to their manpower-focused and expertise-focused recruitment strategies, the
Islamic State also uses a general religious-based and caliphate messaging strategy to ensure that
the entire world understands the necessity of the caliphate and acknowledges their sovereignty.
The religious-based messaging strategy explains that their interpretation of Islam is under attack
(Robinson, 2017). The Islamic State uses social media to cultivate widespread fear of an
approaching apocalypse and the urgent need for a caliphate (Schmid, 2017). Historically, this
tactic has been effective in promoting action and justifying the use of violence (Schmid, 2017).
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With frequent references to verse in the Quran they gain credibility from the religion. Then they
describe how they are going to overcome these threats and urge their followers need to
participate (Robinson, 2017). Their caliphate messaging strategy is executed by using social
media platforms to broadcast information about what the caliphate can offer for those who
choose to live and work within its boundaries. In addition, the Islamic State uses billboards, radio
stations, posters, food packaging, and public events to demonstrate the services they provide
which include housing, medical care, schooling, and disaster relief, among other things (Ingram,
2015). While the Islamic State never sought to develop a network of affiliate terrorist
organizations, the religious-based and caliphate messaging has helped the Islamic State to
develop affiliate terrorist organizations throughout the world who also provide funding, weapons,
and additional manpower (Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist
Recruitment, 2015). Various terrorist organizations, including Boko Haram in Nigeria, have
pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State (Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of
Terrorist Recruitment, 2015). As the Islamic State loses territory, they have become increasingly
reliant on this unintended source of assistance. However, affiliate terrorist organizations easily
and often withdraw their support when they become displeased with the Islamic States practices
(Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment, 2015).
Both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State capitalized on the first stage of radicalization,
sensitivity, when individuals feel frustrated with society, are desperately seeking community, and
begin to explore the concept of jihad. Where Al Qaeda and the Islamic State differed in their
recruitment strategy is where they derive their legitimacy and their use of the internet. The
Islamic State has a global strategy that derives its legitimacy from religion, and utilizes various
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social media platforms, to recruit and indoctrinate committed followers. Al-Qaeda uses a local
strategy which derives its legitimacy from making local political gains (Hamblet, 2017). In the
early 2000’s, their outreach was limited to a small number of websites and corresponding
chatrooms (Hamblet, 2017). As a result, their varying messages only reached local audiences and
those who were actively seeking guidance (Hamblet, 2017). Al Qaeda supporters were typically
middle-class males under the age of 35 descending from the Middle East, North Africa, and
South Asian cultures who were already followers of Islam (Hamblet, 2017). The Islamic State,
however, understands the potential of the internet and its ability to develop a brand to entice
those who are vulnerable to radicalization (Hamblet, 2017). The Islamic State expanded their use
of the internet by creating an ecosystem of radicalization using almost every available platform
for constantly broadcasting their message and tailored individual and group correspondence.
While the Islamic State is active on Facebook, Tumblr, Telegam, Kik, WhatsApp, and Surespot,
their success has been mostly attributed to Twitter (Berger & Morgan, 2015).
Several social media platforms have developed programs to detect terrorist rhetoric and
close accounts. The Islamic State attempts to evade detection by using encrypted applications
when possible; and when accounts are inevitably closed they are poised to immediately create
new accounts that pick off exactly where the last left off to ensure continuity (McDowell-Smith,
Speckhard, & Yayla, 2017). The Islamic State also creates an echo chamber with nodes,
amplifiers, and shout-outs to spread their message (Hamblet, 2017). The nodes post the initial
content, the amplifiers share the content, and the shout-outs promote nodes and amplifiers so that
users will follow their online activity (Hamblet, 2017). By casting a wider net, the Islamic State
expanded past Al Qaeda’s demographic to capture a larger number of supporters. Islamic State
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supporters are typically males under the age of 26, who tend to be heavy users of social media,
and are also from a wide range of social and ethnic backgrounds (McDowell-Smith et al., 2017).
Interestingly, Islamic State was able to not only recruit those already practicing Islam for
radicalization, but also convert individuals to Islam for the same purpose (Hamblet, 2017).
During 2014 and 2015, it was common for social media users to stumble across content posted
by the Islamic State without looking for it because there were so many nodes, amplifiers, and
shout-outs which that were being posted throughout the day and night (Hamblet, 2017).
Hamblet’s (2017) article, The Islamic State's Virtual Caliphate, observed that due to the Islamic
State’s aggressive online marketing during 2014 and 2015, they averaged 4.1 recruits per month,
but those numbers have significantly fallen as the Islamic State continues to lose credibility as a
terrorist organization that can maintain its territory and provide for its citizens. While Islamic
State content varies, there are several recurring themes. For those who are radicalized, nodes
encourage individuals to leave their home countries and immigrate to the Islamic State, and if
this travel is not possible, to plan and execute attacks in their home countries (Hamblet, 2017).
According to Phillips (2017), Bloom (2017), and Hamblet (2017), eradicating terrorism
requires an emphasis on preventing recruitment. Some scholars such as Haykel (2016) feel that
policies focusing on reducing repression and increasing economic opportunity for Muslims are
effective at abating recruitment. After all, if there are less individuals experiencing sensitivity to
radicalization, then less individuals are available to be radicalized. However, policies that reduce
repression and increase economic opportunity are expensive for governments to finance and
difficult to implement. Scholars, such as Robinson (2017) and (Schmid, 2017), have studied the
recruitment and messaging strategy of the Islamic State believe that another way to counter the
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rhetoric is to use the same tactics. For example, in order to detract from the Islamic State’s
narrative that the caliphate can provide houses and cars, there should be a counter-narrative that
shows a dozen fighters living in a two-bedroom house and sharing one car. Exposure to an
alternative truth can cause vulnerable individuals to question the rhetoric of the Islamic State and
prevent their future radicalization (Schmid, 2017).
Rejecting Extremism
Radicalization is extremely difficult to study because most individuals who consider
joining a terrorist organization, or who have joined a terrorist organization, are reluctant to admit
their inclinations and involvement for fear of retribution. However, a group of researchers from
RAND Corporation managed to conduct two empirical studies in Palestine and Yemen.
Interestingly, both studies found that demographics such as education, economic status, religion,
gender, and age were associated with radicalization, but not significantly (Cragin, Bradley,
Robinson, & Steinberg, 2015). In addition, both studies found that providing alternatives to
political violence does not diminish propensity toward violent extremism (Robinson, Frier,
Cragin, Bradley, Egel, & Steinberg, 2017). Instead, developing a sense of apathy diminishes
propensity toward violent extremism (Robinson et al., 2017).
In, What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism, Cragin et al. (2015) separate
the factors contributing to radicalization into two distinct groups - structural and individual.
Structural factors include poverty and a lack of opportunities. Individual factors include personal
experiences of discrimination and absent parents. The researchers interviewed ten elected and
appointed officials, national political leaders, and local mayors in the West Bank because they
could easily choose to become involved in violent extremism and were also accessible for
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interviews. In addition, the researchers surveyed 600 Palestinian youth living in the West Bank
with a wide range of backgrounds and beliefs. The interviews and surveys measured attitudes
toward suicide attacks against civilians and willingness to engage in violent protests. Like much
of the other existing research on radicalization, this study posits that radicalization is a multiple
stage process with sensitivity, discovery, indoctrination, and commitment to action. The
researchers for this article conclude that during this process, the influence of family and friends
have a stronger influence on the decision to join a terrorist organization than structural and
individual factors. When evaluating the influence of family members and friends, family
members had a more significant influence than friends. Specifically, a feeling of obligation to
their family members who had been arrested and detained outweighed their own fears of
retaliation. Therefore, subjects who had family members who were arrested and detained by the
opposition were more likely to engage in violent extremism. Other contributing factors were
revolutionary objectives, personal grievances (i.e., death of a loved one), benefits, and sacred
meaning. Also, the closer associated a person was to Hamas, the more likely they were to support
violent extremism. Most surprisingly, the researchers found that opportunities to participate in
non-violent political activism does not prevent radicalization. If anything, apathy, thinking that
nothing will work, is most effective at preventing radicalization. These findings contradict held
beliefs about counter-radicalization and may help focus further counter-radicalization research.
When considering the impact of friends and family, interactions have to be physical or can they
be virtual. For example, if a friend or family posts a link on social media condemning jihadism, it
could dissuade an individual from joining. The outcome of this study left the researchers
interested in determining if perhaps some benefits more alluring than others or if the absence of a
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specific benefit could influence the decision to join a terrorist organization. Given the results, the
researchers were also interested in determining if social media posts can help individuals to
develop a sense of apathy (Cragin et al., 2015).
A follow-on research study, Rejecting Extremism in Yemen, was conducted by Robinson,
Frier, Cragin, Bradley, Egel, & Steinberg (2017) with the same basic analysis construct as What
Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West
Bank by Cragin et al (2015). The researchers conducted six focus groups with ten participants
each in Yemen’s capital and then distributed a national survey to each of Yemen’s regions to
1,200 individuals. The authors determined that there are two types of radicalized individuals –
individuals who support violent extremism and individuals who engage in violent extremism.
The questions assessed the individuals’ level of opposition toward political violence by asking if
they would support a friend who traveled overseas to fight in the jihad or if they were willing to
engage in street demonstrations. The questions also gaged the individuals’ level of political
activism, level of hope for the future, level of influence of friends and family, and level of
religious devotion to discover patterns among the responses. Unsurprisingly, individuals who
exhibited a high level of political activism were more likely to support violent extremism and
individuals with a high level of hope for the future were less likely to support violent extremism.
Findings suggest that constructs such as political activism and hope for the future should be
viewed on a spectrum with violent extremism requiring the most commitment to political
activism and the least hope for the future. The study also found that individuals living in urban
environments were more likely to support violent extremism and engage in violent extremism
but less likely to travel abroad to do so. This research suggests that counter-radicalization efforts
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in urban environments should focus on local participation in violent extremism while counterradicalization efforts in rural environment should focus on foreign participation in violent
extremism. Like the study on individuals in Palestine, this study found that the concept of
promoting alternatives to political violence did not diminish propensity toward violent
extremism. In contrast to the prior study in Palestine, the study did not address the peer-to-peer
relationship but found that individuals in Yemen are not influenced by parents and religious
leaders because they have a general distrust of authority. In addition, religious devotion did not
influence individual attitudes towards violent extremism though it did have some effect in
Palestine (Robinson et al., 2017).
While both studies relied heavily on the openness and honesty of participants with little
incentive to cooperate, the results are still notable. Several federal and local governments,
including those in the United States, Europe, and Canada are currently investing a significant
amount of resources to improve the individual and structural factors that are believed to
contribute to extremism and provide alternatives to political violence. Yet, this study shows that
investing in efforts that cultivate a sense of apathy could be more effective. In addition, the
differences between the two studies in Palestine and Yemen further demonstrate that counterradicalization efforts must be tailored to specific audiences. This study suggests that while
focusing efforts on familial relationships and religious devotion may be effective in Yemen, they
could be ineffective in Palestine. It is critical that researchers develop an understanding of what
an audience values before attempting to engage them (Robinson et al., 2017).
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The Emergence of Social Media
Social media provides terrorist organizations with a platform to broadcast their message
throughout the world and deliver enabling support to followers. The Islamic State is particularly
savvy with social media and use various tactics to make their movement appear larger, stronger,
and more exhilarating than it actually may be. While a robust social media presence can impact
recruitment, it could also contribute to attrition if the Islamic State cannot provide more benefits
than costs.
The Internet as a Gateway to Radicalization
Gill et al (2017) studied the police interviews, trial records, and computer records of 223
convicted terrorists in the United Kingdom. Gill’s et al., work attempted to determine if and how
terrorists the internet to become radicalized, prepare for an attack, and execute an attack. The
researchers found that 61% of the convicted terrorists utilized the internet to view content
including beheadings and executions, crimes against Muslims, interviews with various notable
radical fighters and preachers, jihadist texts, and attack preparation and training videos. They
found that many of the terrorists went online not to have their beliefs changed, but to have their
beliefs reinforced and to develop an understanding of how to commit attacks. The study
concluded that the convicted terrorists who had completed significant online research were more
likely to choose hard targets (i.e., government facilities) and conduct sophisticated attacks. As a
result, the researchers recommended that governmental and nongovernmental organization
efforts focus less on changing ideology and more on eliminating online content that inspires and
instructs terrorists on how to commit attacks. The sample included lone-actors and groups who
were convicted of planning an attack or facilitating terrorism (i.e., financing operations and
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distributing propaganda). The researchers concluded that lone-actors were 2.64 times more likely
to use the internet to plan and execute an attack because they lacked the variety of expertise that
is often found in groups (Gill et al., 2017).
In a similar study, Koehler (2017) conducted interviews with former extremists to ask
questions about how the internet changed and shaped their individual radicalization, and found
that the majority credited the internet as their gateway to radicalization. Individuals who seek
extremist information on the internet have already completed the sensitivity phase. In the
discovery phase, an unfiltered ideology is presented to the recruit. In the group membership
phase, the recruit can virtually meet and network with like-minded individuals and adapt a
radical world view. In the commitment to action phase, the recruit can find instructions about
targets and attack methods. Koehler (2017) found that the anonymity that the internet provides
made individuals more likely to speak or act radically and the amount of user accounts also made
the movement seem larger than it was which contributed to the belief that the movement could
realistically achieve their short-term and long-term goals. In addition, by communicating with
others online, individuals were able to easily build a reputation and network which enabled them
to contribute to the existing ideology which not only gave them a sense of belonging but also
made them feel empowered. The authors concluded that the internet is the most important
element driving radicalization and could also make it the most effective platform for intervention
(Koehler, 2017).
The studies conducted by both Koehler (2017) and Gill et al (2017) provide strong
evidence of the dangers of self-radicalization which can be achieved without the influence of
recruiters. While the sensitivity phase may be unavoidable, what occurs during the discovery
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phase, group membership phase, and commitment to action phase should be researched to
determine if there are opportunities for intervention. For example, both Koehler (2017) and Gill
et al (2017) agree that the virtual and/or physical interaction with like-minded individuals play a
pivotal role in radicalization, attack planning, and execution (Gill et al., 2017). Perhaps by
stopping social media users from moving past the discovery phase or by stopping
communication during the group membership phase, radicalization could be prevented.
However, while Koehler (2017) believes that intervention should be solely focused on the virtual
environment, Gill et al (2017) believes that intervention should be focused on both the physical
and virtual environment because both have historically played a role in radicalization.
Regardless, their studies convincingly argue that the internet influences the occurrence of
radicalization and possibly the severity of attacks.
The Islamic State’s Messaging Tactics
Several researchers including Torok (2015), Badaway and Ferrara (2017), and Ingram
(2015), have studied the specific messaging tactics used by terrorist organizations to gain a
following on social media. As previously mentioned, Al-Qaeda attempted to cater to the needs of
local populations to gain support. In contrast, the Islamic State rules with fear by offering only
two options to the territories they conquer – conversion or death (Torok, 2015). They broadcast
their brutality in theater productions that normalize radical attitudes and makes their tactics seem
acceptable (Torok, 2015). Continued exposure to indiscriminate torture and killing may cause
vulnerable individuals to define their perception of Islamic Rule. However, Torok (2015) and
Ingram (2015), agree that graphic images alone do not radicalize individuals.
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Badawy and Ferrara (2017) focused on Arabic content posted by the Islamic State as they
traced the connection between terrorist rhetoric and global events. The authors used a dataset of
25,000 Islamic State promotional accounts on Twitter and studied their tweets made between
January 2014 and June 2015. During this time period, the Islamic State conducted crucifixions in
Raqqa and invaded Mosul, Tikrit, and Sinjar – all causing spikes in online conversations. The
authors separated Islamic State content into three categories: violence-driven, theological, and
sectarian. They found that the violence-driven content is used to draw viewers and the
theological and sectarian content is used to justify action.
Torok (2015) found that once an individual is actively following the Islamic State on
social media, they often are exposed to content that encourages them to isolate themselves from
their prior personal relationships and encourages them to develop virtual networks, bolstering
radicalization (Torok, 2015). The Islamic State facilitates the group membership phase by
communicating a consistent narrative that focuses on the grievances Muslims have had to endure
due to oppressive foreign powers and their duty to create an Islamic State (Torok, 2015).
Interestingly, they do not downplay the risk of joining the Islamic State. Instead, they frame
martyrdom as a challenge and reward for those courageous enough to participate (Torok, 2015).
Torok (2015) concludes that the Islamic State messaging derives its legitimacy from passages in
the Quran and Hadith, fatwas, and statements by prominent radical scholars. However, Ingram
(2015), credits the Islamic State’s impressive following to their presentation of information that
shapes perceptions of security, stability, livelihood, and develops an in-group versus out-group
mentality.
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The Islamic State portrays its governance as all-encompassing, sophisticated, and
organized to create a vision of what life could be like for their supporters. They accomplish this
task by regularly disseminating information about successful military operations, security
posture, law and order, economy, social welfare programs, education, infrastructure, and positive
relationships with various tribes in the region. At the same time, they craft messages that
magnify crisis and position the caliphate as the only solution while reminding Muslims that it is
their divine duty to participate in their efforts. The Islamic State also uses baiting to reinforce
their message and polarize viewers. For example, in the video “Healing the Believers Chest,” the
Islamic State had a captured Jordanian Air Force pilot walk through the rubble in Syria, past the
dead bodies of women and children, before being burned alive. The purpose was to increase the
perception of crisis and provoke a disproportionate response from Jordan which they could then
further capitalize. The video sparked global backlash that enabled the Islamic State to further
propagate their message (Ingram, 2015).
The Islamic State’s utilization of message framing argues that their efforts are
meticulously planned and deliberate. Torok (2015) and Ingram (2015) agree that a feasible
strategy to limit the influence of the Islamic State’s campaign is to dispute their core principles at
every level, specifically challenging the depiction of crisis and control of the caliphate. A strong
barrier to this approach is the Islamic State directly confronting the counter-narratives as false
and misleading (Ingram, 2015). Therefore, the information provided by the counter-narrative
would have to be constant, substantiated, and highly adaptive to criticism (Torok, 2015).
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Attempted Solutions
Several governments have attempted to reduce terrorism by administering immersive deradicalization programs, intervening militarily, implementing restrictive immigration policies,
monitoring internet activities, and executing information operations. This section of the literature
review discusses the limited success of these programs and the potential impact of studying and
improving certain strategies.
Immersive Deradicalization Programs
Several countries administer immersive deradicalization programs. The author of, “How
Could a Terrorist be Deradicalized,” was interested in determining what approaches are
successful in eliminating radical beliefs and radical intent to act (Bertram, 2015). Bertram (2015)
studied immersive deradicalization programs administered in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan
by conducting interviews with terrorists and intervention personnel. The only unsuccessful
program that the researcher studied was in Yemen, which focused on terrorists who have been
captured. In contrast, the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani immersive deradicalization programs were
focused on terrorists who chose to defect willingly. Bertram (2015) concluded that the most
critical aspect of an immersive deradicalization program is the relationship between intervention
personnel and the terrorist; working within a process that is flexible and adaptive. Bertram
(2015) also noted that when studying deradicalization programs, social media often plays a role
in the individual’s initial radicalization and therefore may also be a tool for countering the
Islamic State’s narrative (Bertram, 2015).
The Saudi Arabian immersive deradicalization program approaches deradicalization by
providing educational support to assist individuals in understanding the ideology and emotional
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support to address apprehensions about reintegrating into society. To accomplish this, they
present defectors with religious authorities for educational support, trusted family, and fully
deradicalized former terrorists for emotional support. Interestingly, the Saudi Arabian immersive
deradicalization program also treated the terrorists as victims which eliminates fear of retribution
and may contribute to their success. The Pakistani immersive deradicalization program focused
on providing education and vocational training to ensure that individuals were able to support
themselves when released. This approach is used because several terrorist organizations in
Pakistan target financially vulnerable families. Like the Saudi-Arabian immersive
deradicalization program, the Pakistani immersive deradicalization program also provided
religious guidance. By targeting individuals’ religious beliefs, psychological states,
socioeconomic status, and even family life, these immersive deradicalization programs attempt
to completely re-shape the terrorist’s lives and allowed them to break free from jihadism.
Immersive deradicalization programs are not used by most governments because their
effectiveness has not been empirically tested. Webber, Chernikova, Kruglanski, Gelfand,
Hettiarachchi, Gunaratna, and Belanger (2018) attempted to gauge effectiveness when studying
an immersive deradicalization program in Sri Lanka for former members of the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam. The immersive deradicalization program was aimed at providing terrorists with
sustained mechanisms for earning personal significance (Webber et al., 2018). Sustained
mechanisms for earning personal significance include training on how to build a new social
network, find a job, and even start a family. By surveying terrorists throughout the
deradicalization program, researchers found that extremist thoughts and intentions were
significantly reduced (Webber et al., 2018). The researchers also found that upon release,
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beneficiaries expressed lower levels of extremism than their counterparts in the community
(Webber et al., 2018). While these results appear to be promising, they are difficult to validate
because it is challenging to assess whether a terrorist has been deradicalized or if they just want
to appear compliant to avoid imprisonment. In addition, it is difficult for researchers to determine
if a terrorist who has completed an immersive deradicalization program has re-entered their
previous terrorist organization, or joined a new terrorist organization. The study also ignores the
effect of other variables that could have had a more significant effect on deradicalization such as
disappointment in the resources or group membership provided by the terrorist organization or a
desire to return home and start a family.
Other researchers such as Ferguson (2016) and Barelle (2015) claim that while immersive
deradicalization programs are beneficial, they often do not cause deradicalization. Ferguson
(2016) drew his conclusions studying defectors of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland
while Barelle (2015) developed her conclusions studying various Islamic-based terrorist
organizations in the Middle East. Individuals often chose to defect from terrorist organizations
due to the same structural and individual factors that caused them to join in the first place
(Cragin et al., 2015). Perhaps they were seeking a way to make a difference, or feel less isolated,
but the terrorist organization was unable to satisfy those needs and may have even made their
lives even more stressful (Barelle, 2015). Changes in perspective often contribute to what Barelle
(2015) calls natural deradicalization that occurs as a terrorist gets older and their priorities
change. Ferguson (2016) and Barelle (2015) both found that the terrorist organizations’ inability
to meet expectations has a much more significant impact on deradicalization than an immersive

60

deradicalization program which provides educational, emotional, and sometimes even financial
support.
Military Intervention
After 9/11, the United States embarked on the War on Terror, which involved the use of
targeted killings aimed at eliminating senior leadership of various terrorist organizations. The
purpose of targeted killings was to disrupt and degrade terrorist operations and deter future
attacks. Targeted killings also discredit terrorist organizations by making it look incapable of
protecting its own leadership which could make it more difficult to retain current followers and
recruit new followers. The strategy was largely based off one notable success. In 2007, a terrorist
organization headquartered in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf, split into factions and became more
focused on petty crime after its leaders were killed (Cronin, 2013). However, Abu Sayyaf was
unique because it was hierarchically structured and lacked a clear succession plan (Cronin,
2013). Over time, the War on Terror strategy expanded to include not only the targeted killing of
leadership but also targeted killing of followers (Cronin, 2013). This expansion inevitably led to
the accidental death of civilians (Cronin, 2013). Many critics of the War on Terror feel that
eliminating leadership and followers does not necessarily solve problems and may prolong
conflict because there is often an endless stream of replacements; or worse, more competent
replacements (Bloom, 2017). In addition, terrorist organizations often use targeted killings to
legitimize their cause, invigorate current followers, and recruit more followers – all of which
increases a terrorist organization’s chance of survival. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State both
regularly broadcast footage of drone strikes, portraying them as indiscriminate violence against
Muslims.
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Researchers have attempted to study the effectiveness of targeted killings by measuring
the frequency and severity of attacks following strikes against key leaders. However, due to the
reality that it can take a terrorist organization months, or years, to develop a plan to retaliate
against a specific strike, the results have been largely inconclusive and even contradictory. For
example, Carson (2017) examined the effects of 10 targeted killings on the average monthly
number of attacks and number of days until the next attack and found that there was no
significant effect on attack frequency. However, Carson’s (2017) study does not examine the
effects of the targeted killings on the severity of attacks or attempt to attribute attacks to the
terrorist organizations that were directly affected by the targeted killing. In another study,
Johnston & Sarbahi (2016), found that drone strikes in Pakistan conducted from 2007-2011 were
associated in decreases in the frequency and severity of attacks. This study is flawed because it
does not attempt to attribute attacks to the terrorist organizations that were directly affected by
the targeted killing (Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016). An increase, decrease, or stagnation in frequency
and severity of attacks could be attributed to a multitude of reasons, including: seasonal fighting
patterns, world events, and fluctuations in financing, among others.
Researchers have also attempted to study the rate of recruitment following targeted
killings. A study conducted by Shah (2018) examined the local and global impact of drone strikes
in Pakistan on terrorist recruitment. To complete his study, Shah (2018) interviewed citizens
living in the most heavily targeted districts in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) and examined the surveys of 500 detained terrorists. In addition, Shah (2018) examined
the trial testimonies and accounts of terrorists convicted in the U.S. Based on the responses, the
researcher concluded that there was not a significant impact on terrorist recruitment at the local
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or global levels (Shah, 2018). Instead, he found that other factors such as identity crises,
political, and economic grievances have more effect on terrorist recruitment (Shah, 2018). Shah
(2018) also noted that online exposure to jihadist ideologies and influence of peers and social
networks have a more significant impact on radicalization than military intervention. While the
interviews conducted in the FATA were focused on assessing the effect of drone strikes on
terrorist recruitment, the surveys, trial testimonies, and accounts of terrorists were more general.
Shah (2018) utilized thematic content analysis to identify key themes, highlighting text
that appeared to describe an opinion, and then recording the incidence/variance and direction of
responses which were reported as percentages for the whole sample. This method is highly
subjective due to its dependence upon the researcher’s interpretation of incidence/variance and
direction. In addition, interviews, surveys, and trial testimonies are often unreliable sources of
data because they are dependent on the participant’s honesty. Many of the participants in this
study feared reprisals from the governments that developed the questions and the terrorist
organizations who often threaten participants for cooperating with researchers. However, Shah’s
(2018) research is the only systematic study of the effect of drone strikes on terrorist recruitment.
The lack of substantiated research on the effectiveness of military intervention and the
many obstacles to developing substantiated research on the effectiveness of intervention make it
a controversial solution to terrorism. Cronin (2013) encourages governments to research
alternatives. Cronin (2013) concludes that a more effective way to defeat terrorist organizations
may be to discredit its message and divide followers. Terrorist organizations already have
disagreements about short-term and long-term goals, mission, and vision (Cronin, 2013). Cronin
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(2013) argues that these disagreements should be exploited to make potential followers doubt the
messages they are hearing and viewing.
The Muslim Ban
On 27 January 2018, the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, signed an Executive Order called “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,”
also named “the Muslim Ban.” The purpose of this Executive Order was to prevent radicalized
terrorists from entering the country by the following: (1) lowering the number of refugees to be
admitted into the U.S. by 50,000, (2) halt the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days
while a new system was put in place to increase vetting, (3) ban entry of foreign nationals for 90
days from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen with exceptions to be granted on
a case-by-case basis, and (4) ban the entry of foreign nationals from Syria indefinitely. While the
Muslim Ban was blocked by various courts and only upheld for 50 days, more than 700 travelers
were detained and up to 60,000 visas were provisionally revoked during this time (Patel & Levinson-Waldman, 2017).
In the distinguished study, “Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the
West” the authors researched 51 successful attacks throughout the U.S., Europe, and Canada between 2014 and 2017 to determine the legal status and motivations for the attackers. The researchers found that 73% were citizens (Vindino et al., 2017). Of the citizens, the majority were
second generation citizens. The researchers concluded that while the first-generation citizens still
feel connected to their native country, the second-generation citizens often feel little connection
to their native country and marginalized by their new country leading them to find new ways to
define their identity. As a result, second generation citizens pose the greatest terrorist threat to the
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U.S., Europe, and Canada, not legal residents, refugees, or illegal immigrants (Vindino et al.,
2017).
In addition to being unenforceable and ineffective, the Muslim Ban also led to widespread islamophobia. While terrorist attacks are salient in the minds of many Americans, they
represent a relatively small actual threat to livelihood compared to heart disease, cancer, gun violence, car accidents, and diabetes, among others (Mosher & Gould, 2017). Since 9/11, foreignborn terrorists have killed an average of one American per year and home-grown terrorists have
killed an average of six Americans per year (Mosher & Gould, 2017). In addition, of the 1.5 billion Muslims in the world, roughly 25% of Muslims believe in the Islamic State, and roughly 1%
of that 25% of Muslims believe that violence should be used to develop the Islamic State
(Beydoun, 2017). These statistics translate to only a few thousand, and of that few thousand,
only a few hundred are focusing their efforts on global terrorism (Beydoun, 2017).
Monitoring Social Media
When considering terrorism there are typically three types of terrorists. There are enabled
terrorists who receive training, weapons, and instructions to commit attacks that are planned by
terrorist organizations. There are directed terrorists who only receive instructions to commit attacks that are chosen by terrorist organizations. And finally, there are inspired terrorists who often have minimal, if any, contact with terrorist organizations and instead have to plan and execute their attacks with general information (Vindino et al., 2017).
Of the different types of inspired terrorists, Maltene and Lasse (2017) categorize two
types – the peripheral drifter and the failed joiner. The peripheral drifter has difficulty maintaining personal relationships with family and friends, mental health issues which cause them to
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withdraw further, and only feel acceptance once they discover a terrorist group. The failed joiner
attempted to connect to a terrorist group but fails and decides to act alone (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). The peripheral drifter and failed joiner make an enticing case for developing a
profile for terrorists and monitoring social media to discover their presence and intentions.
Most social media data mining efforts focus on attempting to develop a profile of users
who are at risk of being radicalized and then monitoring their activity. Lara-Cabrera, Pardo, Benouaret, Faci, Benslimane and Camacho (2017) used various algorithms to evaluate risk of radicalization for a sample of social media users. The researchers began by using the Alter-Ego Network Model where they labeled specific users as Ego and the users that they interacted with as
Alters. Lara-Cabrera et al (2017) then applied multiple bottom-up and top-down algorithms to
map different communities and understand how they connected. Once the social communities
were mapped, the researchers worked to identify users within them who have a high risk of being
radicalized and then they analyzed the social communities that they interacted with. The researchers used five indicators to assess vulnerability to radicalization, including frustration, introversion, and perception of discrimination for being Muslim, negative views of the West, and
positive views of jihadism. The researchers measured frustration with word usage, capitalization,
and introversion with sentence length, and the use of ellipses. The researchers also measured perception of discrimination for being Muslim, negative views of the West, and positive views of
jihadism by analyzing the content of posts and specifically looking for the presence of double
keywords/phrases. For example, “hate and U.S.” or “divine duty and jihad.” While the researchers investigated 112 users, they noted that some of them may have been duplicate accounts
owned by the same person. They found that most users posted less than 300 tweets since creating
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their account and had approximately 1,000 followers but there were a few users who fell outside
of that range with much more tweets and followers. Unsurprisingly, Lara-Cabrera et al (2017)
researchers found strong correlations between perception of discrimination for being Muslim and
expressing negative views of the West and positive views of jihadism. The researchers thought
that once these individuals have been identified, actions can be taken to prevent their radicalization (Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017).
While researchers agree that social media can be used to radicalize at risk individuals,
few studies have focused on how exactly radicalization is accomplished through social media.
Rowe and Saif (2016) were interested in discovering how to detect when a user has adopted a
pro-Islamic State stance and behavior. They identified specific social media users who became
activated, which they defined as sharing radicalized content, and examined how their language
and social interactions changed before, during, and after activation. Rowe and Saif (2016)
measured the lexical terms used by a user, the content that was shared, and the references to
other users. The researchers found that in addition to sharing specific word choices, many of the
activated users also followed the same accounts. The authors concluded that activated users
adopted their radicalized language and social interactions from users that were sharing
radicalized content with them, and whom they also shared commonalities. This demonstrates that
it is not only the content but the perception of belonging that radicalizes individuals (Rowe &
Saif, 2016). In addition, in the days leading up to activation, the researchers saw a significant
increase in radicalized language as if the users were rejecting their old way of thinking and
communicating and immersing themselves in a new way of thinking and communicating (Rowe
& Saif, 2016).
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Of the many activated users that Rowe and Saif (2016) studied, very few planned and
executed attacks because radicalization occurs on a spectrum. Once an individual is radicalized,
their level of commitment can increase, decrease, or stay the same (van Eerten et al., 2017). On
one side of the spectrum is passive terrorism, where individuals may simply encourage others to
fight in the jihad either in person or virtually (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). On the other side
of the spectrum is active terrorism, where individuals are planning and executing attacks
(Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). Monitoring social media will inevitably lead to the discovery of
a mixture of passive and active terrorists. There is currently no validated method that can help
data miners distinguish between the two. In addition, developing a profile of what an at risk
individual may look like, and then scouring social media for their presence, violates the civil
liberties that most developed nations promise to protect in defend.
A Failed Information Operation
After 9/11 the U.S. Government decided to address online radicalization. Researchers
examined several counter-narrative programs executed by the U.S. Department of State during
the Bush and Obama Administrations. During the Bush Administration, the Digital Outreach
Team (DOT) was tasked with debunking propaganda about U.S. foreign policy, but faced many
challenges considering the United States’ long history of injustices. The campaign was quickly
discredited by critics who pointed out the hypocrisy of the U.S. Government condemning
violence while simultaneously us advanced interrogation tactics and killing civilians via drone
strokes. The program was further undermined by the unauthorized disclosure of U.S. Central
Command’s OPERATION Earnest Voice which involved using machine learning software to
administer hundreds of online personas that promoted counter-radicalization content over the
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internet without attributing itself to an employer – the U.S. Government. During the Obama
Administration, the DOT shifted its strategy from promoting the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy to
discrediting key disseminators and undermining the image of terrorism for social justice, false
information about religion, claims of military success, deaths of innocent Muslims, mistreatment
of women, and testimony of former foreign fighters. The DOT began using social media
platforms to create a conversation with individuals in support of jihad and to develop a mutual
understanding rather than impose a set of values on another culture. They engaged directly in
English, Arabic, Persian, Urdu, and Farsi. Unlike other countries such as France, Israel, China,
and Russia, who pose as ordinary users, the DOT identified themselves as the U.S. Department
of State. Still, the campaign was criticized for being out of touch with the general user
population. Posts and replies to commentary were long and well-written while terrorist recruiters
were more relatable using wit and cultural references. Like the Bush’s campaign, it was seen as
counterproductive because it drew attention to jihadists and also frequently prompted the
discussion of the most shameful discretions of the U.S. Government (Khatib, Dutton, &
Thelwall, 2012).
Khatib et al. (2012) analyzed 181 posts from the DOT and 459 posts from other non-state
counter-radicalization users and found that the DOT posts generated more negativity and were
largely seen as counterproductive. In this study, only 4.8% of the comments expressed a positive
view of the U.S. The authors also concluded that state sponsored counter-radicalization campaigns face many limitations, whereas partnering with community groups and nongovernmental
organizations to develop capacity, but not drive the message, may be a better option. The researchers specifically focused on reactions to a speech made by President Barack Obama’s on
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June 4, 2009, in Cairo, Egypt, calling for a new beginning with the Muslim World. The DOT began 30 threads by either posting a video or transcription of the speech which prompted 459 comments by other users and 181 replies by the DOT. Khatib et al (2012) studied the reaction to the
DOTs initial post and subsequent posts to measure stance (positive, negative, or natural), type of
rhetoric (emotional, logical, religious), and tone (dismissive, refuting, engaging, accepting, condescending, or ridiculing.) They concluded that 80% of other posts were of a negative stance,
92% were of other posts emotional rhetoric, and 56% of other posts were refuting in tone. In addition, the researchers noted that most of the other posts brought up U.S. imperialism, suffering
in the Middle East caused by the U.S., downfall of the U.S., and U.S. support for Israel. Overall,
the DOTs efforts appeared to be counter-productive as it exacerbated tension. However, the DOT
argued that the study did not take into consideration the effect of silent observers, known as
‘lurkers,’ who form views based on posts but not commenting. It is possible that the DOT was
able to change the hearts and minds of lurkers who chose to remain silent because their opinion
was in the minority (Khatib et al., 2012).
The DOT faced many challenges while executing their campaign. They took an average
of 2.77 days to respond because the group had to choose which posts to respond to, research the
topic, develop a response, and then receive approval to post (Khatib et al., 2012). This is an issue
in an environment where the administrators are already outnumbered by users who can spend all
day and night freely posting. This imbalance in the amount of post inevitably makes the DOT
and their arguments appear weak. In addition, the other users occasionally made posts that were
impossible to respond to, such as the images of dead women and children. Despite the failures of
the DOT, the researchers argue that foreign policy cannot be left up to the public’s interpretation.
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Governments need to invest time and resources to ensure that their messages are heard in the
way that they were intended. The researchers also propose that if a counter-narrative is unsuccessful, perhaps a parallel narrative that preaches multiculturalism and inclusiveness could be
more promising (Khatib et al., 2012).
Competing Narratives and Counter-Narratives
Governments have a window when they can successfully dissuade an individual from
joining a terrorist organization. During this time, governments can provide a counter-narrative
which emphasizes the costs of joining a terrorist organization, a competing-narrative which emphasizes the benefits of not joining a terrorist organization, or elements of both counter-narratives and competing-narratives. Current research emphasizes the importance of tailoring these
narratives to local populations.
Phases of Radicalization to Focus On
The researchers who published, Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks
in the West, were particularly interested in why some European countries such as France,
Germany, and Belgium have experienced a high number of attacks while other European
countries such as Spain and Italy have experienced a low number of attacks (Vidino et al., 2017).
After all, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Italy all have similarly sized Muslim
populations (between 5% and 7%) and are not inclusive of Muslims from a political and social
perspective (Vidino et al., 2017). Vidino, Marone, and Entenmann (2017) found that Spain and
Italy, Muslims do not live in closed communities where they can easily discuss sympathetic
attitudes towards terrorism. As a result, it very difficult for radicalized mosques to develop and
spread their ideology. Once again, this research emphasizes the importance of the first two
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phases of radicalization – sensitivity and discovery. In addition, Vidino et al (2017) states that to
complete the radicalization process, an individual often needs to be influenced by either virtual
or physical social networks which emphasizes the impact of the group membership phase. Rowe
and Saif (2016) found that highly publicized world events involving the Islamic State, such as
territorial gains by the Islamic State, attacks conducted by the Islamic State, and the execution of
enemy hostages by the Islamic State appear to have significantly accelerated radicalization for
many individuals. This provides a strong argument for the validity of the fourth stage of
radicalization which involves a trigger event. These trigger events may not directly affect the
individual but nonetheless solidifies their commitment to action (Rowe & Saif, 2016). There is
very little a government can do to prevent an individual from experiencing the sensitivity and
commitment to action phases of radicalization. However, a government may be able to intervene
during the discovery and group membership phases of radicalization.
Cronin (2013) stated that if terrorist organizations continue to perpetuate their message,
they will not be defeated. The problem is not the terrorists, it is the ideology behind their actions.
Therefore, terrorism cannot be solved by destroying domestic and transnational terrorist
organizations. Terrorism can be solved by learning about the ideology, searching for
vulnerabilities, and then communicating a new ideology (Cronin, 2013). The existing literature
seems to distinguish by two types of narratives; competing-narratives and counter-narratives.
Competing-narratives demonstrate the benefits of avoiding terrorism whereas counter-narratives
demonstrate the costs of participating in terrorism. However, there is very little research on
which approach is more effective in reaching the general user population, or how effectiveness
should be measured.
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An example of a competing-narrative is Minhaj-ul-Quran International which is run by
the Islamic scholar Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri. Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri is a respected religious thinker who has
authored books and given lectures addressing how terrorist organizations have misinterpreted the
Quran and Hadith. He is known for releasing several fatwas denouncing extremism. In 2010, he
released a fatwa which demonstrated each contradiction that the terrorists use to justify killing
innocent women and children and to gain followers. He explained that Islam only justifies killing
in self-defense (Shorer-Zeltser & Ben-Israel, 2016). He also emphasized that “tawhid” means belief in one God and it does not mean that God must be obeyed in every way and that those who
do not follow God’s laws should be persecuted (Shorer-Zeltser & Ben-Israel, 2016). These are
commonly held ideas by the jihadists that could easily be dispelled if all Muslims could read the
Arabic text within the Quran and Hadith. In addition to exposing contradictions between terrorist
ideology and Islamic texts, Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri routinely criticizes the U.S. Government for encouraging the terrorist ideology by making Muslims feel threatened. Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri founded
an institution. Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International, that uses several communication channels including the internet to discuss the promotion of tolerance and urge Muslims to take advantage of the
opportunities offered to them in the U.S., Europe, and Canada and to embrace the culture where
they can live and practice freely. He emphasizes the opportunities available outside of the Islamic State such as public education, jobs, and even recreational sports. Minhaj-ul-Quran International also provides religious literature for those interested in Islam and organizes daily events
throughout the world which encourage Muslims to learn more about their religion and become
involved with their local and global communities (Shorer-Zeltser & Ben-Israel, 2016).
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Betram (2015) argues that challenging the religious doctrine spread by the terrorist organization will be ineffective because most individuals viewing the information will not have the
scholarly background required to be convinced by rational critique. Bertram (2015) believes that
counter-narratives should expose the contradictions that exist within the ideology and discredit
the goals. Betram (2015) suggests accomplishing this task by highlighting the poor living conditions that terrorists endure and the atrocities that they witness. Betram (2015) specifically cited
the case study of Mohammed Mahbub Husain who was a member of Jamat-e-Islami and Hizb utTahrir. It was not until there was a murder of an innocent man orchestrated by his terrorist organization that he began considering their goals and searching for more information. Through online
research, Mohamed Mahbub Husain deradicalized and defected. The case study proves that a
counter-narrative can be effective (Betram, 2015).
The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism interviewed 43 Islamic State
defectors and produced video clips where they denounced the group (McDowell-Smith et al.,
2017). In the video clips, each of the Islamic State defectors told stories about the corruption and
brutality of the Islamic State and closed with a final warning to others to refrain from joining
(McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). This is an emotional approach to providing a counter-narrative
which contrasts with the logical approach used by most counter-narratives. This approach
focuses on providing factual religious, political, and social information that exposes the
hypocrisy of the Islamic State. The video clips were focus-tested on a small normative sample of
75 college students who then filled out a survey with closed-ended and open-ended questions
(McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). Overall, the college students found the content to be authentic
and disturbing which ultimately made radicalization seem unappealing. 95% of respondents
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considered the Islamic State to be a terrorist organization and 90% of respondents also thought
that if others watched the videos, they would be convinced not to join the Islamic State
(McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). The authors note that this strategy does not address the
underlying individual vulnerabilities that often lead to radicalization and that many of the college
students already held a negative view of the Islamic State prior to completing the study, making
it inherently bias. Since conducting their study, McDowell-Smith et al (2017) have begun
experimenting with placing the videos on social media accounts of those endorsing the Islamic
State and have even subtitled the videos in various other languages in an attempt to capture the
attention of at risk individuals who may be inclined to support the Islamic State (McDowellSmith et al., 2017).
A Localized Approach
The previous research studies on radicalization in Palestine and Yemen prove that
motivations differ from one country to the next and even from urban to rural environments. This
reality calls for a localized approach to counter-radicalization. Mirahmadi (2016) recommends
using community-based organizations to develop and communicate a counter-narrative. If the
government builds partnerships with community-led initiatives by moderate Muslims, then it
could deter individuals from radicalizing in the first place. Mirahmadi (2016) argues that
moderate Muslims are best positioned to lead a counter-narrative, however, their networks in the
U.S.— mosques, cultural associations, community centers, and college student groups— need
help to develop their institutional capacity and improve their messaging capabilities. Partners
should support religious freedom, non-violent conflict resolution, and the preservation of the
constitution as the rule of law. Partners should also provide community centers that foster a sense
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of belonging and provide access to mentors who preach socially responsible definitions of what
it means to be a “good Muslim” based on shared American and Islamic values. Partners could
even provide counseling that is authentic and therefore palatable to at-risk Muslims. While
Mirahmadi (2016) only addresses intervention in physical communities, there are also
opportunities to intervene in virtual communities (Gill et al., 2017). Communities can provide
online forums where moderate Muslims issue statements against radical ideologies that breed
violence and hatred; and post content that highlights Islamic values of religious tolerance,
pluralism, gender equality, and social cohesion. Online forums reach even further than at risk
individuals by providing the public with information that is geared toward preventing
islamophobia and making Muslims feel welcome in all communities.
Graduate students at Carleton University in Ottowa developed a fact-based counternarrative platform to prevent individuals who were just beginning to research terrorism from
becoming fully radicalized (Wilner & Rigato, 2017). The administrators chose to use Facebook
for its wide user base that included their target demographic of 16-25-year old and decided to
focus on trustworthy messaging, engaging content, and accessible delivery. Their goals were to
post and share accurate and timely information that undermined the extremist ideology, provided
information about warning signs of radicalization, reduced feelings of social isolation, and
disseminated credible voices (local and national community leaders, academia, and former
extremists). Given these highly sensitive political subjects, they were also motivated to dismantle
stereotypes to prevent islamophobia. The graduate students chartered two focus groups to
develop their brand by providing feedback on content, material, style, and strategy. The focus
groups showed a preference for pastel colors, visually simple designs, short sentences, and links
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to reputable news articles. Over a period of three months in 2017, graduate students made 140
posts. During this time, their most popular posts were testimonials from former terrorists and
information about a recent terrorist attack that occurred in the United Kingdom. The researchers
determined popularity by studying reach, clicks, and engagement. The number of newsfeeds that
the posts appeared on measured reach. The number of times the link was accessed from their
posts measured clicks. The number of comments made on each post measured engagement.
Wilner & Rigato (2017) were surprised to find that while their campaign focused on Canadians
and was specifically geared towards students attending University of Ottowa, it also reached
U.S., India, Saudi Arabia, and Australia, demonstrating the potential of the campaign. While
these metrics are telling, they do not measure the effect that a post had on the viewer. The study
was also limited because they only posted in English which limited the reach; however, the
information still appealed to local and global audiences (Wilner & Rigato, 2017).
Saudi Arabia has also attempted to develop an online counter-narrative through a
Nongovernmental Organization with support from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs known as the
Sakinah Campaign (Casptack, 2015). The Sakinah Campaign uses scholars of Islam who
complete four tasks to limit extremism. First, the scholars collect and catalog jihadist material
which is used to understand the thinking. Second, the scholars open a dialogue with Muslims
who are seeking information on the internet about their religion and encourage them to avoid
militancy. These dialogues last from a few hours to a few months and are posted online for others
to see. Third, the scholars infiltrate extremist websites with forums to create dissent by exposing
the contradictions in the extremist’s interpretation of the religion. The government of Saudi
Arabia also penalizes the owners of websites that promote Islamic Militancy which include a
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maximum of 10 years in prison and/or fines reaching the equivalent of $1.3M. Fourth, the
scholars maintain a website for the Sakinah Campaign that serves as a repository of factual
religious information for those studying Islam and includes fatwa’s issued by clerics that
denounce violence. The Sakinah Campaign has announced that it has persuaded several hundred
individuals from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere to change their views on jihadism. The government
of Saudi Arabia runs this counter-narrative in addition to an extensive immersive deradicalization
program for prisoners. Experts involved in the immersive deradicalization program for prisoners
believe that they have a 90% success rate due to the reality that an estimated 10% of jihadists are
“hard-core” and refuse to cooperate with the rehabilitation process. Therefore, both immersive
and online counter-radicalization efforts are focused on jihadist sympathizers and supporters who
may already be somewhat disillusioned by terrorism (Casptack, 2015).
Messaging Theories
Current research suggests that quantity and quality are both important aspects to conducing a campaign on social media. Governments may want to focus on increasing the amount of
posts while focusing on the audience, communicator, and content of posts.
Creating the Illusion of Consensus with Constant Posting
In addition to communicating a new message, social media can also be used to change an
existing narrative. During the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Hezbollah manipulated and
controlled information within the operational environment to its advantage. Hezbollah used
staged and altered photographs and videos and limited where journalists went and what they saw
(Matusitz, 2018). Hezbollah also timed releases of information for maximum strategic effect
(Matusitz, 2018). These tactics made it appear as if Israel was disproportionately using force in
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response the kidnapping of only two soldiers. Hezbollah used self-justifying posts to affect
perceptions of blame and used self-congratulatory posts information to affect public perceptions
of victory (Matusitz, 2018). Hezbollah's efforts focused on gaining trust and sympathy for its
cause and because Israel provided no counter view - Hezbollah's perceptions were accepted
regionally and worldwide (Matusitz, 2018). After the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Israel
created a governmental department to study and execute information operations. They
determined that while Lebanon incurred more losses, they were able to create a perception of
failure for Israel (Matusitz, 2018). As a result, the world saw a win for Lebanon and a loss for
Israel. For the Gaza War, Israel created a YouTube channel where they posted videos and
received millions of views. The videos depicted precision airstrikes and made allegations that
Hamas was deliberately drawing fire to schools and hospitals (Matusitz, 2018).
The U.S. suffered a similar blunder in 2006 with OPERATION Valhalla. Special Forces
killed a number of jihadist and destroyed a weapons cache but by the time they returned to the
base, a terrorist organization known as Jaish al-Mahdi had repositioned the bodies and removed
the weapons of the jihadists, so it looked like they were murdered during prayer (Waltzman,
2017). Jaish al-Mahdi then photographed the bodies in these poses and uploaded the images to a
website with a press release asserting that they were killed in a mosque (Waltzman, 2017). The
U.S. Special Forces had evidence to disprove the claims but because the process for releasing
information involved many approvals from higher-ups it did not reach the media for three days
and by that time, the damage had been done (Mayfield III, 2011). Mayfield III (2011) argued that
this situation could have been avoided if the U.S. understood how social media can be used in an
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information operation. The authors conclude that information operations need to be studied for
the U.S. to benefit from the use of social media.
While the Islamic State is losing territory in the Middle East, they continue to radicalize
and inspire attacks all over the world with their robust online presence. In The War of Ideas on
the Internet: An Asymmetric Conflict on which the Strong Become Weak, McCauley (2015)
credits the online success of the Islamic State to the existence of meta-opinions. He explains that
people like to feel and look as if their way of thinking lies within the majority and will attempt to
minimize their own deviation from what they believe is the norm (McCauley, 2015). For
example, if a person thinks that everyone supports the Islamic State, then they will often
outwardly express support of the Islamic State even if they have reservations. The Islamic State
uses social media to make it appear that the public is in support of their ideology and operations
by constantly uploading posts on a multitude of platforms from multiple sources (McCauley,
2015). The very nature of social media compounds this effect by surrounding users with posts
that are targeted to their interests and inevitably confirms their beliefs. For example, if a user
clicks on a post about brides who are available for marriage in the Islamic State, then they will
begin seeing more and more related posts until their entire newsfeed shows unanimous support
for the Islamic State and its benefits. While the quality of Islamic State posts varies, the quantity
is most impactful. If social media users were to encounter a counter narrative it may make the
Islamic State seem less supported. McCauley (2015) posits that there is often a difference
between actual public opinion and perceived public opinion and an event that reveals the true
distribution of opinion can cause sudden political change. To disrupt the Islamic State, the
appearance of consensus must be destroyed. McCauley (2015) notes that the counter narrative
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should be communicated similarly to the Islamic State - informally, high quantity, distributed
across platforms, and individualized to users. The challenge with administering a counternarrative is keeping messages consistent; but McCauley (2015) argues that if the quantity is
vigorous, the counter-narrative should be successful in detracting from the Islamic State's
appearance of a majority.
Waltzman (2017) and Mayfield III (2011) both acknowledge that terrorist organizations
have an undisputed advantage on social media due to their decentralized structures. Local
commanders are often empowered to make decisions that allows them to be agile and flexible. In
contrast, the governments that they seek to destroy are often unable to respond in an efficient
manner because of the many layers of approvals required. Mayfield III (2011) argues that the
U.S. Department of Defense needs to implement processes to guide the expeditious release of
information at lower levels which know how to best communicate with local populations.
However, neither Waltzman (2017) or Mayfield III (2011) explain who should be publicly seen
as responsible for executing the campaign or what specific channels should be used.
The Audience, Communicator, and Content
There is consensus among terrorism researchers that the only way to defeat terrorist organizations is to use their same tactics. The Islamic State focuses on three aspects of communication: the audience, the communicator, and the content. Therefore, a competing-narrative or counter-narrative should theoretically focus on the same elements. McCauley (2015) stresses that no
terrorist rhetoric should exist on the internet without a response. When terrorist rhetoric is all that
is available to a vulnerable individual, it increases their chance of acceptance (MaCauley, 2015).
The mere presence of a dissenting opinion can prevent radicalization (MaCauley, 2015).
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The Islamic State understands the complexity of identity and power and utilizes in-group
and out-group dynamics to persuade followers to join. An audiences’ attitudes are developed
from individual values, and values of the groups that they belong to (Dubois, Rucker, &
Galinsky, 2016). It is easier to change the attitude of a person if they do not value their group and
more difficult if they do value their group (Dubois et al., 2016). The Islamic State repeatedly
reminds the audience that they do not belong in their current group (i.e., the U.S., Europe, or
Canada) because their current group treats them like second class citizens. However, they are
welcome to join a new group, the Islamic State, which will welcome them with open arms and
provide them with all the opportunities that their previous group withheld. An example of a
competing-narrative under this approach would be Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International’s messaging.
Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International reminds their audience that not only are they free to live and
practice however they want in the United States, Europe, and Canada, but there are also many
communities in these regions that provide social and even economic support for people of all
religions. A counter-narrative would argue that the Islamic State is not as welcoming as it may
appear. It would include testimonies of deradicalized terrorists who traveled to Iraq or Syria but
were unable to find the sense of belonging that they were seeking. An understanding of the
audience is crucial when deciding who the communicator should be, and what content should be
posted. The internet is full of noise and for a narrative to break through the noise, it must be seen
as relevant to users.
The communicator should be credible to the audience due to their level of trustworthiness
and expertise (Dubois et al., 2016). The communicators for the Islamic State often derive their
level of trustworthiness and expertise from being perceived as religious scholars. However, many

82

of the communicators for the Islamic State have no formal schooling in religion and often do not
even speak Arabic which is the language of the Quran and Hadith (Schmid, 2015). Instead, the
communicators are simply able to claim that they are religious scholars and due to their
substantial following on social media - they are believed (Schmid, 2015). In addition, many of
the religious scholars also claim to have fighting experience having participated in the efforts to
expel foreign invaders from Afghanistan and overthrow what they deem to be corrupt regimes in
Iraq and Syria (Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment, 2015).
Fighting experience is not easily substantiated but is often confirmed by other jihadists which
makes it possible for users to blindly accept. This concept of fighting experience also contributes
to the communicator’s credibility. Therefore, communicators of competing-narratives and
counter-narratives have been mostly religious scholars but with credentials that prove their level
of trustworthiness and expertise. In addition, there have been several communicators who are
deradicalized terrorists who can make similar claims of fighting experience. However, these
claims of fighting experience are often not widely confirmed and without many followers may be
more difficult for users to accept.
When it comes to content, the Islamic State focuses on images, videos, and statements
that demonstrate their power, sense of belonging, the chance to become a part of something
bigger than themselves, material luxuries, and an approaching apocalypse combined with a need
to protect their religion. The tactics used are dependent on whether the Islamic State is
attempting to recruit manpower, expertise, or gain general support. Existing research on
persuasiveness suggests the effectiveness of the content of the communication is dependent on
the vividness of the threat presented (Blondé & Girandola, 2016). This theory has gained
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popularity with salient examples such as the viral picture of a stunned child sitting in the back of
an ambulance after the bombings of Aleppo, Syria. The theory may also be deduced to suggest
that counter-narratives are more effective than competing-narratives because of the mere
presentation of a threat. However, there has been no research to validate such a claim. Given the
lack of research on the topic, content of communication for competing-narratives and counternarratives has focused on capturing the attention of viewers and providing information that
challenges their current views.
The Islamic State is attempting to promote an image of a successful caliphate where the
basic needs and desires of followers are met. They are losing territory and many of their
followers are being forced to live in poor conditions. Haykel (2016) traveled to Yemen, Iraq,
Syria, and Saudi Arabia where he interviewed Sunni and Shia Muslims to learn about their
thoughts and feelings towards Sharia Law and the caliphate as interpreted by the Islamic State.
He found that those living under the control of the Islamic State in the caliphate feel
inconvenienced by Sharia Law but are willing to withstand those inconveniences because the
Islamic State provides them with necessities such as jobs (Haykel, 2016). He found that
sympathizers living outside of the control of the Islamic State and the caliphate support the
overall strategy and goals but do not want to live under Sharia Law (Haykel, 2016). This
evidence suggests that Sharia Law is largely seen as a deterrent that can be emphasized with a
competing-narrative or counter-narrative. Haykel (2016) closes by explaining that the Islamic
State has emerged from an unstable economic, political, and social environment but it’s
foundation and ideas are not new as they have been discussed and practiced since the 7th century
(Haykel, 2016). The Islamic State is concerned with gaining territory and influence in the Middle
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East. Therefore, Haykel (2016); argues that there is no need to for the U.S. to intervene militarily.
The population which is currently under control of Islamic State will eventually revolt because
while they are seeing improvement in stability they will not see the promised utopia and once the
true conditions are revealed to the world they will stop gaining followers (Haykel, 2016).
Where many researchers vehemently disagree is about creating a dialogue with general
users. Casptack (2015) and Bertram (2015) believe that competing-narratives and counternarratives should incorporate feedback mechanisms to help administrators determine whether
information is appealing to the masses, and if necessary, make adjustments. This is due to the
marginal success of immersive deradicalization programs in the Middle East that both
researchers studied. However, feedback mechanisms such as a comment functionality may invite
dissent that can distort the information the competing-narratives and counter-narrative are trying
to relay as it did with Bush and Obama’s online counter-narrative programs. Therefore, feedback
such as LIKES, and SHARES, may be a safest and most accurate option for measuring outreach.
The article, Online Engagement Factors on Facebook Brand Pages, assessed the
relationship between the content of social media posts and customer engagement measured by
number of LIKES and SHARES, comments, and interaction duration for a page. The study found
that certain types of content can increase the LIKES ratio, SHARES ratio, comments, ratio, and
interaction duration ratio, while other types of content had no effect (Cvijikj & Michahelles,
2013). In a related study, Do Social Media Marketing Activities Enhance Customer Equity? An
Empirical Study of Luxury Fashion Brand, the researchers found that increases in engagement
showed a correlation to a change in attitudes and behavior for retail companies (Kim & Ko,
2012). Social media marketing increased value equity (β = .47, t = 3.47) and brand equity (β =
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.66, t = 7.73) which increased purchase intention at a significant level of p < .001 (Kim & Ko,
2012). Both studies demonstrate the validity of using LIKES and SHARES to determine the
perception of relevance and credibility when viewing social media content.
Summary and Conclusions
The Islamic State has found itself repeatedly fighting against other regional terrorist
organizations such as Al Shabab and Jabhat al-Nusra which rule with shared power and
governance and oppose the Islamic State’s quest for complete control over forcibly conquered
territory. Conflicts with other regional terrorist organizations drain the Islamic State’s already
limited resources and distracts them from fulfilling their mission of establishing a caliphate
(Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment, 2015). In addition to
regional conflicts, the Islamic State is also losing territory due to the military strikes made by
foreign powers including the U.S., France, Russia, Turkey, Lebanon, Australia, Great Britain,
Canada, The Netherlands, Jordan, and Morocco (Haykel, 2016). Yet, the Islamic State continues
to inspire attacks throughout the world due to their robust online presence that promotes a
powerful image of growth and prosperity. As living conditions within the Islamic State
deteriorate, foreign governments have an opportunity to reveal a different view of the caliphate
that could potentially prevent individuals from radicalizing (Haykel, 2016).
As addressed in this chapter, terrorist organizations are actively recruiting followers on
social media and their efforts could be undermined by providing information about costs and
benefits that a vulnerable individual may not be aware (McCauley, 2015). This chapter traced the
evolution of the Islamic State and examined the issues revolving around previous and current
counter-radicalization efforts. It specifically focused on the potential of social media, but the
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challenges involved with uploading information that is relevant and credible enough to trend.
While progress has been made with counter-radicalization efforts, there are many issues that still
need to be studied and analyzed for improvement and validation. The existing research
emphasized two overarching concepts. The first overarching concept is the need to understand
the ideology behind terrorism (Cragin et al., 2015). While researchers may know what
information entices a vulnerable individual to join a terrorist organization, there is very little
insight into what information may dissuade a vulnerable individual from joining a terrorist
organization. The second overarching concept is the need to provide information to the public
that competes with the Islamic State’s narrative, or counters, the Islamic State’s narrative
(McCauley, 2015). While much has been written about terrorist recruitment and counterradicalization, no studies have empirically researched what information is effective or ineffective
at reaching the general population.
Chapter 3 will discuss the quantitative research design. It will delve into methodology
and include a discussion of the population, sampling and sampling procedures, data collection,
and data analysis plan. In addition, Chapter 3 will address threats to validity and outline the
ethical procedures that will be followed.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
This chapter outlines the parameters of the methodological approach used in this study. It
includes an overview of the research design and explains why the design was chosen. It also covers on the population and sampling procedures, and then discusses the data collection procedures and statistical analyses techniques that will be used to conduct the analysis. The chapter
ends with a discussion of the validity, reliability, and ethical considerations inherent in this
study.
Research Design and Rationale
The nonexperimental, quantitative research descriptive design was appropriate for this
study because counter-radicalization social media campaigns are already being administered and
followed. Therefore, there was no need to create an environment to measure the outreach of
social media posts; it already exists and was waiting to be observed and understood. Measuring if
there was a relationship between CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION of
posts and their level of engagement on social media was intended to determine if utilizing data
analytics when administering counter-radicalization campaign on social media can ensure that
the posts are reaching the general user population. This study used a nonexperimental descriptive
design to observe relationships between variables without manipulation. Due to the lack of
testing and treatment, the study was unable able to determine a cause-and-effect relationship but
was able to determine correlation (Frankfort-Nachmias, Nachmais, & DeWaard, 2015). In
addition, the nonexperimental descriptive design had few threats to internal and external validity.
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Social media research is a relatively new field of study. As a result, there are few established scales to provide a foundation for discerning reliability. However, many private companies use a variety of the vectors to measure and focus their outreach and engagement efforts
(Stelzner, 2010). For example, DigitasLBi, a company that assists retailers in understanding their
social media metrics, studies the number of impressions, day of the week, time, post type, number of SHARES, number of LIKES, number of comments, number of pages tagged in post, and
number of hashtags used by social media platforms, over a period of time, to draw attention to
which posts are effective and ineffective (Berger, 2013). Their outcome is called the “Contagious
Index” because it provides a score of between 0 and 100 to the retailer. DigitasLBi is given administrator privileges to complete their studies because this authority has access to much more
information on posts. I did not have administrator privileges for the Quilliam Facebook page.
Due to this limitation, I created a modified version of the Contagious Index by measuring only
the LIKES and SHARES of Facebook posts. According to the DigitasLBi, a share means that a
user found the information to be so important that they are willing to take personal responsibility
to further its dissemination and a like means that a user wants the poster to know that they agree
with them and support their view (Berger, 2013).
Methodology
This study utilized a quantitative method to measure the trending of posts on social
media. Facebook was chosen as the social media platform for this study because it is the most
popular social media platform; and unlike Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram, its users often share
published content that aims to spread ideas and teach others (Bene, 2017). There are several
radicalization counter-narratives on Facebook that are currently being administered by
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governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Of the governmental radicalization counternarratives, The United Kingdom’s Prevent Tragedies, Canada’s Extreme Dialogue, the United
States’ The Global Engagement Center, have relatively low outreach and engagement as
previously mentioned. Therefore, they were not chosen for analysis. However, there were several
radicalization counter-narratives that were being administered by nongovernmental organizations
that have an adequate following, including Minhaj-ul-Quran International, The Israel Project,
and Quilliam.
Minhaj-ul-Quran International, The Israel Project, and Quilliam were all created and
administered with the purpose of dissuading individuals from joining terrorist organizations but
utilize varying strategies. Minhaj-ul-Quran International was eliminated because the posts often
are not informational. Instead, Minhaj-ul-Quran International often posts to promote upcoming
events where religious leaders and scholars would discuss counter-radicalization. The Israel
Project was eliminated because it was focused only on Hamas and Hezbollah and did not address
terrorism as a global issue but as only a threat to Israel. In contrast to both Minhaj-ul-Quran
International and The Israel Project, Quilliam, presented a balanced feed with a variety of
CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION making it the obvious choice for the
study.
Once the counter narrative, Quilliam, was chosen, it was evaluated to see what types of
posts were typically made. This helped to define the CATEGORY, CONTENT and
GEOPOLITICAL REGION as seen below in Table 3. After completing a preliminary evaluation
of the data, it appears that the personal story has the most reach as measured by LIKES and
SHARES. However, this conclusion needs to be verified by statistical analysis of the data
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collected. The Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) test was used to analyze the data
and test the hypotheses. The results of the MANOVA verify if the CATEGORY, CONTENT, and
GEOPOLITICAL REGION have an impact on the dependent variable constructs, LIKES and
SHARES as seen below in Table 4.
Table 3
Independent variable data coding
Independent variables

CATEGORY

CONTENT

GEOPOLITICAL REGION

Table 4
Dependent variable constructs
Dependent variables
LIKES
SHARES

Data entry code
1. personal story
2. news article
3. research/policy analysis
4. military defeats
5. religious doctrine
1. written status
2. written status with link to website
3. written status with video
4. written status with photograph
1. West
2. Middle East
3. global
4. cyber

Construct
User agrees with information presented
User wants others to view information presented
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The strategic choice theory argues that individuals weigh the costs and benefits of joining
a terrorist organization before choosing to join (Borum, 2011). According to the social movement
theory and social identity theory, information about the resources and group membership offered
by a terrorist organization should be of interest to an individual who is contemplating terrorism.
When applied to terrorism, the social movement theory and social identity theory can be used to
encourage or dissuade an individual who is considering joining a terrorist organization.
The Islamic State recruits by offering resources and group membership. In reality, they
are struggling financially and as a result have been unable to provide the cars, houses, and weaponry that they have promised and this lack of resources has led to defections (Schmid, 2015). If
the social movement theory and social identity theory are true, then information about the current
condition of the Islamic State could interest an individual who is contemplating joining. The application of the social movement theory and social identity theory to terrorism led to the initial
research question posed by this study; are some categories of information posted on social media
more appealing to the general user population than others? If accepted, the hypothesis that personal story reaches more social media users than other categories would mean that the absence of
resources and group membership is of interest to those contemplating terrorism and could potentially dissuade individuals from joining a terrorist organization.
Considering what individuals who are contemplating terrorism may want to view on
social media led to two additional research questions; are some contents on social media more
appealing to the general user population than others and are some GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs
on social media more appealing to the general user population than others? Individuals in the
discovery phase of radicalization often seek information that is reputable. A post with a status,
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picture, or video posted by a single source (a Facebook page) is often not enough to sway
opinions. However, a post with a link to secondary source (website) is often seen as credible
(Westerman et al., 2014). This belief led to the hypothesis that social media post CONTENT of
written status with a link to a website will reach more social media users than the other
CONTENT.” Individuals in the discovery phase may also be more interested in CONTENT that
discusses the Middle East. After all, individuals who have passed the sensitivity phase of
radicalization often have begun mentally disassociating themselves with their homes in the West
and have begun identifying with their homeland in the Middle East (Robinson et al., 2017). This
belief led to the hypothesis that the social media post GEOPOLITICAL REGION of Middle East
will reach more social media users than the other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs.
Population
The population for this study were posts published on the Quilliam Facebook page between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2018. These posts were LIKED and SHARED by the
general user population. There are very few barriers to creating a Facebook account. All an individual need to provide is a first name, last name, phone number or email address, password, date
of birth, and gender. This information can easily be fabricated which has led to an abundance of
duplicate accounts. While a user may have more than one account, they typically only use one.
As a result, Facebook delineates between active users who have logged-on within the past day
and in-active who have not logged in within the past day when determining their total users and
categorizes users based on how recently they last logged into an account. As of 2018, Facebook
had 2.01 billion active daily users (Donnelly, 2018).
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The demographics of users on Facebook have significantly changed since its inception.
When the social media platform was first launched in 2004, only college students could join. Users had to either be invited by another student to join or request that another student verify their
academic enrollment to join. In 2005, registration was extended to U.S. high school students and
users still had to either be invited to join or their student status had to be verified by another user
who attended the same school. This registration strategy severely limited the demographics of
users to white middle and upper-class Americans between the age of 14 and 22. In 2006 the social media platform expanded to include users who were not students. Many parents who were
interested in what their children were doing online also joined. However, this expansion deterred
many young users from using the social media platform and encouraged them to move onto other
popular social media platforms such as Instagram, Snapchat, and Pinterest, which were less frequented by parents. By 2018, only 88% of 18-29 year olds were using Facebook as seen in Table
5. While this exodus effected Facebook, it was offset by the massive number of users in their forties and fifties joining the social media platform. With even more users clicking on advertisements and generating revenue, Facebook once again was able to expand and begin providing
their services to other countries such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico as seen in Table 8
with 79% of all Facebook Users logging on at least once a day as seen in Table 7 and reaching
both men and women as seen in Table 6.
Table 5
Facebook Age Demographics
Age Group
18-29 year olds

Percent of Age Group Using Facebook
88%
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30-49 year olds

84%

50-64 year olds

72%

65 and older

62%

Note. From “75 Super-Useful Facebook Statistics for 2018,” by G. Donnelly, 2018, September 7.
Retrieved from https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/11/07/facebook-statistics
Table 6
Countries with Most Facebook Usage
Nationality

Percent of Total Facebook User Population

U.S.A.

12%

India

10%

Brazil

7%

Indonesia

5%

Mexico

4%

Note. From “75 Super-Useful Facebook Statistics for 2018,” by G. Donnelly, 2018, September 7.
Retrieved from https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/11/07/facebook-statistics
Table 7
Usage of Facebook
Log Ons

Percent of Total Facebook User Population

Once a Day

79%

Multiple Times a Day

53%

Note. From “75 Super-Useful Facebook Statistics for 2018,” by G. Donnelly, 2018, September 7.
Retrieved from https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/11/07/facebook-statistics
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Table 8
Facebook Gender Demographics
Gender

Percent of Total Facebook User Population

Men

56%

Women

44%

Note. From “75 Super-Useful Facebook Statistics for 2018,” by G. Donnelly, 2018, September 7.
Retrieved from https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/11/07/facebook-statistics

Quilliam posts do reach every demographic. The exposure of the Quilliam posts to the
general user population is limited because they are in English and discuss counter-radicalization.
Therefore, Quilliam posts will only reach users who are most likely to have a potential interest in
counter-radicalization. Quilliam posts will populate on a Facebook Users newsfeed if a) a user is
following the Quilliam Facebook page, b) a user has friends who are interested in counter-radicalization and several of those friends have interacted with (liked, shared, or commented on) a
trending post, or c) a user has clicked on previous posts about counter-radicalization prompting
the Facebook algorithm to populate a targeted post. Due to this constraint, the generalizability of
this study is severely limited.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
To ensure that the study is perceived as timely, the sample included posts made by
Quilliam during the most recent full calendar year of postings starting 1 January 2018 and ending
31 December 2018. During this time, the administrators uploaded a total of 426 posts. Each post
was recorded in Microsoft Excel 2016 and coded for CATEGORY, CONTENT, and
GEOPOLITICAL REGION as seen below. The amount of LIKES and SHARES was also
recorded to measure engagement.
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The entire population was studied. There were nine terrorist attacks in 2018 as seen in
Figure 1. In the immediate aftermath of these attacks, there was a significant amount of attention
focused on the news reporting and the overall global issue of terrorism. As a result, the LIKES
and SHARES may not be related to the content that could potentially skew the results. For
example, if I had chosen a cluster of posts from 1 May to 31 May, the results would be highly
influenced by the Surbaya Suicide Bombing, Paris Stabbing, and Liege Shooting. To preserve the
integrity of the study, it is important that posts about terrorist attacks are included, but do not
dominate the results. By studying the entire population, posts were more representative of all
posts ever made by Quilliam.

Note. From “Terrorism Timeline,” by Since 9/11, 2018, Retrieved from
https://since911.com/explore-911/terrorism-timeline
Figure 4. 2017 Terrorist attacks
To calculate the sample size, I determined the statistical power, alpha, and effect size.
Statistical power is the probability that a test will detect a correlational relationship. The

97

generally accepted value for statistical power is .80 (Walden University, 2009). High statistical
power improves the chances that findings are not due to chance (Walden University r, 2009). The
alpha is the probability of a Type I error (rejection of a true null hypothesis) or Type II (failing to
reject a null hypothesis) error (Walden University, 2009). The generally accepted value for alpha
is .05 (Walden University, 2009). The effect size is the indication of how strong the correlation is
(Walden University, 2009). The stronger a relationship is, the smaller the sample is needed to
detect an effect (Walden University, 2009). The weaker a relationship, the larger the sample will
be needed to detect an effect (Berman, 2016).
Table 9
Effect size
Effect size

w2

Small

w2 < .06

Medium

.06 - .14

Large

w2 > .14

An Assessment of Quantitative Research in Mass Communication was used to determine
the appropriate effect size for this study (Chase & Baran, 1976). The authors of this article
analyzed 48 studies published in mass communication journals for their methods in choosing
sample sizes for research that used several tests including Pearson’s product-moment correlation
coefficient (Chase & Baran, 1976). The researchers relied on investigators from several different
research fields including; Cohen (Psychology), Brewer (Education), Chase/Tucker
(Communication), Kroll/Chase (Speech Pathology), and Chase/Baran (Mass Communication)
(Chase & Baran, 1976). Choices for the effect size of w2 are in the table below (see Table 3). The
authors of “An Assessment of Quantitative Research in Mass Communication” found that a small
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effect size of for w2 of .025 is appropriate for studies in mass communication (Chase & Baran,
1976).
There were 426 posts made between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2018. I
determined the CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION of each Facebook
post for these posts and manually record the respective coded values in Microsoft Excel 2016.
Then I manually recorded the corresponding number of LIKES and SHARES for each post in
Microsoft Excel 2016. Given the statistical power of .80, an alpha of .05, and the effect size of
.025, the minimum sample size was calculated to be 375 posts as seen in Figure 5: G*Power
Sample Size Calculation and Figure 6: G*Power Sample Size and Power Plot. However, in order
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to decrease the margin of error, the statistical analysis for this study included the entire
population of 426 posts.

Figure 5. G*Power sample size calculation
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Figure 5. G*Power sample size and power plot
Procedures for Participation and Data Collection
Facebook has a comprehensive data policy that was updated on 19 April 2018 to reduce
public scrutiny following the disclosure that third parties were harvesting user information to influence behavior. In the updated data policy, which can be viewed in Appendix A, Facebook
(2018) states that users are responsible for understanding what is public and private with regards
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to general usage (see Figure 6). Public information can be mined and manipulated by users, Facebook, and third parties (Facebook, 2018). Facebook encourages users who are concerned about
privacy to update their settings and have an awareness of what can be seen when interacting with
public pages (Facebook, 2018). Facebook also stated that they expect and encourage academic
institutions to use public information to conduct research that advances scholarship and innovation on topics of general social welfare (Facebook, 2018).

Figure 6. Facebook data usage policy
The Quilliam Facebook page is public. Therefore, all Quilliam posts are public information and when users like and share Quilliam posts that interaction also becomes public information. According to Facebook’s data policy, this public information can be collected and used
for research. Data collection involved recording the date and a general synopsis for each post
made. Each post was categorized based on the criteria in Table 1 for CATEGORY, CONTENT,

102

and GEOPOLITICAL REGION. For CATEGORY, posts were coded as (1) if they were a personal story, (2) if they were a news article, (3) if they were a research/policy analysis, (4) if they
concern military defeats, and (5) if they include religious doctrine. For CONTENT, posts were
coded as (1) if they were a written status, (2) if they were a written status with a link to a website, (3) if they were a written status with a video, and (4) if they were a written status with a
photograph. For GEOPOLITICAL REGION, posts were coded as (1) if they discussed a location
in the West, (2) if they discussed a location in the Middle East, (3) if they discussed global topics, and (4) if they discussed cyber topics. A comprehensive example of how coding was completed can be understood by evaluating the figure below (see Figure 7).
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Note. From “Quilliam,” in Facebook [Group page]. Retrieved December 28, 2018, from
https://www.facebook.com/QuilliamInternational/
Figure 7. Post example
The CATEGORY for this post was personal story (coded as 1) because it is about an individual whose father was killed in a terrorist attack. The CONTENT for this post was written
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status with a link to a website (coded as 2) because it includes a brief synopsis of the article and
the link to the article. The GEOPOLITICAL REGION for this post was West (coded as 1) because it was about a family living in the United Kingdom. In addition to the posting date, CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION, the corresponding number of LIKES (10)
and SHARES (1) was also recorded in Microsoft Excel 2016 as seen in the table below (see Table 10).
Table 10
Coding in Microsoft Excel 2016 example
Posting
date

CATEGORY

6/7/2018

1

CONTENT
2

GEOPOLITICAL
REGION

# of
LIKES

# of
SHARES

1

10

1

This process was followed for each of the 426 posts which were uploaded between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2018. Then, the entire table was copied and pasted into IBM SPSS.
I then ran the various statistical tests to determine if the assumptions were satisfied and if the differing categories of information, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs had a statistically
significant effect on the amount of LIKES and SHARES. Then I copied and pasted the output
into Microsoft Word to evaluate and draw conclusions.
Data Analysis Plan
The study utilized a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) because it is normreferenced and measures whether there are any significant differences between two or more
vectors of means. This test is appropriate because the study was interested in determining
whether the CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION influences the posts
number of LIKES and SHARES. The MANOVA assumes that the dependent variable is
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measured on a continuous scale and the independent variable consists of categorical independent
groups and that the dependent variables are normally distributed within each group of categorical
independent variables (Green & Salkind, 2014). The MANOVA also assumes that observations
are randomly and independently sampled from the population. Lastly, the MANOVA assumes
that there are no outliers and the population covariance matrices of each group, and (what) are
equal. Microsoft SPSS was used to check for each of these assumptions (Green & Salkind,
2014).
Multivariate tests were run to demonstrate the effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and
REGION individually on the combination of LIKES and SHARES. Univariate tests were run to
demonstrate the effects of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION individually on LIKES and
SHARES individually. The partial eta square (η2) was used to show how much variance is explained by the independent variable which will demonstrate which independent variables have
the largest effects on the combination of LIKES and SHARES and LIKES and SHARES individually (Green & Salkind, 2014). Post hoc tests were also performed to determine where the significant differences lie and ensure that a Type I error has not been made (Green & Salkind, 2014).
Threats to Validity
Due to the non-experimental nature of this study, there were minimal threats to external
and internal validity. However, the measurement of LIKES and SHARES was based on the assumption that users purposely LIKE and SHARE posts because they agree with the message
communicated.
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External Validity
This was not threatened by the effects of testing or selection of participants (FrankfortNachmias et al., 2015). However, external validity could be threatened by bias. As the rater, I determined the CATEGORY of each post and may have been more likely to choose categories
which confirm my hypotheses (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). This threat to external validity
was overcome by adhering to the coding criterion outlined in Table 2.
Internal Validity
The internal validity could be threatened by historical events (Frankfort-Nachmias et al.,
2015). For example, a terrorist attack could have a significant effect on the LIKES and SHARES
of posts that may not be attributed the varying independent variables (CATEGORY, CONTENT,
and GEOPOLITICAL REGION). Several studies were conducted after 9/11 to develop an
understanding of how people felt about their safety and how it changed the way that they went
about their daily lives (Huddy & Feldman, 2011). By analyzing the results of interviews and
surveys, researchers concluded that terrorist attacks had a significant effect on the behavior of
Americans which decreased as time passed (Huddy & Feldman, 2011).
Content Validity, Empirical Validity, and Construct Validity
Content validity involves checking the operationalization against the content domain for
the construct (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). This study compared the number of LIKES and
SHARES on specific social media posts that have been coded based on CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION. The main threat to content validity with this measurement is that users sometimes accidentally click when scrolling through a newsfeed. It is unlikely
that a user will accidentally share a post because the interaction would require two targeted
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clicks. Therefore, the measurement of SHARES has high content validity. It is however, possible
that a user will accidentally like a post while scrolling through a newsfeed or wall and not even
realize their mistake. As a result, the measurement of LIKES has low content validity (Berman,
2016).
Empirical validity describes how closely scores correlate with behavior as measured in
other contexts (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The methodology for data collection was chosen for its strong validity across cultures and different types of organizations. A variety of studies
have shown the measurement of Facebook LIKES and SHARES to be an effective measurement
of a post’s appeal. For example, the measurement of Facebook LIKES and SHARES has been
applied to studies of anti-cyberbullying campaigns (Alhabash, McAlister, Hagerstrom, Quilliam,
Rifon, & Richards, 2013), anti-underage alcohol consumption campaigns (Glider, Midyett,
Mills-Novoa, Johannessen, & Collins, 2001), and anti-obesity campaigns (de la Peña, 2015). All
three studies have shown that high LIKES and high SHARES correspond with favorable attitudes which can lead to favorable behaviors. In addition to public health campaigns, the measurement of LIKES and SHARES are also commonly used for companies which are attempting to
sell products. It is one of the most common ways to determine the effectiveness of a brand. As a
result, the measurement of LIKES and SHARES have high empirical validity.
Construct validity determines the degree in which inferences can be made from the
operationalizations in the study to the theoretical constructs on which those operationalizations
were based on (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The participants in this study are registered
Facebook users who use social media to view information about terrorism. The
operationalization is the impact that posts have on these Facebook users. Does some information
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provided in a post entice a user to LIKE or SHARE a post more than other information provided
in other posts? It is assumed that if a person LIKES or SHARES a post, then they thought it was
relevant and credible (Berger, 2013). These assumptions may not always hold true. A person may
LIKE or SHARE a post without even agreeing with it because they want to appear informed, or
because they find the post to be entertaining. The assumptions that the study is based could make
the results less generalizable to the field of counter-radicalization efforts on social media.
Ethical Procedures
The participants in this study were followers and registered Facebook users who LIKED
and SHARED content which was posted on the Quilliam Facebook page. Naturalistic observation is critical to ensuring the integrity of this study. If participants were to know that their
LIKES and SHARES were being monitored for research, then it could influence their behavior.
Due to a reliance on naturalistic observation, the study did not involve gaining the consent of
participants. It is assumed that the participants realize that the Quilliam Facebook page is public
and that anyone can view the page and see if a participant has shared or liked a post. The study
also did not gain consent of the administrators of the Quilliam Facebook page because the page
is public, and the study should not have an effect on the page’s popularity.
Data collected was only be used to make inferences about the relationship between the
content of social media posts and the level of appeal. Data collected was not be used outside of
this study. Data collection involved counting the total number of LIKES and SHARES on specific posts. Data collection did not involve clicking to view the users that liked or shared posts.
Therefore, there was no exposure to user names or personal information that is listed on accounts
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such as place of work, place of education, location, names, or any other personal identifiable information. There was also no exposure to user’s friends lists, posted and tagged pictures, or
posted and tagged posts. Research involving the analysis of publicly available information,
where the data can be collected such that individual subjects cannot be identified in any way is
exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight (Marshall, 2003). The Institutional Review Board for Walden University confirmed that the study met ethical standards on 11 April
2019 with approval number 04-11-19-0541364. The study adhered to the exact procedures described in the approved IRB materials.
Summary
This chapter outlined the parameters of the methodological approach used in this study. It
included an overview of the research design and then provides specific information on data collection procedures and statistical analysis techniques. The chapter ended with a discussion of the
validity, reliability, and ethical considerations inherent in this study. Using a non-experimental
descriptive quantitative approach, this study assessed the relationship between the content of social media posts and the level of appeal to the general user population as well as the differing approaches of counter-narratives. Given the nature and the scope of the research questions under
scrutiny, the current research design provided both the informational depth and breadth necessary to evaluate the independent and dependent variables across the varied demographics of social media users. The following chapter will address the data collection, analysis, and results of
the study.
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Chapter 4: Results
This chapter outlines the results of the study. It includes an overview of the challenges
encountered during data collection and while completing the statistical analysis. Three MANOVAs were conducted to test each hypothesis. The chapter delves into the results of each
MANOVA and the results of the post hoc tests.
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative study was to assess the utility of data analytics when administering counter-radicalization campaigns on social media, and to ensure that the posts are
reaching and engaging the general user population. This chapter discusses the challenges encountered during data collection, how the data was prepared for statistical analysis, and the results of the research. The three independent variables for this study are CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION. The two dependent variables were LIKES and
SHARES. The first research question examined whether categories of information posted on social media were more appealing to the general user population than others. The second research
question examined whether some content on social media was more appealing to the general user
population than others. The third research question examined whether some geopolitical regions
on social media were more appealing to the general user population than others. A MANOVA
analysis was used to answer the three research questions.
Data Collection
Facebook data is dynamic. Posts can be deleted by the administrators at any time. LIKES
and SHARES can increase or decrease as users view and re-view posts. For example, a user who
has just discovered the Quilliam Facebook page may take a few moments to peruse the last

111

month of posts and decide to like a few posts. Similarly, a follower of the Quilliam Facebook
page who occasionally views their posts may notice that they accidentally liked a post yesterday
and choose to un-like the post to correct their mistake. As time passes, the changes made to data
become less frequent. When viewing any newsfeed or Facebook page, the latest posts appear at
the top and as the Facebook user scrolls down to read older posts, it takes time to load. Facebook
users not only are often not interested in older posts but they are often impatient and do not want
to wait for older posts to load (Bik & Goldstein, 2013). Initial data collection was conducted on
11 April 2019. Secondary data collection was conducted on 12 April 2019. There were no differences found in coding of CATEGORY, CONTENT, or GEOPOLITICAL REGION. There were
no differences found in resulting LIKES and SHARES. By conducting data several months after
the period of posts being studied (1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018) the study minimized its
exposure to dynamic data. All data will be held on a USB drive and stored in a locked safe for a
total of 7 years after CAO approval.
Exclusion of Self-Promotional Posts
During data collection, it was discovered that there was an additional CATEGORY. Quilliam
page not only posted information that fell into categories such as personal story, news article, research/policy analysis, military defeats, and religious doctrine, but they also uploaded posts that
were Self-Promotional. Self-Promotional posts are intended to improve the image of Quilliam or
the image of the founders of Quilliam. Self-Promotional posts were excluded because they do
not provide information to the general public with the intent to dissuade individuals from joining
terrorist organizations. Self-Promotional posts include:
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1. Advertisements for upcoming Quilliam events (lectures and radio/television interviews)
2. Holiday greetings from Quilliam
3. Articles defending the founders of Quilliam who are frequently criticized for their
controversial past and outspoken beliefs
4. Solicitations for financial support for Quilliam
5. Recruitment of talent to join Quilliam
6. Selling merchandise
7. Awards received by the founders of Quilliam
Challenges Encountered When Coding Posts
Posts in the study were coded based on CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL
REGION. While determining the CONTENT was clear, there were several posts that had an unclear CATEGORY and GEOPOLITICAL REGION. There were several posts were the subject
was about a person’s ideas and experiences but they were written by a third party. The applicable
categories of information to choose from were personal story, news article, research/policy analysis, military defeats, and religious doctrine. While these posts represented a personal story they
were coded as a news article or research/policy analysis (depending on the source) because they
were not written from the person’s perspective. Instead, they were written from the perspective
of a journalist or policy writer. There were also several posts about U.S. Troops striking targets
in the Middle East and British terrorists and victims in the Middle East. The applicable GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs to choose from were West, Middle East, global, and cyber. These posts
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were coded as global. This strategy for coding posts remained consistent throughout data collection to ensure that the results were not compromised.
Statistical Analysis
Three MANOVAs were conducted to compare the effect of three independent variables;
CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION of a post on the dependent variables;
LIKES and SHARES. The objective of the MANOVA was to discover if the dependent variables
are influenced by the independent variables and to determine the strength of the effect (Green &
Salkind, 2014). I determined that the relationship between two of the independent variables,
CONTENT and GEOPOLITICAL REGION, did not have a statistically significant influence on
the dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES. From this result, I inferred that Facebook Users
do not prefer a written status, written status with a link to a website, written status with a video,
or written status with a photograph. I can also infer that Facebook Users do not prefer posts that
discuss the West, Middle East, global, or cyber GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs. Thus, I will accept
the alternative hypothesis for my second and third hypotheses focus further research on the CATEGORY of social media information which did have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES.
Satisfying the Assumptions
A MANOVA tests to see if there is a relationship across the levels of the independent variable on the linear composite of the dependent variables, or on the dependent variables separately
(Green & Salkind, 2014). The MANOVA demonstrates the main effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION alone on LIKES and SHARES and also the interaction effect of the combination of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION combined on LIKES and SHARES. To be
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confident in the results of a MANOVA, several assumptions should be satisfied: (a) a MANOVA
assumes that the independent variables are measured on the interval scale, (b) the dependent variables are measured on a continuous scale, (c) the observations are independent, and (d) the sample size is sufficient. All the conditions were satisfied in this study’s data collection method
(Green & Salkind, 2014).
A MANOVA also assumes multivariate normality because the test is sensitive to outliers
(Green & Salkind, 2014). To test for outliers, a linear regression for each independent variable
was conducted. Graphs were created to evaluate the distribution for each independent variable.
The scatter plots in Appendix B: Data Dispersion show a linear relationship for the three independent variables, CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION, as seen in Figures 8, 9, and 10, respectively. The histograms in Appendix B show that the data are positively skewed for the dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES, in Figure 11 and 12. The box plots in Appendix B: Data
Dispersion also show that there are significant outliers for LIKES and SHARES in Figure 13 and
14. The Q-Q plots in Appendix B: Data Dispersion also show that the data does not follow a normal distribution for LIKES and SHARES, as seen in Figure 15 and 16. Therefore, statistical tests
were run to determine multivariate normality and determine the impact of outliers (Green &
Salkind, 2014).
The Shapiro-Wilks test was run to ensure multivariate normality. Significant values,
where the p-value is greater than the α level, as seen below in Table 11: Tests of Normality indicate multivariate non-normality for both dependent variables (p= .000 for LIKES and SHARES).
Table 11
Tests of normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova

Shapiro-Wilk
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LIKES

Statistic
.280

df
426

Sig.
.000

Statistic
.531

df
426

Sig.
.000

SHARES

.431

426

.000

.124

426

.000

A linear regression was also run to determine the mahalanobis distance (Green & Salkind,
2014). As seen in the Residual Statistics for CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL
REGION (Tables 12, 13, and 14), the maximum value for the mahalanobis distance, 279.997,
was greater than the maximum allowable critical value for mahalanobis distance, 16.27 (Green &
Salkind, 2014). The mahalanobis distance demonstrates that there are significant outliers in the
data (Green & Salkind, 2014). Because there are significant outliers and the assumption of nonnormality was not met, this study will rely on Pillai’s Trace when determining significance for
this study (Green & Salkind, 2014).
Table 12
CATEGORY residuals statistics

Predicted Value
Std. Predicted Value
Standard Error of Predicted Value
Adjusted Predicted Value
Residual
Std. Residual
Stud. Residual
Deleted Residual
Stud. Deleted Residual
Mahal. Distance
Cook's Distance
Centered Leverage Value

Minimum
1.3289
-8.658
.037

Maximum
2.7017
1.411
.626

Mean
2.5094
.000
.049

Std. deviation
.13634
1.000
.042

N
426
426
426

1.4049
-1.59509
-2.073
-2.076
-2.07099
-2.084
.002
.000
.000

4.0710
2.48635
3.231
3.234
2.49226
3.271
279.997
1.596
.659

2.5114
.00000
.000
-.001
-.00202
.000
1.995
.006
.005

.16085
.76783
.998
1.003
.77889
1.007
15.816
.080
.037

426
426
426
426
426
426
426
426
426

116

Table 13
CONTENT residuals statistics
Minimum
Predicted Value
.7952
Std. Predicted Value
-16.720
Standard Error of Pre.013
dicted Value
Adjusted Predicted Value .3956
Residual
-.94389
Std. Residual
-3.532
Stud. Residual
-3.565
Deleted Residual
-.96136
Stud. Deleted Residual
-3.615
Mahal. Distance
.002
Cook's Distance
.000
Centered Leverage Value .000

Maximum
2.0297
1.666
.217

Mean
1.9178
.000
.017

Std. deviation
.06714
1.000
.015

N
426
426
426

2.0323
.23149
.866
1.316
.60439
1.318
279.997
1.127
.659

1.9170
.00000
.000
.001
.00080
-.003
1.995
.004
.005

.08200
.26661
.998
1.001
.26931
1.013
15.816
.055
.037

426
426
426
426
426
426
426
426
426

Mean
1.9366
.000
.066

Std. deviation
.11389
1.000
.057

N
426
426
426

1.9363
.00000
.000
.000
.00031
.001
1.995
.002
.005

.12219
1.03330
.998
1.001
1.04028
1.002
15.816
.018
.037

426
426
426
426
426
426
426
426
426

Table 14
GEOPOLITICAL REGION residuals statistics
Minimum Maximum
Predicted Value
.9495
2.0005
Std. Predicted Value
-8.667
.561
Standard Error of Pre.050
.842
dicted Value
Adjusted Predicted Value .4865
2.0036
Residual
-1.00025 2.24057
Std. Residual
-.966
2.163
Stud. Residual
-.967
2.187
Deleted Residual
-1.00358 2.51354
Stud. Deleted Residual
-.967
2.197
Mahal. Distance
.002
279.997
Cook's Distance
.000
.368
Centered Leverage Value .000
.659

Lastly, a MANOVA relies on the assumption that there is no multi-collinearity and homogeneity of covariance matrices (Green & Salkind, 2014). Pearson’s Correlation Co-efficient is

117

.615, as seen in Table 15: Correlation. Pearson’s Correlation Co-efficient is greater than .2 means
there is multi-collinearity and less than .8 is a positive relationship between the dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES. Several statistical tests were used to ensure homogeneity of covariance. Significance for these tests were determined at the α =.001. Box’s Test-of-Equality of Covariances was used to determine that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES, are equal across groups. Non-significant values, where the p-value is
less than the α level, as seen in Table 16: Box’s Test-of-Equality of Covariances, indicate equal
covariances between groups. Levene’s Test-of-Equality of Variance was used to examine
whether or not the variance between independent variables are equal. Non-significant values,
where the p-value is less than the α level, as seen in Table 17: Levene’s Test of Equality of Variance, indicate equality of variance.
Table 15
Correlation
LIKES

SHARES

LIKES
Pearson Cor- 1
relation
Sig.
(2tailed)
N
426
Pearson Cor- .615**
relation
Sig.
(2- .000
tailed)
N
426

SHARES
.615**
.000
426
1

426
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Table 16
Box's test of equality of covariance matrices
Statistic

Value

Box's M

1526.966

F

30.297

df1

45

df2

3538.342

Sig.

.000

Table 17
Levene's test of equality of error variances

LIKES

Based on Mean

Levene statistic df1
5.851
16

df2
403

Sig.
.000

Based on Median

2.316

16

403

.003

Based on Median and with
adjusted df

2.316

16

91.441

.007

Based on trimmed mean

4.013

16

403

.000

28.809

16

403

.000

Based on Median

20.058

16

403

.000

Based on Median and with
adjusted df
Based on trimmed mean

20.058

16

27.152

.000

21.708

16

403

.000

SHARES Based on Mean
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Descriptive Statistics
Prior to formally testing the hypotheses, a descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent variables were conducted to document the distribution of each variable and discuss implications to the analysis. Descriptive statistics provided information on the sample size, mean,
and standard deviation.
Looking at Table 18: the Between-Subjects Factors, the samples are not normally distributed. For CATEGORY, the majority of posts were a News Article (49%) or Policy Article (40%).
For CONTENT, the majority of posts were a written status with a link to a website (91%). For
REGION, the plurality of posts were about the West (50%) or global (29%). This uneven distribution impacts the quality of analysis and increases the chance of error.
Table 18
Between-Subjects Factors
Independent
variable
CATEGORY

CONTENT
GEOPOLITICAL REGION

1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00

N
21
207
173
10
15
35
391
213
58
124
31

Looking at Table 19 Descriptive Statistics: The combination of CATEGORY, CONTENT
and REGION preformed with regards to the resulting mean for LIKES and SHARES. The best
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performing combination for LIKES was news article, video, west (with an average 99.5 LIKES).
The second best performing combination for LIKEs was personal story, video, west (with an average of 95 LIKES). However, the combination of news article, video, west only occurred one
time and the combination of personal story, video, west only occurred two times. The best performing combination for SHARES was news article, video, west with an average of 357.5
SHARES and personal story, video, west an average of 91 SHARES. Once again, the combination news article, video, west only occurred two times and the combination of personal story,
video, west only occurred one time. The lack of occurrences makes these findings less reliable.
While the results for CATEGORY appear to be strongly influenced by outliers; the CONTENT
of Video and REGION of West consistently received a high number of LIKES and SHARES.
Table 19
Descriptive statistics

LIKES

CATEGORY
1.00

CONTENT
1.00

2.00

Total

2.00

1.00

REGION
1.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
Total

Mean
95.0000
26.0000
60.5000
65.7500
40.8333
43.1111
47.1579
71.6000
40.8333
41.4000
48.4286
99.5000
2.0000
4.3333
35.6667

Std. deviation
.
.
48.79037
63.94985
71.42945
107.06942
85.39468
56.90606
71.42945
101.09094
81.84227
137.88582
.
2.51661
79.06116

N
1
1
2
4
6
9
19
5
6
10
21
2
1
3
6
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2.00

Total

3.00

1.00

2.00

Total

4.00

2.00

Total

5.00

1.00
2.00

Total

1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
1.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
2.00
4.00
Total
2.00
4.00
Total
3.00
Total
1.00
3.00
Total
1.00
3.00
Total

23.3697
18.4667
21.2258
17.6190
21.7065
24.6281
17.9355
19.7353
17.6190
22.1111
29.6316
19.4286
26.8846
17.2985
21.0833
8.9831
5.3333
13.5374
20.0233
21.0833
10.0909
5.3333
15.5434
25.1111
77.0000
30.3000
25.1111
77.0000
30.3000
18.0000
18.0000
3.0000
5.3077
5.1429
3.0000
6.2143
6.0000

27.46180
18.71701
33.37036
21.66443
26.73440
31.54392
18.63855
32.19289
21.66443
29.17427
69.47278
20.22257
59.95420
27.05831
40.92001
13.40418
8.04674
23.57450
40.21266
40.92001
14.44217
8.04674
31.89180
28.78995
.
31.71768
28.78995
.
31.71768
.
.
.
2.52932
2.50713
.
4.17278
4.10575

119
30
31
21
201
121
31
34
21
207
19
7
26
67
12
59
9
147
86
12
66
9
173
9
1
10
9
1
10
1
1
1
13
14
1
14
15
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Total

1.00

2.00

Total

SHARES

1.00

1.00

2.00

Total

2.00

1.00

1.00
2.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
1.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
Total

38.9545
2.0000
16.0833
30.0571
22.0209
22.4211
14.6875
15.9677
19.4987
23.7700
22.0690
14.8226
15.9677
20.3662
91.0000
6.0000
48.5000
18.7500
9.3333
23.1111
17.8421
33.2000
9.3333
21.4000
20.7619

74.96442
.
16.68128
60.86288
28.95568
33.62341
36.42542
22.13968
31.59332
36.53454
33.43486
34.96317
22.13968
34.93863
.
.
60.10408
12.52664
19.47990
65.23505
45.39978
34.08372
19.47990
61.74176
46.05096

22
1
12
35
191
57
112
31
391
213
58
124
31
426
1
1
2
4
6
9
19
5
6
10
21

1.00

357.500
0
.0000
2.3333
120.333
3
4.7899
2.8333
3.2258
2.7143
4.0398
10.6198

505.58135

2

.
3.21455
291.33532

1
3
6

6.32707
3.96609
4.25605
3.40797
5.53339
64.87376

119
30
31
21
201
121

2.00
3.00
Total
2.00

Total

1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
1.00
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3.00

1.00

2.00

Total

4.00

2.00

Total

5.00

1.00
2.00

Total

Total

1.00

2.00

2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
1.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total
2.00
4.00
Total
2.00
4.00
Total
3.00
Total
1.00
3.00
Total
1.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
Total
1.00
2.00

2.7419
3.1471
2.7143
7.4106
32.2105
8.8571
25.9231
5.2836
7.1667
2.7458
1.6667
4.1973
11.2326
7.1667
3.3939
1.6667
7.4624
3.8889
10.0000
4.5000
3.8889
10.0000
4.5000
3.0000
3.0000
.0000
1.0000
.9286
.0000
1.1429
1.0667
64.4545
.0000
6.5000
42.7429
5.2304
4.5965

3.93249
4.14241
3.40797
49.72244
121.71897
10.49490
103.94803
18.01078
18.27981
4.55841
2.29129
13.52301
59.29203
18.27981
5.68366
2.29129
42.26556
6.35304
.
6.29374
6.35304
.
6.29374
.
.
.
.70711
.73005
.
.86444
.88372
184.45563
.
8.44770
147.85194
12.00567
10.90848

31
34
21
207
19
7
26
67
12
59
9
147
86
12
66
9
173
9
1
10
9
1
10
1
1
1
13
14
1
14
15
22
1
12
35
191
57
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Total

3.00
4.00
Total
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Total

4.3125
2.6452
4.6701
11.3474
4.5172
4.5242
2.6452
7.7981

18.81730
3.35210
13.76473
61.85354
10.82920
18.06513
3.35210
45.08044

112
31
391
213
58
124
31
426

Testing the Hypotheses
Table 20, Multivariate Tests, demonstrates the significant effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION individually on the combination of LIKES and SHARES with a p < .05 for
each independent variable. The partial eta square (η2) shows how much variance is explained by
the independent variable (Green & Salkind, 2014). This measurement is important because a post
often will not trend with a high quantity of LIKES or SHARES. However, a post often will trend
with a high quantity of both LIKES and SHARES. For CATEGORY, η2 = 78.9. For CONTENT, η2 = 9.95. For REGION, η2 = 46.5. From these results, one can infer that CATEGORY
and REGION have the largest effect on the combination of LIKES and SHARES. The level of
significance for the combination of CATEGORY*CONTENT*REGION is 0 which informs us
that there is a statistically significant effect on LIKES and SHARES as a combination with a η2
of 77.457. Therefore, CATEGORY and REGION should be the focus when attempting to increase the quantity of LIKES and SHARES of a post to improve a posts potential to trend.
In addition, CATEGORY*CONTENT (η2 = 82.018), CATEGORY*REGION (η2 =
84.051), and CONTENT*REGION (η2 = 62.098) also have a statistically significant effect on
LIKES and SHARES. From these results, inferring that the independent variables are combined,
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they have an even larger effect on LIKES and SHARES. This finding is important because it informs us that not only does CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION are important, but also the
combination of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION are also important.
Table 20
Multivariate tests

Intercept

CATEGORY

CONTENT

Pillai's
Trace
Wilks'
Lambda
Hotelling's
Trace
Roy's
Largest
Root
Pillai's
Trace
Wilks'
Lambda
Hotelling's
Trace
Roy's
Largest
Root
Pillai's
Trace
Wilks'
Lambda
Hotelling's
Trace

Hypoth
esis
df

Error
df

Sig.

Partial
eta
squar
ed

Noncent.
parameter

Observed
powerd

Value

F

0.055

11.666b

2

402 0

0.055

23.332

0.994

0.945

11.666b

2

402 0

0.055

23.332

0.994

0.058

11.666b

2

402 0

0.055

23.332

0.994

0.058

11.666b

2

402 0

0.055

23.332

0.994

0.178

9.862

8

806 0

0.089

78.9

1

0.826

10.089b

8

804 0

0.091

80.713

1

0.206

10.315

8

802 0

0.093

82.522

1

0.177

17.852c

4

403 0

0.151

71.408

1

0.024

4.977b

2

402

0.024

9.955

0.81

0.976

4.977b

2

0.024

9.955

0.81

0.025

4.977b

2

0.024

9.955

0.81

0.0
07
0.0
402
07
402

0.0
07
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Roy's
Largest
Root
Pillai's
Trace
Wilks'
GEOLambda
POLITHoICAL
telling's
RETrace
GION
Roy's
Largest
Root
Pillai's
Trace
Wilks'
CATE- Lambda
GORY Ho* CON- telling's
TENT
Trace
Roy's
Largest
Root
Pillai's
Trace
CATEWilks'
GORY
Lambda
* GEOHoPOLITtelling's
ICAL
Trace
RERoy's
GION
Largest
Root
Pillai's
Trace
CONWilks'
TENT *
Lambda
GEOHoPOLITtelling's
ICAL
Trace
RERoy's
GION
Largest
Root

0.025

4.977b

2

402

0.109

7.756

6

0.891

7.956b

0.122

0.0
07

0.024

9.955

0.81

806 0

0.055

46.535

1

6

804 0

0.056

47.734

1

8.155

6

802 0

0.058

48.929

1

0.12

16.112c

3

403 0

0.107

48.335

1

0.185

13.67

6

806 0

0.092

82.018

1

0.815

14.392b

6

804 0

0.097

86.35

1

0.226

15.114

6

802 0

0.102

90.683

1

0.225

30.262c

3

403 0

0.184

90.787

1

0.189

6.004

14

806 0

0.094

84.051

1

0.814

6.232b

14

804 0

0.098

87.254

1

0.226

6.461

14

802 0

0.101

90.452

1

0.21

12.093c

7

403 0

0.174

84.648

1

0.143

15.525

4

806 0

0.072

62.098

1

0.857

16.129b

4

804 0

0.074

64.517

1

0.167

16.732

4

802 0

0.077

66.93

1

0.167

33.606c

2

403 0

0.143

67.212

1
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CATEGORY
* CONTENT *
GEOPOLITICAL
REGION

Pillai's
Trace
Wilks'
Lambda
Hotelling's
Trace
Roy's
Largest
Root

0.168

18.497

4

806 0

0.084

73.989

1

0.832

19.364b

4

804 0

0.088

77.457

1

0.202

20.231

4

802 0

0.092

80.922

1

0.201

40.502c

2

403 0

0.167

81.004

1

Table 21, Tests of Between-Subjects Effects, shows us the univariate tests for the effects
of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION on LIKES and SHARES. Individually, there is a statistically significant difference for CATEGORY on LIKES and SHARES, CONTENT on
SHARES and REIGION on LIKES and SHARES. However, there is not a significant effect of
CONTENT on LIKES. In addition, the partial eta-squared for the significant effects is very small
which means that it does not explain much of the variance.
When combining independent variables, there is a statistically significant difference for
CATEGORY*CONTENT on SHARES, CATEGORY*REGION on SHARES, CATEGORY*CONTENT on LIKES and SHARES, and CATEGORY*CONTENT*REGION on
LIKES and SHARES. However, there is not a significant effect of CATEGORY*CONTENT on
LIKES or CATEGORY*REGION on LIKES. In addition, the partial eta squared for the significant effects is very small which means that it does not explain much of the variance. From these
results, inferring that the effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION is much stronger on
LIKES and SHARES as a combination than individually on LIKES and SHARES.
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Table 21
Tests of between-subjects effects

Source

Dependent variable

Type III
sum of
squares

Mean
square

a

22

SHARES

271701.51
1b

22

LIKES

26840.23

1

SHARES

16076.03

1

LIKES

14234.29

4

SHARES

78966.39

4

2482.90
6
12350.0
7
26840.2
3
16076.0
3
3558.57
1
19741.6

LIKES

648.008

1

648.008

SHARES

11858.67

1

GEOPO- LIKES
LITICAL
REGION SHARES

11052.88

3

66790.35

3

LIKES

1686.794

3

SHARES

93368.37

3

LIKES

11434.3

7

SHARES

100358.3

7

LIKES

7254.619

SHARES
LIKES

Corrected
Model

LIKES

54623.942

df

Intercept

CATEGORY
CONTENT

CATEGORY *
CONTENT
CATEGORY *
GEOPOLITICAL
REGION
CONTENT *
GEOPOLITICAL
REGION
CATEGORY *

11858.6
7
3684.29
4
22263.4
5

F

Sig.

Partial
eta
squar
ed

2.16

0.00
2

0.105

47.43

8.41

0

0.315

184.96

1

23.30

0

0.055

23.30

0.99
8

0.026

10.94

0.91

0.03

12.36

0.81

0.118

53.76

0.001

0.56

0.02

8.07

0.023

9.60

1
0.11
6
0.80
9
0.73
7

10.94
3.09
13.44
0.56
8.07
3.20

0.00
1
0.01
6
0
0.45
4
0.00
5
0.02
3

Noncent.
parameter

Observ
ed
pow
erc
0.99
5

15.16

0

0.101

45.47

1

0.49

0.69
1

0.004

1.46

0.14
9

21.19

0

0.136

63.56

1

1.42

0.19
6

0.024

9.93

0.60
1

14336.9

9.76

0

0.145

68.32

1

2

3627.30
9

3.15

0.04
4

0.015

6.30

0.60
3

85011.04

2

42505.5
2

28.94

0

0.126

57.87

1

7800.317

2

3900.15
9

3.39

0.03
5

0.017

6.77

0.63
7

562.265
31122.7
9
1633.47
1
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CONSHARES
TENT *
GEOPOLITICAL
REGION

100555.1

2

50277.5
6

34.23

0

0.145

68.45

1

Hypothesis 1
To review, the first hypothesis for Part I:
Part I, Ho1: The social media post CATEGORY of personal story will reach more social
media users than other categories.
Part I, Ha1: The social media post CATEGORY of personal story will not reach more
social media users than other categories.
I ran a Simple Contrast test in SPSS on each level of the independent variable,
CATEGORY, to see how each performs when compared to personal story. Personal story was
coded as (1), news story was coded as (2), research/policy analysis was coded as (3), military
defeats was coded as (4), and religious doctrine was coded as (5). Looking at the contrast results
for CATEGORY in Table 22, there is not a statistically significant difference between personal
story and news article, personal story and military defeats, or personal story and religious
doctrine for LIKES or SHARES. However, there is a statistically significant difference between
personal story and research/policy analysis on LIKES (but not SHARES) with p = .035. The
confidence interval was wide with (-57.278, -2.156). The multivariate and univariate results (as
seen in Table 23 and 24) were not statistically significant. From this result, inferring that the
independent variable, CATEGORY information, does have a statistically significant effect on the
dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES but the interaction effect is not consistent across the
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different levels. Specifically, the social media post CATEGORY of personal story is preferred to
research/policy analysis. As a result, this study fails to reject the null hypothesis.
Table 22
CATEGORY contrast results (k matrix)
CATEGORY simple contrast
Level 2 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate
Hypothesized Value
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized)
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Difference
Upper Bound
Level 3 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate
Hypothesized Value
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized)
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Difference
Upper Bound
Level 4 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate
Hypothesized Value
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized)
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Difference
Upper Bound
Level 5 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate
Hypothesized Value
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized)
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Difference
Upper Bound

LIKES
-28.644
0
-28.644
14.902
.055
-57.939
.650
-29.717
0
-29.717
14.020
.035
-57.278
-2.156
39.158
0
39.158
42.057
.352
-43.522
121.837
-36.184
0
-36.184
20.976
.085
-77.421
5.052

SHARES
-12.504
0
-12.504
16.829
.458
-45.587
20.579
-10.325
0
-10.325
15.833
.515
-41.450
20.801
-4.541
0
-4.541
47.497
.924
-97.914
88.831
-14.620
0
-14.620
23.689
.537
-61.189
31.949
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Table 23
CATEGORY multivariate test results
HyValue F
pothesis df
Pillai's
0.028 1.448
8
trace
Wilks'
0.972 1.454a 8
lambda
Hotelling's 0.029 1.46
8
trace
Roy's
largest 0.029 2.875b 4
root

Error
df

Sig.

Partial
Noncent.
Eta
ParameSquared ter

Observed
Powerc

806

0.173

0.014

11.584

0.661

804

0.17

0.014

11.633

0.663

802

0.168

0.014

11.681

0.665

403

0.023

0.028

11.499

0.778

Table 24
CATEGORY univariate test results
DependSource ent variable
Contrast

Error

LIKES
SHARE
S
LIKES
SHARE
S

Sum of
squares

df

Mean
square

F

10299.47

4

2574.867

2.236

975.707

4

243.927

0.166

464176.9

403

1151.804

592003.1

403

1468.99

Partial
Sig eta
.
square
d
0.0
0.022
65
0.9
0.002
56

NonObcent.
served
parampowera
eter
8.942

0.654

0.664

0.085

Hypothesis 2
To review, the second hypothesis for Part I:
Part I, Ho2: The social media post CONTENT of written status with video will reach
more social media users than other CONTENTs.
Part I, Ha2: The social media post CONTENT of written status with video will not reach
more social media users than other CONTENTs.
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I ran a Simple Contrast test in SPSS on each level of the independent variable, CONTENT, to see how each performs when compared to written status with a video. Video was coded
as (1) and written Status with a link was coded as (2). Looking at the contrast results for CATEGORY in Table 25, there is not a statistically significant difference between written status with a
video and written status with a link to a website on LIKES. However, there is a statistically significant difference between written status with a video and written status with a link to a website
on SHARES with p = .000. The confidence interval was wide with (-77.129, -32.662). Multivariate tests were statistically significant for LIKES and SHARES meaning that the interaction effect
is consistent across the different levels. With a partial eta squared of .070, I can infer that only
7% of the variance in the combination of LIKES and SHARES is explained by the level of CONTENT which is a small effect. However, univariate tests were only statistically significant for
SHARES. From this result, I can infer that the independent variable, CONTENT, does have a
statistically significant effect on the dependent variable, SHARES. Specifically, the CONTENT
of written status with a video is preferred to written status with link to a website. The null hypothesis should be rejected, with the alternative hypothesis having validity.
Table 25
CONTENT contrast results (K Matrix)
CONTENT simple contrasta
Level 2 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate
Hypothesized Value
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized)
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Difference
Upper Bound

LIKES
-11.298
0
-11.298
10.015
.260
-30.985
8.390

SHARES
-54.895
0
-54.895
11.310
.000
-77.129
-32.662
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Table 26
CONTENT multivariate results
Valu
e
Pillai's trace
.070
Wilks' lambda
.930
Hotelling's trace .075
Roy's largest root .075

F
15.014a
15.014a
15.014a
15.014a

Hypothesis df
2.000
2.000
2.000
2.000

Error df
402.000
402.000
402.000
402.000

Sig.
.000
.000
.000
.000

Partial eta
squared
.070
.070
.070
.070

Noncent. parameter
30.028
30.028
30.028
30.028

Observed
powerb
.999
.999
.999
.999

Table 27
CONTENT univariate test results
Source

Dependent variable
LIKES

Contrast
SHARES

Sum of
squares
1465.8
37
34608.
35

LIKES

464176
.9

SHARES

592003
.1

Error

df

1
1
4
0
3
4
0
3

Mean
square
1465.8
37
34608.
35

NonObcent.
served
parampowera
eter

F

Sig.

Partial
eta
squared

1.273

0.26

0.003

1.273

0.203

23.55
9

0

0.055

23.559

0.998

1151.8
04
1468.9
9

Hypothesis 3
Part I, Ho3: The social media posts concerning the GEOPOLITICAL REGION of West
will reach more social media users than other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs.
Part I, Ha3: The social media posts concerning the GEOPOLITICAL REGION of West
will not reach more social media users than other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs.
I ran a Simple Contrasta test in SPSS on each level of the independent variable, REGION,
to see how each performs when compared to West. West was coded as (1), Middle East was
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coded as (2), global was coded as (3), and cyber was coded as (4). Looking at the contrast results
for GEOPOLITICAL REGION in Table 28, there is not a statistically significant difference between GEOPOLITICAL REGION on LIKES or SHARES. Multivariate tests were statistically
significant meaning that the interaction effect is consistent across the different levels. With a partial eta squared of .070, inferring that only 6% of the variance in the combination of LIKES and
SHARES is explained by the level of CONTENT with is a very small effect. In addition, univariate tests were not statistically significant as seen in Table 29 and 30. From this result, I can infer
that the independent variable, GEOPOLITICAL REGION, does have a statistically significant
effect on the dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES, rejecting the null hypothesis is acceptable and accepting the alternative hypothesis, as a result.
Table 28
Region contrast results (k matrix)
REGION simple contrasta
Level 2 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate
Hypothesized Value
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized)
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Difference
Upper Bound
Level 3 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate
Hypothesized Value
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized)
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Difference
Upper Bound
Level 4 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate
Hypothesized Value

LIKES
-20.622
0
-20.622
12.997
.113
-46.172
4.929
-5.230
0
-5.230
4.570
.253
-14.214
3.755
-8.858
0

SHARES
-3.010
0
-3.010
14.678
.838
-31.865
25.845
-2.051
0
-2.051
5.161
.691
-12.197
8.095
-2.846
0
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Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized)
Std. Error
Sig.
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound
for Difference
Upper Bound
Table 29
REGION multivariate test results
HyError
Value
F
pothedf
sis df
Pillai's
0.013 0.868
6
806
trace
Wilks'
0.987 .869a
6
804
lambda
Hotelling's 0.013 0.869
6
802
trace
Roy's
largest
0.013 1.723b
3
403
root

-8.858
7.240
.222
-23.092
5.376

-2.846
8.177
.728
-18.921
13.228

Partial
eta
squared

Noncent. parameter

0.518

0.006

5.21

0.347

0.517

0.006

5.213

0.348

0.517

0.006

5.216

0.348

0.162

0.013

5.17

0.45

Sig.

Observed
powerc

Table 30
REGION univariate test results
DependSource ent variable
Contrast
Error

Sum of
squares

df

Mean
square

F

Sig.

LIKES
4569.568 3 1523.189 1.322 0.267
SHARES 357.611
3
119.204 0.081 0.97
LIKES
464176.9 403 1151.804
SHARES 592003.1 403 1468.99

Partial
eta
squared
0.01
0.001

Noncent.
Obpa- served
rame powera
ter
3.967 0.353
0.243 0.065

Post Hoc Tests
When there is a significant difference between groups, post hoc tests are performed to determine where the significant differences lie and ensure that a Type I error has not been made
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(Green & Salkind, 2014). Post hoc tests were not performed for CONTENT because it only had
two levels (written status with video and written status with link to a website). Post hoc tests
were also not performed for GEOPOLITICAL REGION because they did not show a statistically
significant difference. The post hoc test for CATEGORY showed that there is a statistically significant difference between the means for personal story, news article, research/policy analysis,
military defeats, and religious doctrine on LIKES as seen in Table 31: CATEGORY Multiple
Comparisons. However, there was no statistically significant difference between the levels of
CATEGORY and SHARES.
Table 31
CATEGORY multiple comparisons
(I)
DependCATent variaEGOR
ble
Y
1

(J)
CATEGOR
Y
2
3
4
5
1

2
LIKES

3
4
5
1

3

4

2
4
5
1
2
3
5

Mean
difference (IJ)
26.3175*
32.8852*
18.1286
42.4286*
26.3175*
6.5678
-8.1889
16.1111
32.8852*
-6.5678
-14.7566
9.5434
-18.1286
8.1889
14.7566
24.3

95% Confidence interval

Std. error

Sig.

7.77252
7.84255
13.03949
11.47322
7.77252

0.007
0
0.634
0.002

Lower
bound
5.0194
11.3953
-17.6018
10.99

Upper
bound
47.6155
54.3751
53.859
73.8671

0.007

-47.6155

-5.0194

3.49601 0.331
10.98839 0.946
9.07476 0.389

-3.0119
-38.2989
-8.7553

16.1474
21.9211
40.9775

7.84255

0

-54.3751

-11.3953

3.49601
11.03803
9.13481
13.03949
10.98839
11.03803
13.85523

0.331
0.668
0.834
0.634
0.946
0.668
0.402

-16.1474
-45.0027
-15.4876
-53.859
-21.9211
-15.4894
-13.6657

3.0119
15.4894
34.5743
17.6018
38.2989
45.0027
62.2657
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42.4286*
-16.1111
-9.5434
-24.3
13.3513
13.2995
16.2619
19.6952
-13.3513
-0.0518
2.9106
6.344
-13.2995
0.0518
2.9624
6.3958
-16.2619
-2.9106
-2.9624
3.4333
-19.6952
-6.344
-6.3958
-3.4333

1
5

1

2

SHARES 3

4

5

2
3
4
2
3
4
5
1
3
4
5
1
2
4
5
1
2
3
5
1
2
3
4

11.47322 0.002

-73.8671

-10.99

9.07476
9.13481
13.85523
8.77773
8.85682
14.72586
12.95703
8.77773
3.94814
12.4095
10.24838
8.85682
3.94814
12.46557
10.3162
14.72586
12.4095
12.46557
15.6471
12.95703
10.24838
10.3162
15.6471

-40.9775
-34.5743
-62.2657
-10.7012
-10.9697
-24.0894
-15.8092
-37.4037
-10.8704
-31.0935
-21.7383
-37.5686
-10.7668
-31.1953
-21.8724
-56.6132
-36.9147
-37.1202
-39.4424
-55.1997
-34.4262
-34.6639
-46.309

8.7553
15.4876
13.6657
37.4037
37.5686
56.6132
55.1997
10.7012
10.7668
36.9147
34.4262
10.9697
10.8704
37.1202
34.6639
24.0894
31.0935
31.1953
46.309
15.8092
21.7383
21.8724
39.4424

Table 32
CATEGORY LIKES
Subset
CATEGORY
5.00
3.00
2.00
4.00
1.00
Sig.

N
15
173
207
10
21

1
2
6.0000
15.5434
22.1111 22.1111
30.3000 30.3000
48.4286
.121
.075

0.389
0.834
0.402
0.549
0.562
0.804
0.55
0.549
1
0.999
0.972
0.562
1
0.999
0.972
0.804
0.999
0.999
0.999
0.55
0.972
0.972
0.999
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Table 33
CATEGORY SHARES
CATEGORY
5.00
4.00
2.00
3.00
1.00
Sig.

N
15
10
207
173
21

Subset
1
1.0667
4.5000
7.4106
7.4624
20.7619
.427

Table 34
GEOPOLITICAL REGION multiple comparisons

Dependent variable

(I)GEOPOLITICAL
REGION

(J)GEOPOLITICAL
REGION
2
1
3
4
1
2
3
4

Mean
difference
(I-J)

3

1.701
8.9474
7.8022
-1.701
7.2464
6.1012
8.9474
7.2464
1.1452
7.8022
6.1012
1.1452
6.8302
6.8232

1
LIKES

2
4
1

4

SHARES

1

2
3
2
3

95% Confidence interval
Std. error

Sig.

5.02655
3.83357
6.52399
5.02655
5.39884
7.55074

Lower bound

Upper bound

0.987
0.092
0.63
0.987
0.537
0.851

-11.2664
-0.9424
-9.0283
-14.6684
-6.6814
-13.378

14.6684
18.8372
24.6327
11.2664
21.1742
25.5805

3.83357 0.092

-18.8372

0.9424

5.39884 0.537

-21.1742

6.6814

6.81496 0.998

-18.7263

16.436

6.52399

0.63

-24.6327

9.0283

7.55074 0.851

-25.5805

13.378

6.81496 0.998
5.67663 0.625
4.32936 0.393

-16.436
-7.8143
-4.3456

18.7263
21.4746
17.992
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4
1
2

3
4
1

3

2
4
1

4

2
3

8.7023
6.8302
-0.007
1.8721
6.8232
0.007
1.879
8.7023
1.8721
-1.879

7.36773 0.639

-10.3049

27.7094

5.67663 0.625

-21.4746

7.8143

6.09706
1
8.52726 0.996

-15.736
-20.1264

15.7221
23.8706

4.32936 0.393

-17.992

4.3456

6.09706
1
7.69633 0.995

-15.7221
-17.9758

15.736
21.7339

7.36773 0.639

-27.7094

10.3049

8.52726 0.996

-23.8706

20.1264

7.69633 0.995

-21.7339

17.9758

Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the challenges encountered during data collection
and statistical analysis. It also presented the results from the three MANOVAs which included
multivariate tests, univariate tests, and post hoc tests. The MANOVAs showed that posts coded
with the CATEGORY of personal story resulted in a higher number of LIKES than research/policy analysis and posts coded with the CONTENT of written status with a video resulted in a
higher number of SHARES than written status with a link There was no relationship between the
independent variable; GEOPOLITICAL REGION; and the dependent variables to LIKES and
SHARES.
Chapter 5 will interpret the results and provide conclusions and recommendations.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Individuals are often radicalized over social media (Gill et al., 2017). Therefore, it seems
intuitive to attempt to counter-radicalize using social media. The purpose of this quantitative
study was to assess the utility of data analytics when administering a counter-radicalization campaign on social media to ensure that the posts are reaching and engaging the general user population. The independent variables in this study are attributes of social media posts that may contribute to a post’s virality, which is measured by the resulting LIKES and SHARES. By searching
for patterns in posts that have a high number of LIKES and SHARES, resulting data analytics
could improve the outreach of a counter-radicalization social media efforts. The purpose of this
chapter is to discuss and the results, limitations of the study, and implications.
The literature in the field of counter-radicalization and social media have not addressed
what strategies and tactics have been successful in reaching the general population. The United
States, United Kingdom, and Canada administered counter-radicalization campaigns on multiple
social media platforms but have been unable to develop an adequate following. This research
used data from a popular counter-radicalization campaign’s Facebook Page, Quilliam, to determine whether the CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION of a post had an
effect on outreach. I then ran a MANOVA to determine which of the categories of information,
CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION had the strongest effect and should therefore become the focus of counter-radicalization social media efforts and provide a basis for further studies.
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Discussion of Findings
By measuring the effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION on
LIKES and SHARES, this study aimed to determine which independent variables have the greatest effect on the two dependent variables. The study shows that there is a relationship between
the CATEGORY and the resulting LIKES and CONTENT of a post and resulting SHARES. Specifically, it shows that when evaluating posts made between 1 January 2018 and 31 December
2018, posts that were categorized as a personal story resulted in a higher number of LIKES than
research/policy analysis. Posts that were a written status with a video resulted in a higher number
of SHARES than written status with a link. Also, the study shows that there is no relationship between the independent variable, GEOPOLITICAL REGION, and the dependent variables LIKES
and SHARES. This finding indicates that expending resources attempting to post only about the
West, Middle East, global, or cyber topics to improve outreach will not meet with success.
The results of the MANOVA also proved that CATEGORY and CONTENT individually
and combined (CATEGORY*CONTENT) had a significant effect on resulting LIKES and
SHARES. This finding should indicate to administrators the need to focus on posting personal
story as a written status with a video to maximize both LIKES and SHARES. It is possible that
people are more likely to like a post with a CATEGORY that resonates with them, such as a personal story, and more likely to share a post with an engaging CONTENT, such as a video. This
finding is important because for a post to trend it needs to be both liked and shared in high volume. Therefore, the combination of personal story for CATEGORY and written status with a
video for CONTENT could have the strongest effect on resulting LIKES and SHARES and may
be a useful combination to study when attempting to create viral posts.
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The Most Liked and Shared Posts
In addition to running a MANOVA to determine if the independent variables had a significant effect on the dependent variables, I also compiled a list of the 10 most liked and shared
posts in order to gain more insight into what attributes contribute to the virality of a post. During
this exercise, I found that an overwhelming majority of the posts, listed in Table 34 and Table 35,
involve genuine public figures and local messaging. These are two areas that further research
should investigate.
Table 35
Top 10 liked posts
Date
(2018)

Public
figure

CATEGORY

11/14

yes

personal story

3/18

yes

8/17

no

CONTENT

link
video
research/policy (24K
analysis
views)

news article

video
(26K
views)

Region

global

West

12/6

yes

personal story

link

West
Middle
East

9/18

yes

news article

Link

11/21

no

news article

10/11

yes

personal story

LIKES SHARES Subject
Asia Bibi requests asylum
326
197
from U.K.
Maajid Nawaz
talks about
299
534
grooming gangs
Manchester
Didsbury
Mosque's extremist Imam
has links to
bombing terror197
715
ist

186

49

West

183

14

Link

global

173

14

link

West

156

30

Yazdi victims
share their story
Maajid Nawaz
finds the man
who saved him
from being
stabbed
Mosul University recovering
Skateboarder
who attacked

143

Middle
East

145

64

5/15

no

research/policy
analysis
link

6/19

yes

news article

link

West

126

16

4/19

yes

research/policy
analysis
link

West

134

12

Table 36
Top 10 shared posts
PubDate
lic
(2018) figure CATEGORY

8/17

CONTENT

video
(26K
views)

no

news article

3/18

yes

video
research/policy analy- (24K
sis
views)

11/14

yes

personal story

9/17

no

7/20

no

link

research/policy analysis
link
video
research/policy analy- (12K
sis
views)

London Bridge
terrorists
Israeli/Palestinian conflict policy
Maajid Nawaz
talking about
being labeled
anti-muslim extremist
Maajid Nawaz
talking about
being labeled
anti-muslim extremist

Region LIKES SHARES Subject
Extremist
Imam has
links to
Manchester
West
197
715
Bomber
Maajid Nawaz discusses
grooming
West
299
534
gangs
Asia Bibi
requests
asylum
global 326
197
from U.K.
Labour
party supports antiWest
110
130
semitism

West

95

91

Interview
with
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4/25

5/15

no

no

research/policy analysis
link

Maajid Nawaz
New member of Labour Party
praised terrorist
West

112

70

research/policy analysis
link

Middle
East
145

49

64

12/6

yes

personal story

link

Middle
East
186

10/11

yes

personal story

link

West

156

30

12/12

no

news article

link

West

88

30

Israeli/Palestinian
Conflict
Policy
Yazdi Victims
Hero who
attacked
London
Bridge terrorists
Interview
with
Maajid Nawaz

Genuine Public Figures
During the period of data collection (1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018) there were
several significant events that received attention. There were attacks in Carcasonne and Trebes,
Toronto, Surabaya, Paris, Liege, Mastung, Sweida, Danghara, and Pittsburgh (Terrorism Timeline, 2018). Yet none of these news articles even made it into the Top Ten Liked Post or Top Ten
Shared Posts. In addition, posts that discussed thwarted attacks and arrests of those charged with
planning the thwarted attacks also did not make it into the Top Ten Liked Post or Top Ten
Shared Posts. It is possible that over time, social media users have become desensitized to news
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articles about prior terrorist attacks or thwarted terrorist attacks. It is also possible that social media users were being bombarded by these stories through other channels such as radio, television,
newspapers, etc. and did not feel the need to engage with social media posts about the terrorist
attacks. Either way, this is an occurrence that counter-radicalization administrators may want to
investigate.
In addition to terrorist attacks, there was another event that received significant press coverage during the period of data collection. Aasiya Noreen, a Christian woman from Pakistan who
had been convicted of blasphemy in 2010 following a dispute with neighbors was acquitted
based on insufficient evidence by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The trial sparked international
outrage over the initial conviction. As a result, a post discussing her request for asylum in the
U.K., presented in Figure 19, was the most liked post in the study and one of the most shared
posts in the study (Quilliam, 2018c). This finding led me to develop a theory that stories about
women who have been victims of terrorism would have a high amount of LIKES and SHARES.
However, I noticed that posts about the girls kidnapped from their school and held hostage by
Boko Haram were some of the least popular posts with a surprising average of only 4.5 LIKES.
This may be due to the fact that it is more difficult to empathize with a group than an individual
(Turner, 1956).
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Note. From “Quilliam,” in Facebook [Group page]. Retrieved December 28, 2018, from
https://www.facebook.com/QuilliamInternational/
Figure 9. Asia Bibi post
The top posts discuss a variety of subjects including brutality, injustice, and resilience.
The top posts have one attribute in common – a relatable public figure. After coming to this realization, I went back through the year of posts and coded each post as a 1 if it had a public figure
behind the message, and 2 if it did not have a public figure behind the message. The results were
demonstrative – posts that had a public figure behind the message were more popular than posts
that did not have a public figure behind the message. The results of this study prove that it is not
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only the story that trends, but the person behind it. This theory could also explain why videos
were so popular. Videos reveal the person behind the post which makes the story more palpable
to a viewer. When reviewing all of the videos included in the year of posts, the videos where the
person is unscripted were more popular than the highly edited documentaries. Videos where a
person is speaking freely about their experiences and ideas may also seem more genuine whereas
a published piece may seem like an attempt to manipulate viewers.
Local Messaging
Seventy percent of the most liked posts and 80% of the most shared posts were about
events and policies that specifically effected the United Kingdom. The majority of users following Quilliam are assumed to be individuals living in the United Kingdom. This assumption is
based on the knowledge that Quilliam is headquartered in the United Kingdom. In addition, the
founder of Quilliam is a local celebrity in the United Kingdom, Maajid Nawaz. This specific audience may explain why posts about the United Kingdom tended to receive a higher number of
LIKES and SHARES. People are often more concerned about information that directly effects
them – especially when it comes to terrorist attacks and resulting governmental policies. This
finding provides a strong argument for tailoring counter-radicalization campaigns to local populations which will be discussed as a recommendation for further study.
Limitations of the Study
The participants in this study are Facebook Users who share and like content which is
posted on the Quilliam Facebook Page. In order to see posts made by Quilliam a Facebook User
has to either be following the Facebook Page, friends with other Facebook Users who engage

148

with the Facebook Page, or following similar Facebook Pages. Therefore, it is likely that the Facebook Users who liked or shared the posts being studied already have an interest in terrorism
and may already condemn terrorism. Therefore, the posts studied probably did not reach individuals who are at risk of joining a terrorist organization. While it may not seem productive to
measure the impact of counter-radicalization posts on individuals who are not considering radicalization it is a crucial step in developing information that trends. In order for information to
trend it has to be liked and shared by a massive amount of users. For example, the previously
mentioned dress that trended in 2015 due to the differences in human color perception had 4.4
million tweets in 24 hours (Warzel, 2015). Once information is trending it will be seen by individuals who are at risk of joining a terrorist organization. Therefore, users who may already condemn terrorism are an integral part of the process to get posts to trend even if they are not the intended audience for the posts.
Other Factors Effecting Outreach
While the study found a statistically significant correlational relationship between the
CATEGORY and the resulting amount of LIKES and CONTENT and the resulting amount of
SHARES, there are many other variables that impact the popularity of a post. There are several
research studies that argue that the day of the week and time that a post is uploaded has an effect
on LIKES and SHARES. While the specific recommendations vary, there is consensus among
researchers that posts uploaded during business hours on weekdays have the most potential to
trend (Berger, 2013). When looking at the data collected, the majority of posts were uploaded on
weekdays during business hours in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) because that is when and
where Quilliam is staffed and headquartered. However, many Facebook Users live in other time
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zones. For example, if a post was uploaded at 1600 in GMT it may not have been viewed by Facebook Users in Australia and New Zealand because that would be the middle of the night and
by the time they awaken their newsfeed could be populated by more recent postings. In addition,
the language of a post could also have an effect on LIKES and SHARES. Quilliam posts are all
in English. As a result, they may not be read and understood by Facebook Users who speak other
languages. Therefore, the amount of LIKES and SHARES on posts is this study may have been a
result of variables other than the CATEGORY and CONTENT. Timing and language are two variables that should be considered when administering a counter-radicalization campaign. These
obstacles can be overcome by posting during weekdays and business hours in multiple time
zones and in multiple languages.
Lurkers
Lurkers are unavoidable when conducting observational social media research (Leiner,
Kobilke, Rueß, & Brosius, 2018). Not every Facebook User wants to interact with posts. After
all, liking and sharing a post is public information. It is possible that a Facebook User may not
want their Facebook Friends to see that they liked or shared a controversial post or maybe they
simply do not agree with the post and therefore do not want to like or share it (Leiner, Kobilke,
Rueß, & Brosius, 2018). It is difficult to measure how many social media users are exposed to a
post because of the existence of lurkers. However, the number of social media users who clicked
to view a video is counted and displayed. This provided some insight into the impact of lurkers
on this study. For example, the video posted on 8/17/2018 about the Manchester Didsbury
Mosque's extremist Imam who called for armed Jihad in his sermon in Manchester had links to
the Salman Abedi only receive 197 LIKES and 715 SHARES but had over 26,000 views. Due to
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the apparent presence of lurkers, further research should attempt to measure how many views a
post receives in addition to the level of engagement.
Re-posts
Quilliam administrators routinely re-posted policy pieces, occasionally multiple times in
one day. This may have increased the exposure of these posts but may have also decreased the
amount of collective LIKES and SHARES. For example, the Quilliam administrators re-posted a
personal story about an individual who was a terrorist in Al Qaeda but who defected and began
spying with MI-6 on 10/31/2018, 10/30/2018, 10/25/2018, 10/24/2018, and twice on 10/23/2019
(Quilliam, 2018a). Each post had 2.7 LIKES and 1 SHARE on average. However, collectively
the posts had a total of 16 LIKES and 6 SHARES. It is impossible to know how the post would
have performed if it was only uploaded once. I could have overcome this challenge by consistently consolidating posts which had the same topic and were uploaded on the same day, or two
days, or three days. However, I felt that this would add more subjectivity to the study.
Policy and Social Change Implications
The Quilliam Facebook Page has 26,697 followers who receive notification of new posts
and can choose to like and share any posts (Quilliam, 2018a). In addition, any registered Facebook User can view the page and like or share any of the posts. When followers or registered Facebook Users like and share posts, it increases the likelihood that those posts will appear in the
newsfeed of their Facebook Friends. By using data analytics to discover what past posts result in
the highest number of LIKES and SHARES an administrator can potentially increase the number
of LIKES and SHARES that they receive for future posts.
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Intervention
Social media has the potential to make a movement feel larger than it is. Terrorist organizations use bots who share content to make it seem that there are more supporters (Berger &
Morgan, 2015). When an individual feels that they are one of many with the same beliefs it may
make them feel re-affirmed in their beliefs and provide them with the courage to act (Malthaner
& Lindekilde, 2017). Just as an echo chamber can radicalize individuals, it can also deradicalize
individuals (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). A robust counter-radicalization campaign can make
an individual who is considering joining a terrorist organization and committing terrorist attacks
realize that they are actually in the minority (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017.
As previously mentioned, the sensitivity and discovery phases provide the most promising opportunities to prevent radicalization (Cragin, 2017). An individual completes the sensitivity phase when they find that they are not alone in their beliefs (Cragin, 2017). An individual
completes the discovery phase when they search for more information online and are enticed by
the promises of resources and identity offered by terrorist organizations (Cragin, 2017). Malthaner & Linekilde (2017) found that two of the most effectual motivators are the influence of
friends and family and the individuals experience indoctrinated to a terrorist organization. If either of these motivators are interrupted, there is a possibility that radicalization could be prevented (Malthaner & Linekilde, 2017). By ensuring that counter-radicalization trends, individuals who are interested in becoming a terrorist will realize that their friends and family may not
support terrorism and that joining a terrorist organization may not be as lucrative as it seems.
Counter-radicalization efforts also have the potential to mobilize communities. It is an individuals parents, relative, friends, and teachers who are the first to recognize that an individual
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is becoming radicalized and the last than an individual will remain in contact with once they become isolated (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). Communities need resources to them to help with
prevention and intervention. Social media can be used to disseminate counter-radicalization resources that are specifically tailored to help parents, relatives, friends, and teachers to start a dialogue about radicalization and discuss the ramifications of terrorism.
Prevention
Counter-radicalization efforts have the potential to not only convince individuals to refrain from joining terrorist organizations and committing attacks but to also change the attitude
toward Muslims. When researching social media users who voiced radical opinions, LaraCabrera et al (2017) found a strong correlation between perception of discrimination for being
Muslim and expressing negative views of the West and positive views of jihadism individuals
who became radicalized online. In addition, Cragin et al (2015) found that individuals who were
considering becoming involved with terrorism were often motivated to feel accepted by others.
Counter-radicalization efforts could potentially change the culture of religious discrimination
which could prevent radicalization.
Muslims need to feel supported. Counter-radicalization social media efforts could combat
the misperception that all Muslims are radical. In addition to posting information that dismantles
radical ideologies, counter radicalization social media efforts could post stories that emphasize
Islamic values of religious tolerance and social cohesion. Counter-radicalization social media efforts can provide a platform for local community leaders and religious scholars to serve as an example for others to emulate. These efforts could foster a sense of acceptance for Muslims so that
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they will not feel tempted to seek social movement and social identity from a terrorist organization.
Recommendations for Further Study
This study found that some categories of counter-radicalization information are more
compelling than other categories of counter-radicalization information on social media. The focus for this study was on trending information to reach the general population. This study did not
involve measuring what information is most effective in dissuading individuals from joining terrorist organizations. Three concepts that warrant further study are focused content, source power,
and message framing of counter-radicalization information. Most importantly, further research
should focus not only on what content trends but also on what content can deradicalize individuals.
Focused Content
The CATEGORY, personal story, received more LIKES and SHARES than other categories of information. Further research should focus on what kind of personal stories have the most
potential to trend due to the public figure behind them and the topic they discuss. In addition, it is
also possible that further research into the localization of messages could reveal additional insight into trend patterns.
There are many different types of public figures in counter-radicalization. This dataset
specifically featured victims of terrorism, heroes of terrorism, and defectors of terrorist
organizations. It is possible that some types of public figures may be more popular than other
types of public figures. Further study should determine if specific attributes about a public figure
increases their ability to trend. For example, comparing the education level, ethnicity, gender,

154

and age of various public figures who are the subject of counter-radicalization information to
determine if there are significant differences between these variables and the level of
engagement. These findings could help counter-radicalization campaigns determine who should
be the face of their brand.
Different topics appeal to different audiences. For example, counter-radicalization campaigns such as “Families against Terrorism and Extremism” focuses on children in the Muslim
community and “She Is Here” focuses on women in the Muslim community. It may be useful to
compare the performance of posts about children to posts about women to posts about women
and children. If a statistically significant differences is found, it could potentially uncover additional attributes that contribute to trending posts. For example, Personal Stories may be more appealing when they are about women and children.
The coding for West and Middle East in this study may have been too broad. If this study
had coded for specific countries it could have potentially uncovered a pattern that Facebook Users seem to care more about subjects that impact their specific country. People are often more
concerned about information that directly affects them – especially when it comes to terrorist attacks and resulting governmental policies (Wilner & Rigato, 2017). While it is effective to target
an entire country – it may be even more beneficial to target specific towns and cities (Wilner &
Rigato, 2017). Further research should investigate if counter-radicalization campaigns focused
on a specific region such as New York City, London, or Toronto can reach a large percentage of
each cities population. Administrators can also upload posts which are about topics that directly
effects their audience and upload posts about broader topics that do not directly effect their audience and compare the level of engagement.
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Source Power
As previously discussed, the counter-radicalization social media efforts made by the U.S.,
United Kingdom, and Canada have consistently low levels of engagement. It is possible that this
is not a result of their posts but a result of the source. Source credibility contributes to persuasion. Receiving information from a source with high credibility will lead to a positive acceptance
and receiving information from a source with low credibility will lead to rejection (Berger,
2013). It’s possible that social media users are less likely to trust or be interested in information
coming from their government. There are several counter-radicalization social media efforts being made by nongovernmental organizations such as Quilliam. It may be useful to compare the
level of engagement of posts made by Governmental Organizations and nongovernmental organizations to determine if there is a statistically significant difference. If it is found that posts made
by nongovernmental organizations consistently receive more LIKES and SHARES, then governmental organizations may have to consider partnering with Nongovernmental Organizations rather than administering their own counter-radicalization campaigns.
Message Framing
This study did not delve into the content of specific counter-radicalization information
but it is possible that certain topics, such as risk, could influence how a user perceives terrorism.
Messages can either be framed in a positive or negative way to influence behavior (Rothman &
Salovey, 1997). Information about risk, when presented in different ways, will likely modify an
individual’s perspective and actions (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). For example, communicating
the life expectancy of a member of the Islamic State could dissuade individuals from joining
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even when paired with information about the houses, cars, and brides that they could receive if
they join.
A follow-on study could measure the effect of risk information on the perception of terrorist organizations. The risks of joining a terrorist organization can include: death, being required to take innocent lives, isolation from friends and family, being shunned by friends and
family, and poor living conditions. Researchers should investigate if certain risks are particularly
discouraging to individuals and if the amount of risk information available has an effect on a person’s desire to join a terrorist organization. These questions could help counter-radicalization researchers to develop more effective messages.
In addition to framing risk, the simple wording of a post has an effect on how many
LIKES and SHARES it receives. For example, during the period of data collection the Quilliam
administrators posted links to the same article with two different statuses. The first status uploaded on 6/3/2018 read, “He was a teenage terrorist. Now he’s fighting extremism” and received 34 LIKES and 24 SHARES. The second status uploaded on 7/6/2018 read, “Quilliam
launches new report on the deradicalization of the youngest person to be indicted on terror
charges in the US.” and received 4 LIKES and 0 SHARES. It is possible that by providing sensationalized headlines, the administrators were able to draw the interest of more Facebook Users
and increase the level of engagement. The concept of sensationalized headlines should be studied
in order to determine what makes a story clickable.
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Information that Can Trend and Deradicalize
Posting information that can trend and information that can deradicalize are equally important. This study argues that posts which involve a personal story and are displayed as a written status with a video may be more likely to trend. However, studies published by Cragin et al
(2015) argue that posts that promote feelings of apathy are what actually deradicalizes individual. This can be accomplished by posting about defectors from the Islamic State who were disappointed by the lack of resources and camaraderie that terrorist organization provided (McDowellSmith et al., 2017). Administrators need to find a balance between what can trend and what can
actually deradicalize. This will require expanding data collection to not only measure LIKES and
SHARES but to also ask individuals what their thoughts are on the content. Thoughts on content
can be measured in the comments section of posts but it may be more beneficial to have participants view content and then provide their reactions (McDowell-Smith et al., 2017).
Conclusions
Governments in the U.S., Europe, and Canada have centered their current domestic counterterrorism strategies around law enforcement. Law enforcement relies on the public to report
individuals who exhibit suspicious behavior and monitor those individuals. However, law enforcement is only able to intervene once the intent and the means to commit an attack have been
established. Intent and means to commit an attack are not only difficult to determine but often
too late. This strategy has been unsuccessful in preventing attacks such as the San Bernardino
shooting where the terrorists were completely radicalized by viewing information on the internet
and did not communicate with any known terrorist affiliates (Foster & Hader, 2016).
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Planning and executing an attack is as simple as buying a gun and firing it in a public
place. In this operational environment, counter-radicalization may be one of the only solutions to
inspired terrorism. Social media is the primary source of radicalization which makes it a powerful tool that if properly used could disseminate counter-radicalization information to the general
population (Gill et al., 2017). If a counter-radicalization campaign can create viral posts, then
they could reach individuals who are considering planning and executing an attack or individuals
who know of others who are considering planning and executing an attack and potentially thwart
an impending attack. To be successful, counter-radicalization efforts should encourage individuals to practice a moderate interpretation of Islam, promote religious tolerance, and condemn Islamic terrorism.
By measuring the effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION on
LIKES and SHARES this study determined that there is a relationship between the CATEGORY
and the resulting LIKES and CONTENT of a post and resulting SHARES. Specifically, it shows
that when evaluating posts made between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2018, posts which
were categorized as a personal story resulted in a higher number of LIKES than “research/policy
analysis and posts which were a written status with a video resulted in a higher number of
SHARES than written status with a link. In addition, the results of the MANOVA proved that
CATEGORY and CONTENT individually and combined (CATEGORY*CONTENT) had a significant effect on resulting LIKES and SHARES. Therefore, the combination of personal story
for CATEGORY and video for CONTENT could have the strongest effect on resulting LIKES
and SHARES and may be a useful combination to study when attempting to create viral posts.
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While this study was intended to reveal what engages users, it also provides insight into
what does not engage them. For example, research/policy analysis pieces are needed to contribute to the existing literature on counter-radicalization, but sharing them on social media does not
seem to improve a campaigns outreach. In addition, the study also showed that there is no relationship between the independent variable; GEOPOLITICAL REGION; and the dependent variables; LIKES and SHARES. This finding should indicate to the administrators that they should
not expend resources on creating research/policy analysis pieces or only posting about a specific
GEOPOLITICAL REGION to improve outreach. This study also emphasized specific areas that
further research should investigate. For example; focused CONTENT, source power, and message framing should all be investigated to gain a better understanding of what makes a counterradicalization post trend.
Data analytics should be utilized when uploading information to social media to ensure
that a post is liked and shared to ensure that it reaches the general population which includes the
at risk population. Data analytics could improve intervention efforts by providing counter-radicalization information to individuals in the sensitivity and discovery phases of radicalization.
Data analytics could also potentially improve prevention efforts by promoting religious tolerance
which will make Muslims less likely to seek social movement and social identity from a terrorist
organization.
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Appendix A: Facebook Data Policy

Data Policy
This policy describes the information we process to support Facebook, Instagram, Messenger and other
products and features offered by Facebook (Facebook Products or Products). You can find additional tools
and information in the Facebook Settings and Instagram Settings.

I. What kinds of information do we collect?
To provide the Facebook Products, we must process information about you. The types of information we
collect depend on how you use our Products. You can learn how to access and delete information we collect by visiting the Facebook Settings and Instagram Settings.

Things you and others do and provide.
•

•

•

•

•

•

Information and content you provide. We collect the content, communications and other information
you provide when you use our Products, including when you sign up for an account, create or share
content, and message or communicate with others. This can include information in or about the content
you provide (like metadata), such as the location of a photo or the date a file was created. It can also
include what you see through features we provide, such as our camera, so we can do things like suggest
masks and filters that you might like, or give you tips on using camera formats. Our systems automatically
process content and communications you and others provide to analyze context and what's in them for
the purposes described below. Learn more about how you can control who can see the things you share.
Data with special protections: You can choose to provide information in your Facebook profile fields or
Life Events about your religious views, political views, who you are "interested in," or your health. This
and other information (such as racial or ethnic origin, philosophical beliefs or trade union membership)
could be subject to special protections under the laws of your country.
Networks and connections. We collect information about the people, Pages, accounts, hashtags and
groups you are connected to and how you interact with them across our Products, such as people you
communicate with the most or groups you are part of. We also collect contact information if you choose
to upload, sync or import it from a device(such as an address book or call log or SMS log history), which
we use for things like helping you and others find people you may know and for the other purposes
listed below.
Your usage. We collect information about how you use our Products, such as the types of content you
view or engage with; the features you use; the actions you take; the people or accounts you interact with;
and the time, frequency and duration of your activities. For example, we log when you're using and have
last used our Products, and what posts, videos and other content you view on our Products. We also
collect information about how you use features like our camera.
Information about transactions made on our Products. If you use our Products for purchases or other
financial transactions (such as when you make a purchase in a game or make a donation), we collect
information about the purchase or transaction. This includes payment information, such as your credit or
debit card number and other card information; other account and authentication information; and billing,
shipping and contact details.
Things others do and information they provide about you. We also receive and analyze content, communications and information that other people provide when they use our Products. This can include
information about you, such as when others share or comment on a photo of you, send a message to you,
or upload, sync or import your contact information.

Device Information
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As described below, we collect information from and about the computers, phones, connected TVs and
other web-connected devices you use that integrate with our Products, and we combine this information
across different devices you use. For example, we use information collected about your use of our Products
on your phone to better personalize the CONTENT (including ads) or features you see when you use our
Products on another device, such as your laptop or tablet, or to measure whether you took an action in
response to an ad we showed you on your phone on a different device.
Information we obtain from these devices includes:
Device attributes: information such as the operating system, hardware and software versions, battery
level, signal strength, available storage space, browser type, app and file names and types, and plugins.
Device operations: information about operations and behaviors performed on the device, such as
whether a window is foregrounded or backgrounded, or mouse movements (which can help distinguish
humans from bots).
Identifiers: unique identifiers, device IDs, and other identifiers, such as from games, apps or accounts
you use, and Family Device IDs (or other identifiers unique to Facebook Company Products associated
with the same device or account).
Device signals: Bluetooth signals, and information about nearby Wi-Fi access points, beacons, and cell
towers.
Data from device settings: information you allow us to receive through device settings you turn on, such
as access to your GPS location, camera or photos.
Network and connections: information such as the name of your mobile operator or ISP, language, time
zone, mobile phone number, IP address, connection speed and, in some cases, information about other
devices that are nearby or on your network, so we can do things like help you stream a video from your
phone to your TV.
Cookie data: data from cookies stored on your device, including cookie IDs and settings. Learn more
about how we use cookies in the Facebook Cookies Policy and Instagram Cookies Policy.

Information from partners.
Advertisers, app developers, and publishers can send us information through Facebook Business Tools they
use, including our social plug-ins (such as the Like button), Facebook Login, our APIs and SDKs, or the
Facebook pixel. These partners provide information about your activities off Facebook—including information about your device, websites you visit, purchases you make, the ads you see, and how you use their
services—whether or not you have a Facebook account or are logged into Facebook. For example, a game
developer could use our API to tell us what games you play, or a business could tell us about a purchase
you made in its store. We also receive information about your online and offline actions and purchases from
third-party data providers who have the rights to provide us with your information.
Partners receive your data when you visit or use their services or through third parties they work with. We
require each of these partners to have lawful rights to collect, use and share your data before providing any
data to us. Learn more about the types of partners we receive data from.
To learn more about how we use cookies in connection with Facebook Business Tools, review the Facebook
Cookies Policyand Instagram Cookies Policy.

II. How do we use this information?
We use the information we have (subject to choices you make) as described below and to provide and
support the Facebook Products and related services described in the Facebook Terms and Instagram Terms.
Here's how:

Provide, personalize and improve our Products.
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We use the information we have to deliver our Products, including to personalize features and content
(including your News Feed, Instagram Feed, Instagram Stories and ads) and make suggestions for you (such
as groups or events you may be interested in or topics you may want to follow) on and off our Products. To
create personalized Products that are unique and relevant to you, we use your connections, preferences,
interests and activities based on the data we collect and learn from you and others (including any data with
special protections you choose to provide); how you use and interact with our Products; and the people,
places, or things you're connected to and interested in on and off our Products. Learn more about how we
use information about you to personalize your Facebook and Instagram experience, including features,
CONTENT and recommendations in Facebook Products; you can also learn more about how we choose
the ads that you see.
Information across Facebook Products and devices: We connect information about your activities on
different Facebook Products and devices to provide a more tailored and consistent experience on all Facebook Products you use, wherever you use them. For example, we can suggest that you join a group on
Facebook that includes people you follow on Instagram or communicate with using Messenger. We can
also make your experience more seamless, for example, by automatically filling in your registration information (such as your phone number) from one Facebook Product when you sign up for an account on
a different Product.
Location-related information: We use location-related information-such as your current location,
where you live, the places you like to go, and the businesses and people you're near-to provide, personalize and improve our Products, including ads, for you and others. Location-related information can be
based on things like precise device location (if you've allowed us to collect it), IP addresses, and information from your and others' use of Facebook Products (such as check-ins or events you attend).
Product research and development: We use the information we have to develop, test and improve our
Products, including by conducting surveys and research, and testing and troubleshooting new products
and features.
Face recognition: If you have it turned on, we use face recognition technology to recognize you in photos, videos and camera experiences. The face-recognition templates we create may constitute data with
special protections under the laws of your country. Learn more about how we use face recognition technology, or control our use of this technology in Facebook Settings. If we introduce face-recognition technology to your Instagram experience, we will let you know first, and you will have control over whether
we use this technology for you.
Ads and other sponsored content: We use the information we have about you-including information
about your interests, actions and connections-to select and personalize ads, offers and other sponsored
content that we show you. Learn more about how we select and personalize ads, and your choices over
the data we use to select ads and other sponsored content for you in the Facebook Settings and Instagram
Settings.

Provide measurement, analytics, and other business services.
We use the information we have (including your activity off our Products, such as the websites you visit
and ads you see) to help advertisers and other partners measure the effectiveness and distribution of their
ads and services, and understand the types of people who use their services and how people interact with
their websites, apps, and services. Learn how we share information with these partners.

Promote safety, integrity and security.
We use the information we have to verify accounts and activity, combat harmful conduct, detect and prevent
spam and other bad experiences, maintain the integrity of our Products, and promote safety and security on
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and off of Facebook Products. For example, we use data we have to investigate suspicious activity or violations of our terms or policies, or to detect when someone needs help. To learn more, visit the Facebook
Security Help Center and Instagram Security Tips.

Communicate with you.
We use the information we have to send you marketing communications, communicate with you about our
Products, and let you know about our policies and terms. We also use your information to respond to you
when you contact us.

Research and innovate for social good.
We use the information we have (including from research partners we collaborate with) to conduct and
support research and innovation on topics of general social welfare, technological advancement, public interest, health and well-being. For example, we analyze information we have about migration patterns during
crises to aid relief efforts. Learn more about our research programs.

III. How is this information shared?
Your information is shared with others in the following ways:

Sharing on Facebook Products
People and accounts you share and communicate with
When you share and communicate using our Products, you choose the audience for what you share. For
example, when you post on Facebook, you select the audience for the post, such as a group, all of your
friends, the public, or a customized list of people. Similarly, when you use Messenger or Instagram to
communicate with people or businesses, those people and businesses can see the content you send. Your
network can also see actions you have taken on our Products, including engagement with ads and sponsored
content. We also let other accounts see who has viewed their Facebook or Instagram Stories.
Public information can be seen by anyone, on or off our Products, including if they don't have an account.
This includes your Instagram username; any information you share with a public audience; information in
your public profile on Facebook; and content you share on a Facebook Page, public Instagram account or
any other public forum, such as Facebook Marketplace. You, other people using Facebook and Instagram,
and we can provide access to or send public information to anyone on or off our Products, including in
other Facebook Company Products, in search results, or through tools and APIs. Public information can
also be seen, accessed, reshared or downloaded through third-party services such as search engines, APIs,
and offline media such as TV, and by apps, websites and other services that integrate with our Products.
Learn more about what information is public and how to control your visibility on Facebook and Instagram.
Content others share or reshare about you
You should consider who you choose to share with, because people who can see your activity on our Products can choose to share it with others on and off our Products, including people and businesses outside the
audience you shared with. For example, when you share a post or send a message to specific friends or
accounts, they can download, screenshot, or reshare that content to others across or off our Products, in
person or in virtual reality experiences such as Facebook Spaces. Also, when you comment on someone
else's post or react to their content, your comment or reaction is visible to anyone who can see the other
person's content, and that person can change the audience later.
People can also use our Products to create and share content about you with the audience they choose. For
example, people can share a photo of you in a Story, mention or tag you at a location in a post, or share
information about you in their posts or messages. If you are uncomfortable with what others have shared
about you on our Products, you can learn how to report the content.
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Information about your active status or presence on our Products.
People in your networks can see signals telling them whether you are active on our Products, including
whether you are currently active on Instagram, Messenger or Facebook, or when you last used our Products.
Apps, websites, and third-party integrations on or using our Products.
When you choose to use third-party apps, websites, or other services that use, or are integrated with, our
Products, they can receive information about what you post or share. For example, when you play a game
with your Facebook friends or use a Facebook Comment or Share button on a website, the game developer
or website can receive information about your activities in the game or receive a comment or link that you
share from the website on Facebook. Also, when you download or use such third-party services, they can
access your public profile on Facebook, and any information that you share with them. Apps and websites
you use may receive your list of Facebook friends if you choose to share it with them. But apps and websites
you use will not be able to receive any other information about your Facebook friends from you, or information about any of your Instagram followers (although your friends and followers may, of course, choose
to share this information themselves). Information collected by these third-party services is subject to their
own terms and policies, not this one.
Devices and operating systems providing native versions of Facebook and Instagram (i.e. where we have
not developed our own first-party apps) will have access to all information you choose to share with them,
including information your friends share with you, so they can provide our core functionality to you.
Note: We are in the process of restricting developers’ data access even further to help prevent abuse. For
example, we will remove developers' access to your Facebook and Instagram data if you haven't used their
app in 3 months, and we are changing Login, so that in the next version, we will reduce the data that an
app can request without app review to include only name, Instagram username and bio, profile photo and
email address. Requesting any other data will require our approval.
New owner.
If the ownership or control of all or part of our Products or their assets changes, we may transfer your
information to the new owner.

Sharing with Third-Party Partners
We work with third-party partners who help us provide and improve our Products or who use Facebook
Business Tools to grow their businesses, which makes it possible to operate our companies and provide free
services to people around the world. We don't sell any of your information to anyone, and we never will.
We also impose strict restrictions on how our partners can use and disclose the data we provide. Here are
the types of third parties we share information with:
Partners who use our analytics services.
We provide aggregated statistics and insights that help people and businesses understand how people are
engaging with their posts, listings, Pages, videos and other CONTENT on and off the Facebook Products.
For example, Page admins and Instagram business profiles receive information about the number of people
or accounts who viewed, reacted to, or commented on their posts, as well as aggregate demographic and
other information that helps them understand interactions with their Page or account.
Advertisers.
We provide advertisers with reports about the kinds of people seeing their ads and how their ads are performing, but we don't share information that personally identifies you (information such as your name or
email address that by itself can be used to contact you or identifies who you are) unless you give us permission. For example, we provide general demographic and interest information to advertisers (for example, that an ad was seen by a woman between the ages of 25 and 34 who lives in Madrid and LIKES software
engineering) to help them better understand their audience. We also confirm which Facebook ads led you
to make a purchase or take an action with an advertiser.
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Measurement partners.
We share information about you with companies that aggregate it to provide analytics and measurement
reports to our partners.
Partners offering goods and services in our Products.
When you subscribe to receive premium content, or buy something from a seller in our Products, the content creator or seller can receive your public information and other information you share with them, as
well as the information needed to complete the transaction, including shipping and contact details.
Vendors and service providers.
We provide information and content to vendors and service providers who support our business, such as
by providing technical infrastructure services, analyzing how our Products are used, providing customer
service, facilitating payments or conducting surveys.
Researchers and academics.
We also provide information and content to research partners and academics to conduct research that advances scholarship and innovation that support our business or mission, and enhances discovery and innovation on topics of general social welfare, technological advancement, public interest, health and wellbeing.
Law enforcement or legal requests.
We share information with law enforcement or in response to legal requests in the circumstances outlined
below.
Learn more about how you can control the information about you that you or others share with third-party
partners in the Facebook Settings and Instagram Settings.

IV. How do the Facebook Companies work together?
Facebook and Instagram share infrastructure, systems and technology with other Facebook Companies (which include WhatsApp and Oculus) to provide an innovative, relevant, consistent and safe experience across all Facebook Company Products you use. We also process information about you across the
Facebook Companies for these purposes, as permitted by applicable law and in accordance with their terms
and policies. For example, we process information from WhatsApp about accounts sending spam on its
service so we can take appropriate action against those accounts on Facebook, Instagram or Messenger. We
also work to understand how people use and interact with Facebook Company Products, such as understanding the number of unique users on different Facebook Company Products.

V. How can I manage or delete information about me?
We provide you with the ability to access, rectify, port and erase your data. Learn more in your Facebook
Settings and Instagram Settings.
We store data until it is no longer necessary to provide our services and Facebook Products, or until your
account is deleted - whichever comes first. This is a case-by-case determination that depends on things like
the nature of the data, why it is collected and processed, and relevant legal or operational retention needs.
For example, when you search for something on Facebook, you can access and delete that query from within
your search history at any time, but the log of that search is deleted after 6 months. If you submit a copy of
your government-issued ID for account verification purposes, we delete that copy 30 days after submission.
Learn more about deletion of content you have shared and cookie data obtained through social plugins.
When you delete your account, we delete things you have posted, such as your photos and status updates,
and you won't be able to recover that information later. Information that others have shared about you isn't
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part of your account and won't be deleted. If you don't want to delete your account but want to temporarily
stop using the Products, you can deactivate your account instead. To delete your account at any time, please
visit the Facebook Settings and Instagram Settings.

VI. How do we respond to legal requests or prevent harm?
We access, preserve and share your information with regulators, law enforcement or others:
In response to a legal request (like a search warrant, court order or subpoena) if we have a good faith
belief that the law requires us to do so. This may include responding to legal requests from jurisdictions
outside of the United States when we have a good-faith belief that the response is required by law in that
jurisdiction, affects users in that jurisdiction, and is consistent with internationally recognized standards.
• When we have a good-faith belief it is necessary to: detect, prevent and address fraud, unauthorized use
of the Products, violations of our terms or policies, or other harmful or illegal activity; to protect ourselves
(including our rights, property or Products), you or others, including as part of investigations or regulatory
inquiries; or to prevent death or imminent bodily harm. For example, if relevant, we provide information
to and receive information from third-party partners about the reliability of your account to prevent fraud,
abuse and other harmful activity on and off our Products.
Information we receive about you (including financial transaction data related to purchases made with Facebook) can be accessed and preserved for an extended period when it is the subject of a legal request or
obligation, governmental investigation, or investigations of possible violations of our terms or policies, or
otherwise to prevent harm. We also retain information from accounts disabled for terms violations for at
least a year to prevent repeat abuse or other term violations.
•

VII. How do we operate and transfer data as part of our global services?
We share information globally, both internally within the Facebook Companies, and externally with our
partners and with those you connect and share with around the world in accordance with this policy. Your
information may, for example, be transferred or transmitted to, or stored and processed in the United States
or other countries outside of where you live for the purposes as described in this policy. These data transfers
are necessary to provide the services set forth in the Facebook Terms and Instagram Terms and to globally
operate and provide our Products to you. We utilize standard contract clauses, rely on the European Commission's adequacy decisions about certain countries, as applicable, and obtain your consent for these data
transfers to the United States and other countries.

VIII. How will we notify you of changes to this policy?
We'll notify you before we make changes to this policy and give you the opportunity to review the revised
policy before you choose to continue using our Products.

IX. How to contact Facebook with questions
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You can learn more about how privacy works on Facebook and on Instagram. If you have questions about
this policy, you can contact us as described below. We may resolve disputes you have with us in connection
with our privacy policies and practices through TrustArc. You can contact TrustArc through its website.
You can contact us online or by mail at:
Facebook, Inc.
ATTN: Privacy Operations
1601 Willow Road
Menlo Park, CA 94025
Date of Last Revision: April 19, 2018

181

Appendix B: Data Dispersion

Figure B-1. CATEGORY scatter plot

Figure B-2. CONTENT scatter plot
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Figure B-3. REGION scatter plot

Figure B-4. Histogram for LIKES
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Figure B-5. Histogram for SHARES

Figure B-6. Box Plot for LIKES
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Figure B-7. Box Plot for SHARES

Figure B-8. Q-Q Plot for LIKES
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Figure B-9. Q-Q Plot for SHARES

